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Abstract 
This thesis presents an empirical investigation of the relationship between exporting, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and firm heterogeneity in Thailand using a firm-level data from the 
Annual Survey of Thailand’s manufacturing industry between 2001 and 2004.  We first examine 
the factors affecting the export participation decision of a firm by emphasising the importance 
of sunk entry costs, structure of ownership and other firm-specific characteristics.  If a firm has 
export experience, the probability of exporting is likely to increase in the current period.  Other 
firm-specific characteristics such as ownership, productivity, firm size, training and 
establishment location also significantly determine the probability of exporting.  Second, we 
consider the role of the financial factors and the export participation decision. The internal 
finance of a firm as a measure of financial health is used to explain the capability to invest in 
order to enter export markets. The liquidity ratio has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of exporting whilst the leverage ratio has the opposite effect.  Third, we make a 
distinction between single- and multi-product firms and examine the characteristics associated 
with a multi-product firm. Being a multi-product firm and the number of products produced are 
associated with various firm-specific characteristics such as productivity, firm size and research 
and development (R&D).  Finally, we emphasise on an indirect impact of FDI inflows in the 
host economy by investigating spillover effects from foreign to domestic firms. The positive and 
significant results for horizontal productivity spillovers and vertical export spillovers confirm 
that foreign firms do generate some positive externalities to domestically-owned firms.  
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I would like to express my profound gratitude to both of my supervisors Dr. Robert 
Elliott and Dr. Matthew Cole for their inspiration, helpful guidance, invaluable advice and 
untiring support throughout my PhD study.   
My appreciation also goes to staff members and research students in the Department of 
Economics, University of Birmingham, for all comments at the PhD workshops.  I would like to 
thank Professor Marius Brülhart and participations at the GEP postgraduate conference, the 
GEP research seminar, and the ETSG annual conference in Athens 2007 and Warsaw 2008 for 
their useful comments.  I also gratefully acknowledge the Department of Economics for 
providing me with maintenance scholarship.  
Ultimately, I would like to deeply express my heart-felt thanks to my family especially my 
parents for all of their great support and encouragement.  
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Firm Heterogeneity, Origin of Ownership and Export Participation ............................ 7 
2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Exports and FDI in Thailand ........................................................................................................ 9 
2.2.1 Export Performance ................................................................................................................ 9 
2.2.2 FDI Trends ............................................................................................................................. 16 
2.3 Literature Review ........................................................................................................................... 20 
2.3.1 Sunk Entry Costs and the Decision to Export .................................................................. 20 
2.3.2 Empirical Analysis of Firm Heterogeneity, Sunk Entry Costs and Exporting ............. 22 
2.4 Methodology and Data ................................................................................................................. 26 
2.4.1 Model ....................................................................................................................................... 26 
2.4.2 Variables .................................................................................................................................. 28 
2.4.3 Data .......................................................................................................................................... 31 
2.4.4 Econometric Methodology ................................................................................................... 35 
2.5 Results ............................................................................................................................................. 38 
2.5.1 Firm Characteristics and a Firm’s Decision to Export ..................................................... 38 
2.5.2 Country of Origin of Parent Company and a Firm’s Decision to Export .................... 43 
2.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 49 
Appendix 2A Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics .................................................. 51 
Appendix 2B TFP Estimation Using Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) Method ........................... 56 
Appendix 2C TFP Estimation Using Buettner’s (2003) Method .................................................. 60 
Appendix 2D Additional Results ....................................................................................................... 66 
Appendix 2E Sensitivity Analysis ...................................................................................................... 68 
3. Exporting and Financial Health .................................................................................... 78 
3.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 78 
3.2 Literature Review ........................................................................................................................... 81 
3.2.1 Firm Characteristics and the Decision to Export .............................................................. 81 
3.2.2 Firm-Level Investment and Financial Constraints ............................................................ 85 
3.2.3 Financial Factors and Firm’s Export Behaviour ............................................................... 89 
3.3 Methodology and Data ................................................................................................................. 92 
3.3.1 Model ....................................................................................................................................... 92 
3.3.2 Variables .................................................................................................................................. 94 
3.3.3 Data .......................................................................................................................................... 97 
3.4 Results ........................................................................................................................................... 100 
3.5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 113 
Appendix 3A Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics ................................................ 115 
Appendix 3B Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................................................... 119 
4. Multi-Product Firms and Exporting ............................................................................ 137 
4.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 137 
4.2 Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 142 
4.3 Data ............................................................................................................................................... 147 
4.4 Multi-Product Firms’ Intensive and Extensive Margins ........................................................ 151 
4.5 The Characteristics of Multi-Product Firms ............................................................................ 156 
4.5.1 Being a Multi-Product Firm ................................................................................................ 156 
4.5.2 The Number of Product Produced ................................................................................... 165 
4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 171 
Appendix 4A Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics ................................................ 174 
Appendix 4B Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................................................... 178 
5. Productivity and Export Spillovers from FDI in the Host Country ............................ 195 
5.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 195 
5.2 Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 199 
5.2.1 Spillovers from FDI ............................................................................................................. 199 
5.2.2 Empirical Evidence of Spillovers from FDI .................................................................... 201 
5.2.2.1 Productivity from Spillovers from FDI ..................................................................... 202 
5.2.2.2 Export Spillovers from FDI ....................................................................................... 208 
5.3 Model Specification, Variables and Data ................................................................................. 211 
5.3.1 Empirical Models ................................................................................................................. 211 
5.3.1.1 Empirical Model of Productivity Spillovers.............................................................. 211 
5.3.1.2 Empirical Model of Export Spillovers ...................................................................... 214 
5.3.2 Variables ................................................................................................................................ 217 
5.3.3 Data ........................................................................................................................................ 222 
5.4 Results ........................................................................................................................................... 224 
5.4.1 Productivity Spillovers from FDI ...................................................................................... 224 
5.4.2 Export Spillovers from FDI ............................................................................................... 234 
5.5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 247 
Appendix 5A Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics ................................................ 250 
Appendix 5B New Construction of Industry from the Manufacturing Survey and  
I-O Table ............................................................................................................................................. 255 
Appendix 5C Hausman Specification Test .................................................................................... 257 
Appendix 5D Additional Results ..................................................................................................... 259 
Appendix 5E Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................................................... 263 
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 271 
6.1 Summary of Results ..................................................................................................................... 271 
6.2 Further Research .......................................................................................................................... 276 
Bibliography..................................................................................................................... 278 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Major Export Markets ............................................................................................................ 11 
Table 2.2 Fifteen Major Export Destinations by Country ................................................................. 12 
Table 2.3 Export Structure of Thailand ................................................................................................ 14 
Table 2.4 Fifteen Major Export Commodities in Thai Manufacturing Sector ............................... 15 
Table 2.5 Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows to Thailand Classified by Country ................. 18 
Table 2.6 Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows to Thailand Classified by Sector ..................... 19 
Table 2.7 Mean Characteristics of Exports vs. Non-Exporters in 2003 .......................................... 34 
Table 2.8 Pooled Probit Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export ..................................................... 42 
Table 2.9 Pooled Probit Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export-10% 
Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership ................................................................................................... 47 
Table 2.10 Pooled Probit Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export-50% 
Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership ................................................................................................... 48 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics .................................................................................................................. 99 
Table 3.2 Mean of the Financial Ratios for Different Groups of Sample ..................................... 101 
Table 3.3 The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) ...................... 105 
Table 3.4 The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export for Domestic and Foreign Firms 
(Dep. Var. is itEX ) ................................................................................................................................ 106 
Table 3.5 The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) ..................... 111 
Table 3.6 The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales for Domestic and Foreign Firms (Dep. 
Var. is itEXSALES ) ............................................................................................................................... 112 
Table 4.1 Share of Exporting Firms by two-digit ISIC .................................................................... 149 
Table 4.2 Share of Firms and Output for Different Groups by Product Distributions .............. 150 
Table 4.3 OLS Regression Decomposition of Firm Size and Firm’s Extensive Margins ........... 153 
Table 4.4 OLS Regression of Firm’s Extensive and Intensive Margins ........................................ 155 
Table 4.5 The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. is 
itMULTIDUM ) ..................................................................................................................................... 163 
Table 4.6 The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers by Ownership 
Structure (Dep. Var. is itMULTIDUM ) ............................................................................................ 164 
Table 4.7 The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Product Produced (Dep. Var. is 
itNPRODUCT ) ..................................................................................................................................... 169 
Table 4.8 The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers by Ownership 
Structure (Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) ............................................................................................ 170 
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics ................................................................................................................ 223 
Table 5.2 Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers to all Domestic Firms ...................... 228 
Table 5.3 Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers (Domestic Market- and Export- 
Oriented FDI) to all Domestic Firms ................................................................................................. 229 
Table 5.4 Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers to Domestic Exporters and   
Domestic Non-Exporters ..................................................................................................................... 232 
Table 5.5 Summary of Results on Productivity Spillovers ............................................................... 233 
Table 5.6 Heckman Selection Model for Export Spillovers to all Domestic Firms ..................... 237 
Table 5.7 Heckman Selection Model for Export Spillovers (Domestic Market- and Export-
Oriented FDI) to all Domestic Firms ................................................................................................. 242 
Table 5.8 Marginal Effects of the Heckman Selection Model from Column (6) of Table 5.7 ... 244 
Table 5.9 Summary of Results on Export Spillovers ........................................................................ 246 
 
 
Abbreviations 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BOI  Board of Investment 
CEECs  Central and Eastern European Countries  
EU  European Union 
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
FPRI  Fiscal Policy Research Institute  
GDP  Gross domestic product 
GMM  Generalized method of moment 
HS  Harmonised System 
IFS   International Financial Statistics 
IID  Independently and identically distributed 
IIT  Intra-industry trade 
IO  Industrial organisation 
I-O  Input-Output  
ISIC  International Standard Industrial Classification 
LPM  Linear probability model 
M&A  Mergers and acquisitions 
MNEs  Multinational enterprises 
NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board 
NICs  Newly industrialised countries 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
OIE  Office of Industrial Economics 
OLS  Ordinary least square 
R&D  Research and development 
SIC  Standard Industrial Classification 
TFP  Total factor productivity 
TNSO  National Statistic Office of Thailand 
UK  United Kingdom 
US  United States 
 
 1 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In the global economy, international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have become 
increasingly important.  Both of them are known as key elements that drive an increase in 
economic integration and the economic development process.  Therefore, policymakers from 
both developed and developing countries have adopted trade policies that encourage FDI 
inflows in order to stimulate economic growth. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the trade policy in Thailand emphasised import substitution rather than 
the export promotion.  The government imposed tariffs on imports especially on the final goods 
or finished products.  However, there was a shift in trade policy towards export promotion in 
the 1980s.  Later, the government promoted openness and competition as well as a liberalised 
economy through trade and financial liberalisation in the 1990s. 
After the relaxation of capital controls, funds could freely flow in and out of the country.  Loans 
from abroad were used to channel money into less productive sectors and to finance long-term 
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projects using short-term lending.  Bhaopichitr (1997) points out that the bubble actually started 
in 1995 when goods and wages in real estate and financial sectors were highly overvalued. 
Thailand faced a deficit problem in the current account.  This was mainly because the value of 
exported goods was less than that of imported goods.   
Krongkaew (1999) argues that another factor that contributed to the financial crisis was a 
decline in the country’s export performance.  An increase in wage rates and an overvalued Thai 
currency caused a slowdown in Thai exports as the country lost competitiveness in the world 
market.  In addition, exported goods were expensive compared to other countries.  In July 1997, 
the exchange system was changed to a managed float.  The depreciation of the Thai currency 
pushed up the level of competitiveness, so the export volume increased gradually.   
In terms of FDI inflows, since the 1990s, Thailand has received a large amount of FDI inflows 
especially in the steel and petrochemical industries.1  In 1997 and 1998, FDI inflows increased 
compared to the previous year.  This positive growth was explained by an increase in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) whereas multinational enterprises (MNEs) took over domestic firms 
that experienced liquidity problems. After 1998, the level of FDI inflows decreased by 30 
percent.  This was because foreign investors lacked the confidence to invest in the Thai 
economy. 
Since the financial crisis, the Thai government has continuously implemented policies that 
resolve economic problems and stimulate economic growth by encouraging exports and 
attracting FDI inflows.  The importance of export performance and FDI inflows in Thailand 
motivates this research to empirically investigate different aspects related to exports and FDI at 
a micro-level perspective. 
                                                            
1 Data source: Bank of Thailand 
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In general, it is well recognised that a host country benefits from exporting.  The 
implementation of an export promotion policy is aimed at encouraging more exports.  However, 
the decision to participate in export markets is ultimately a firm-level decision.  Even though 
exporting is considered beneficial, not every firm is able to export.  This is because of the 
differences in firm-specific characteristics including their financial status.  Many empirical 
studies examine the various factors affecting the export decision from the developed country 
perspective (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999, 2004, Girma et al. 2004, Greenaway and Kneller 
2004, Greenaway et al. 2005) with few linking the entry decision with financial factors (see e.g. 
Greenaway et al. 2007).  Some studies look at the evidence from a developing country 
perspective (see e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997, Clerides et al. 1998 and Alvarez and López 2005).   
In regards to FDI, attracting FDI inflows are believed to generate both direct and indirect 
impacts that would possibly benefit the host economy.  The direct benefit is, for example, 
through an increase in capital inflows and employment creation.  At the same time, the indirect 
benefit can be generated through different channels of spillovers such as productivity and 
export spillovers to domestic firms (see e.g. Caves 1974, Blomström and Persson 1983, Aitken et 
al. 1997, Kokko et al. 1997 and Greenaway et al. 2004).  In addition, different FDI incentives 
may have different effects on domestic firms.  Blomström and Kokko (1998) and Görg and 
Greenaway (2004) provide a survey on productivity and export spillovers.  The evidence is quite 
mixed. Since there is no single conclusion for spillover effects from FDI to domestic firms, it is 
interesting to explore the evidence of how FDI affects domestic firms in Thailand. 
Another interesting feature of firm heterogeneity in international trade relates to product level 
analysis as recent studies pointed out, world production and trade is dominated by multi-
product firms (Bernard et al. 2005 and 2006a).  The early literature on traditional trade models 
does not account for the prevailing role of multi-product firms.  However, a number of recent 
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studies develop theoretical and empirical analysis on firm heterogeneity at the product level (see 
e.g. Bernard et al. 2005 and 2006a, Eckel and Neary 2006, Nocke and Yeaple 2006 and Goldberg 
et al. 2008).  The stylised facts and recent interest is the motivation for this research to explore 
and develop a clear understanding about the role of multi-product firms in international trade 
and the characteristics associated with multi-products firms from a developing country 
perspective. 
This thesis combines four empirical studies related to exporting, FDI and firm heterogeneity in 
Thailand using a firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Thailand’s manufacturing industry 
between 2001 and 2004.  We first investigate the determinant of the export participation and 
performance of firms in Thailand and then examine the characteristics associated with multi-
product firms.  Finally, we search for the effects of FDI inflows to domestically-owned firms.  
The findings can be used as a guidance to suggest the policy implications to promote export and 
attract certain types of FDI inflows.  The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter two examines the relationship between firm heterogeneity, origin of ownership and 
export participation.  This is based on the assumption that different characteristics of a firm may 
have different effects on its decision to export.  Sunk entry cost is also taken into consideration 
in determining the export participation decision as a firm must face the one-off large investment 
prior to the entry into the export markets.  Each firm also has different specific characteristics 
such as structure of ownership, productivity, size, training and R&D which are included in the 
empirical model.  Establishment location of a firm may have an influence on the decision to 
participate in export markets because each location exhibits different transportation costs.  We 
also emphasise on the importance of country of origin as we assume that different countries 
invest in Thailand with different incentives such as export-platform or market-seeking FDI. 
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Chapter three re-examines the determinants of a firm’s export participation decision by 
emphasising the financial variables that are used to measure a firm’s financial health.  We assume 
that investment and a firm’s internal finance are linked.  Exporting is also considered as a form 
of investment because a firm has to invest in sunk entry costs in order to start exporting.  
Therefore, we include financial variables in our analysis because they indicate a firm’s ability to 
invest in order to enter and operate in export markets. Other firm-specific characteristics are 
also included. 
Chapter four differs slightly from the previous two chapters.  We link exporting and FDI to 
multi-product firms by investigating different aspects of multi-product firm production.  The 
first part of the analysis relates to the investigation of the relationship between multi-product 
firms’ extensive margins (number of products produced or exported) and intensive margins 
(output or export sales per product).  In the second part, we investigate the characteristics 
associated with multi-product firms (being a multi-product firm and the number of products 
produced) and also making a distinction between domestically- and foreign-owned firms.  
Export status, structure of ownership and various firm characteristics are included in the 
estimation. 
Chapter five focuses on the importance of FDI in the host economy.  The fundamental 
framework for this chapter is that foreign firms may indirectly benefit domestic firms in the host 
economy through externalities arising from proprietary assets.  Thus, we empirically investigate 
the spillover effects from foreign to domestic firms.  Our analyses highlights two aspects of 
spillovers-- productivity and export spillovers, both intra- and inter-industry.  Rather than 
focusing only on the spillover effects from the overall foreign firms, we also distinguish between 
different types of foreign firms whether they are domestic market oriented or export oriented 
and examine the effects on productivity and export behaviour of domestic firms. 
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Chapter six concludes the empirical results and discusses the limitations of this study and 
possible future research. 
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2 
Firm Heterogeneity, Origin 
of Ownership and Export 
Participation 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As the world economy becomes more closely integrated as a result of the pervasive forces of 
globalisation, there is continued interest from both academics and policymakers in the growth 
strategies of developing and newly industrialised countries (NICs).  Development through 
exporting is a widely recognised route by which small open economies, and especially the so-
called Asian Tigers, have managed to grow rapidly. 1   A number of studies have now 
demonstrated a clear link between a country’s openness and its productivity growth (Edwards 
1993 and 1998). 
Although exports are generally perceived to be beneficial to the exporting country, it is 
recognised that by no means all firms export and that the decision to enter the export market is 
                                                 
1 Traditionally, the Asian Tigers were thought to consist of the countries of South Korea, Hong-Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan.  The new Asian Tigers are considered to be Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.  
Together, the “new” and “old” Asian Tigers are characterised by export-driven economic development and 
industrial policies aimed at encouraging inward foreign direct investment. 
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determined by a range of factors.  To date, the majority of studies have examined the export 
decision of firms from developed countries (Bernard and Jensen 1999, 2004, Girma et al. 2004, 
Greenaway and Kneller 2004, Greenaway et al. 2005, Greenaway et al. 2007, and Kimura and 
Kiyota 2006) with few looking at the developing country experience (Roberts and Tybout 1997, 
Clerides et al. 1998, Van Biesebroeck 2005, Sjöholm 2003, and Alvarez and López 2005). 
Studies that examine the export decision of firms from the perspective of one of the new Asian 
Tigers are limited.  The only papers we are aware of are for Indonesia (Sjöholm 2003, Blalock 
and Gertler 2004, and Blalock and Roy 2007).  This is rather surprising given the nature of the 
development strategy of this region that is export driven and involves significant competition 
for FDI.  Multinationals from the developed world, Japan in particular, have used East Asian 
countries as an export platform to market their products globally, a strategy that led to rapid 
growth in Thailand.  Moreover, the manufacturing sectors of the majority of NICs still 
constitute a large proportion of national output in contrast to many developed countries where 
manufacturing now typically accounts for less than 20% of GDP. 
In this chapter, we employ a detailed firm-level dataset for Thailand between 2001 and 2004 to 
investigate the determinants of firms’ decisions to participate in the export market.  One 
significant contribution of this chapter is that we are able for the first time to break down FDI 
by country and region of origin for a country of the new Asian Tigers.  We show that a firm’s 
decision to export is determined by the evidence of sunk entry costs, structure of ownership, 
productivity, firm size and location.  Our results are broadly consistent with those of developed 
countries and other developing countries although, as we might have expected given the nature 
of Thailand’s economy, past export performance, foreign ownership and product quality 
generally have stronger effects for Thailand than the US, UK and other developing countries.  
As well as being one of the first studies for a new Asian Tiger economy, and the first for 
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Thailand, by distinguishing between different countries of ownership we are able to identify 
whether the nationality of ownership influences the likelihood of exporting.  Our results show 
that US, UK, Singaporean, Japanese and Chinese ownership results in an increased propensity to 
export whilst Korean and other Southeast Asian ownership has a negative impact.  This has 
potentially important policy implications for developing country governments looking to attract 
FDI as a means to future growth. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide an overview of 
Thailand’s export performance and FDI trends.  In Section 2.3, we review the theoretical and 
empirical literature.  Section 2.4 describes our econometric specification and discusses our 
estimation techniques.  Our results are presented in Section 2.5 while Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Exports and FDI in Thailand 
2.2.1 Export Performance 
The current structure of the Thai economy can be explained by a new macroeconomic model 
developed by the Fiscal Policy Research Institute (FPRI), Ministry of Finance, Thailand.  The 
so-called “Diamond-5 Policy Paradigm” links the domestic economy through international trade 
with five equally important trading blocs: the US; EU; Japan; East Asia-9; and the rest of the 
world. 2   This builds on the more traditional “Locomotive-Wagon Paradigm” in which the 
economic growth of other countries depends upon three major blocs: the US, Western Europe 
and Japan (Chaipravat, 2003).  This implies that at least in the minds of the Thai authorities that 
Thailand’s pattern of trade has taken on a more intra-regional dimension. 
                                                 
2  The 9 countries in the East Asia are China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. 
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Thailand has been the third largest exporter from the Southeast Asian region for the last 10 
years (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2005).  As an ASEAN member, Thailand shares in the 
benefits of the ASEAN Free Trade Area that aims to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in 
both manufacturing and agricultural sectors among member countries.3  As a result, the ASEAN 
region remains a major export market for Thailand.  Table 2.1 reveals that after 2001 ASEAN 
replaced the US as Thailand’s largest export market with an export share to ASEAN in 2007 of 
about 21.3 percent of total exports with 12.6 percent and 12.8 percent exported to the US and 
EU15 respectively.  
Considering exports by country, there is no doubt that the main export destinations are 
concentrated in East and Southeast Asia.  As explained by Chaipravat (2003), the intra-regional 
trade within East Asia has increased significantly with a change from horizontal to vertical 
integration.  Such growth in trade is due in part to the development of an international 
production network in the region.  Each country produces different parts of a product and 
trades with other countries within the regional bloc.  According to Table 2.2, the US, Japan, 
China, Singapore and Hong Kong are the top-five export destinations in both 2003 and 2007, 
accounting for 46 percent of total Thai exports in 2007.  In addition, all countries in East Asia-9 
have been recognised in the top-fifteen of Thailand’s export destinations that account for, on 
average, more than 30 percent of total Thai exports during 1998 to 2007. 
                                                 
3 Attempts at organised regional co-operation between South-East Asian countries dates to August 1967 when the 
ASEAN was established with original members Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
Expansions to ASEAN were Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. 
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Table 2.1: Major Export Markets 
Export 
Markets 
Value :  US$ million 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
ASEAN 9,895.85 10,871.61 13,482.22 12,599.12 13,568.90 16,486.03 21,238.38 24,390.42 27,021.71 32,791.08 
EU-15 9,718.11 9,828.66 11,001.28 10,551.89 10,214.62 11,747.73 13,810.60 14,293.81 16,874.60 18,119.05 
Japan 7,469.33 8,261.32 10,232.38 9,945.38 9,949.98 11,356.20 13,491.63 15,089.85 16,385.90 19,415.61 
US 12,167.20 12,654.27 14,870.11 13,199.62 13,509.42 13,596.16 15,502.86 16,996.64 19,449.60 19,848.06 
Others 15,239.57 16,847.59 20,038.24 18,887.22 20,913.39 26,853.87 32,459.35 40,166.93 49,988.63 63,691.16 
World 54,490.06 58,463.44 69,624.23 65,183.23 68,156.31 80,039.98 96,502.82 110,937.66 129,720.43 153,864.96 
Source: Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce 
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Table 2.2: Fifteen Major Export Destinations by Country  
Rank 
Country 
Value :  US$ million 
2007 2003 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 1 USA 12,167.20 12,654.27 14,870.11 13,199.62 13,509.42 13,596.16 15,502.86 16,996.64 19,449.60 19,415.61 
2 2 Japan 7,469.33 8,261.32 10,232.38 9,945.38 9,949.98 11,356.20 13,491.63 15,089.85 16,430.60 18,119.05 
3 4 China 1,766.75 1,860.95 2,836.47 2,873.36 3,555.04 5,688.92 7,113.45 9,167.55 11,727.95 14,846.75 
4 3 Singapore 4,698.25 5,073.12 6,065.97 5,261.39 5,552.73 5,850.25 7,027.01 7,689.15 8,357.22 9,619.69 
5 5 Hong Kong 2,783.06 2,981.32 3,517.88 3,306.82 3,687.89 4,315.16 4,939.56 6,165.34 7,166.74 8,694.76 
6 6 Malaysia 1,780.28 2,124.23 2,832.15 2,733.44 2,835.29 3,872.01 5,312.37 5,821.92 6,613.62 7,819.19 
7 11 Australia 980.18 1,316.28 1,636.11 1,361.72 1,641.74 2,159.99 2,467.73 3,174.55 4,349.60 5,937.42 
8 10 Indonesia 983.61 968.45 1,354.52 1,369.76 1,680.19 2,265.65 3,215.81 3,982.86 3,313.19 4,818.55 
9 9 Netherlands 2,180.43 2,198.56 2,271.00 2,037.11 1,891.70 2,364.79 2,596.90 2,774.21 3,237.45 3,860.05 
10 15 Vietnam 591.67 572.83 847.37 801.23 947.98 1,262.09 1,876.51 2,363.80 3,074.97 3,804.11 
11 8 UK 2,120.19 2,089.73 2,385.00 2,336.78 2,393.05 2,577.45 3,029.83 2,804.61 3,399.60 3,623.04 
12 7 Taiwan 1,743.14 2,043.64 2,428.96 1,925.33 1,969.42 2,581.53 2,607.97 2,721.70 3,366.12 3,329.55 
13 13 Philippines 766.90 929.17 1,095.37 1,157.65 1,275.13 1,616.26 1,834.93 2,056.91 2,571.77 3,011.86 
14 14 South Korea 626.03 909.62 1,277.46 1,233.96 1,398.21 1,583.00 1,858.86 2,258.64 2,669.63 2,982.62 
15 12 Germany 1,556.37 1,459.58 1,658.94 1,574.33 1,534.81 1,793.06 1,803.01 2,007.62 2,326.95 2,921.59 
  Total 15 Countries 42,213.39 45,443.07 55,309.69 51,117.88 53,822.58 62,882.52 74,678.43 85,075.35 98,055.01 112,803.84 
  Total Others 12,276.67 13,020.37 14,314.54 14,065.35 14,333.73 17,157.46 21,824.39 25,862.31 31,665.42 41,061.12 
  Total 54,490.06 58,463.44 69,624.23 65,183.23 68,156.31 80,039.98 96,502.82 110,937.66 129,720.43 153,864.96 
Source: Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce 
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Since 1998, the total export value has increased dramatically reaching US$ 152 billion in 2007.  
This is because the depreciation of the Thai currency in 1997 has pushed up the level of 
competitiveness. According to Table 2.3, the manufacturing sector still dominates, accounting 
for 78 percent of total exports in 2007.  In the same year, the share of agriculture products, 
agro-industry products and mining and fuel products were 10 percent, 6 percent and 5 percent, 
respectively with other at 1 percent. 
Table 2.4 illustrates the level of exports for a selection of Thai industries.  Sectors with large 
export volumes tends to be highly-technological products such as computers (and parts), 
automobiles (and parts) and integrated circuits.  The production of computers and parts has 
been Thailand’s leading industrial export sector for many years accounting for 11.35 percent of 
the country’s total exports in 2007.  The other leading export industry is the automotive industry 
with numerous foreign automotive manufacturers from Japan, the US and Europe using 
Thailand as an export platform to sell their products worldwide.  In 2007, some industries have 
shown outstanding progress, e.g. the growth rates of machinery (and components) industry and 
electrical appliances industry were 64.46 percent and 45.98 percent, respectively.  
Other prominent export sectors include more labour-intensive products such as gems, jewellery 
and garments.  The expansion of the gem and jewellery market is mainly from fine jewels and 
articles of jewellery made from gold alloy with an export growth in 2007 of about 47 percent.  
Garment was one of Thailand’s top-five exports during 1998 and 2003.  However, after 2004, 
the growth of exports from the textile industry fell because of the elimination of the quota 
restriction in early 2005 and increased competition in the garment sector from China, Vietnam 
and India (Bank of Thailand, 2006). 
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Table 2.3: Export Structure of Thailand 
Product 
Value :  US$ million 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Agricultural  7,110.74 7,011.70 7,336.75 7,055.66 7,117.83 8,797.09 10,327.17 10,447.33 13,131.15 15,167.65 
Agro-Industrial  4,253.60 4,558.71 4,718.54 4,817.94 5,098.89 5,950.14 6,369.87 7,008.75 7,970.61 9,489.47 
Manufacturing  40,310.68 43,960.11 53,252.03 49,082.80 51,901.22 61,213.94 74,595.39 86,764.91 100,068.11 120,559.56 
Mining and Fuel  1,061.30 1,264.83 2,418.87 2,046.72 2,009.76 2,302.89 3,680.32 5,127.96 6,894.95 7,510.90 
Other 1,753.74 1,668.09 1,898.04 2,180.11 2,028.60 1,775.92 1,530.08 1,588.71 1,655.61 1,137.38 
Total 54,490.06 58,463.44 69,624.23 65,183.23 68,156.31 80,039.98 96,502.82 110,937.66 129,720.43 153,864.96 
Source: Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce 
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Table 2.4: Fifteen Major Export Commodities in Thai Manufacturing Sector 
Rank 
Product 
Value :  US$ million
2007 2003 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 1 Computer machinery, parts 
and accessories 
7,851.04 8,121.57 8,739.55 7,947.47 7,430.35 8,189.69 9,185.45 11,848.66 14,876.39 17,331.58 
2 4 Automobile, parts and 
accessories 
1,241.01 1,902.26 2,419.36 2,655.03 2,919.71 3,965.53 5,495.24 7,745.44 9,524.19 12,978.12 
3 2 Integrated circuits 2,278.69 2,944.55 4,484.03 3,512.25 3,307.99 4,624.57 4,902.78 5,950.64 7,029.98 8,418.14 
4 5 Gems and Jewellery 1,815.13 1,766.30 1,741.85 1,837.16 2,169.28 2,514.47 2,645.59 3,232.66 3,668.29 5,381.75 
5 7 Plastic pellets 989.56 1,215.31 1,865.63 1,615.02 1,775.24 2,148.43 3,104.60 4,198.45 4,498.43 5,212.30 
6 8 Iron and steel products 905.76 954.29 1,399.16 1,091.43 1,249.69 1,687.20 2,477.84 2,895.63 3,528.61 4,570.55 
7 22 Machinery and 
components 
752.49 613.87 801.45 860.96 930.22 1,244.97 1,670.14 2,111.26 2,655.15 4,369.12 
8 9 Chemicals  683.71 908.00 1,248.11 1,015.12 1,192.97 1,581.36 2,059.06 2,646.08 3,434.34 3,920.14 
9 24 Electrical appliances 574.75 545.13 901.09 873.57 905.66 967.930 1,839.57 2,208.78 2,514.18 3,746.63 
10 12 Rubber products 866.39 875.05 1,060.37 1,095.07 1,260.31 1,556.44 1,943.68 2,351.20 3,082.00 3,653.74 
11 10 Air Conditioning machine 
and parts 
780.42 895.52 1,079.62 1,160.50 1,108.35 1,430.29 1,997.74 2,201.41 2,287.50 3,189.10 
12 6 Radio, television and parts 1,445.83 1,346.48 1,964.87 1,692.77 2,094.58 2,501.77 3,224.46 3,141.84 3,457.34 3,070.84 
13 3 Garments 2,986.76 2,915.63 3,132.68 2,914.40 2,721.50 2,760.19 3,089.23 3,150.21 3,198.83 3,051.38 
14 17 Plastic products 708.42 758.13 894.23 860.32 954.44 1,236.20 1,410.21 1,774.70 1,883.99 2,301.83 
15 47 Reciprocating internal 
combustion engine and 
components 
121.52 187.69 327.40 286.97 345.98 547.82 1,245.04 1,379.96 1,567.92 1,732.28 
  Total 15 products 24,007.48 25,949.78   2,059.40  29,418.04  30,366.27  36,956.86  46,290.63  56,836.92  67,207.14  82,927.50  
 Total Others 30,482.58  32,513.66  37,564.83  35,765.19  37,790.04  43,083.12  50,212.19  54,100.74  62,513.29  70,937.46  
  Total 54,490.06 58,463.44 69,624.23 65,183.23 68,156.31 80,039.98 96,502.82 110,937.66 129,720.43 153,864.96 
Source: Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce 
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2.2.2 FDI Trends 
As a result of the Plaza accord, there was currency appreciation in Japan and NICs such as 
South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.4  Those countries relocated production towards more 
developed countries in Asia, particularly Malaysia and Thailand (Thomsen, 1999).  Therefore, 
FDI inflows in Thailand increased significantly since the late 1980s.  From Table 2.5, the 
depreciation of Thai currency in 1997 caused a large increase in FDI inflows of over US$ 5.1 
billion in 1998 because the cost of investing in Thailand was cheaper relative to other countries 
and the government relaxed restrictions on the percentage of foreign equity in financial 
institutions.  There was also an increase in M&A since MNEs took over domestic firms that 
faced severe liquidity problems.  
The financial crisis affected foreign investors’ confidence, so the value of FDI fell to US$ 3.6 
billion in 1999 and US$ 2.8 billion in 2000.  However, in 2001 FDI inflows increased more than 
double because of high investment from Japan and Singapore.  Over the years, Thailand 
experienced fluctuations in FDI inflows.  Recent figures show that the FDI inflows were more 
than US$ 10 billion in 2006 and 2007.  
The main sources of FDI inflows have generally been from Japan, the ASEAN region 
particularly Singapore, the US and the EU-15.  Since the 1970s, Japan has been the largest 
source of FDI except 1999.  The large decrease of Japanese FDI in 1999 was mainly because of 
the economic circumstances in the home country.  FDI from Japan increased again in 2000.  
Singapore has been the second largest source of FDI inflows since 2001.  Foreign investors 
from Singapore invested in different sectors such as banking, telecommunications and especially 
in automotives and electronics industries. 
                                                 
4 Plaza accord was an agreement signed in 1985 by G-5 nations (France, West Germany, Japan, the US and the UK) 
to depreciate the US dollar in relation to the Japanese and German currencies. 
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Table 2.6 illustrates the net FDI inflows by sector.  Each year, the industrial sector received the 
highest percentage of FDI inflows.  During 2000 and 2005, the percentages of manufacturing 
FDI to total FDI were more than 50 percent on average whilst only 38.83 and 35.80 percent in 
2006 and 2007, respectively.  The second largest recipient of FDI was the trade sector in 1998 
and 1999.  However, the trade sector was overtaken by the financial sector during 2004 and 
2007. 
In the manufacturing sector, FDI inflows tend to be concentrated in the production of highly-
technological goods, such as machinery and transport equipment, electrical appliances, metal 
and non-metallic.  These figures for FDI inflows are in line with the export features of Thailand 
of which the largest export volumes tend to be highly-technological products.  For example, the 
second largest export industry of Thailand is the automotive industry with numerous foreign 
automotive manufacturers from Japan, the US and Europe using Thailand as an export platform.  
Given the importance of the export sector and FDI inflows and Thailand’s continued export 
driven development policies, it is important to have an understanding of the factors that 
influence a firm’s decision to participate in the export market.  Specifically, it is important to 
know whether there are any significant differences in the factors influencing the decision to 
export for firms in Thailand in comparison with the experience of firms from economies at 
different stages of development. 
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Table 2.5: Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows to Thailand Classified by Country 
Country Value : US$ Million 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Japan 1,484.69 488.35 869.86 1,955.12 1,892.41 2,297.67 2,749.93 2,926.51 2,576.42 3,135.72 
US 1,283.31 641.22 617.57 395.01 182.34 336.23 540.42 750.48 165.78 570.06 
EU-15 912.30 1,368.46 509.59 282.91 -216.12 607.55 697.31 335.02 955.41 1,561.89 
Other EU -1.07 -0.04 0.70 -1.07 0.99 2.07 3.49 -0.07 4.70 19.32 
ASEAN-5 569.65 569.57 381.78 1,709.95 1,403.52 1,053.86 683.37 1,107.34 4,597.15 2,560.17 
  -Brunei Darussalam 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.07 2.09 4.71 2.20 -3.92 
  -Indonesia 2.71 1.19 4.26 2.81 7.43 6.72 5.87 1.06 -6.35 6.10 
  -Malaysia 17.15 27.06 21.33 10.66 -32.55 41.24 147.31 38.36 321.82 21.30 
  -Philippines 7.78 3.21 0.50 2.88 -0.41 5.43 182.96 -5.54 -0.46 7.10 
  -Singapore 541.97 538.10 355.68 1,693.59 1,428.95 1,000.38 345.12 1,068.74 4,279.94 2,529.58 
Other ASEAN 5.26 2.47 7.25 0.73 4.77 6.58 5.31 -6.02 29.35 6.75 
Hong Kong 393.91 233.65 331.31 150.58 86.25 613.08 141.40 7.16 -77.84 390.37 
Taiwan 106.25 121.49 158.96 156.83 103.70 75.25 124.20 29.24 -94.55 91.50 
South Korea 72.72 5.46 -3.69 50.64 93.22 23.83 93.53 29.51 79.48 75.33 
China 5.01 -2.14 7.23 -2.50 20.90 23.83 -3.82 11.55 49.87 73.71 
Canada 3.15 2.97 9.45 5.90 15.04 21.17 28.53 -11.22 7.06 25.52 
Australia 34.58 12.94 26.60 0.56 -0.42 32.47 99.85 -1.09 11.18 69.36 
Switzerland 73.22 60.37 32.16 55.34 48.07 124.12 167.30 99.81 153.90 172.37 
Other 199.14 56.93 -135.55 287.94 -223.71 -52.75 -374.87 1224.89 2021.78 1446.98 
Total 5,142.18 3,561.69 2,813.26 5,048.00 3,411.00 5,165.00 4,956.00 6,503.16 10,479.74 10,199.09 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
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Table 2.6: Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows to Thailand Classified by Sector 
Sector Value : US$ Million 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Industry 2,206.35 1,268.63 1,810.66 2,960.26 1,844.53 2,408.58 3,785.98 3,429.86 4,068.87 3,651.17 
  -Food & Sugar 73.38 94.01 93.00 155.06 21.28 265.14 337.32 -24.76 118.13 120.62 
  -Textiles 123.96 20.81 -3.47 105.56 43.29 64.46 37.95 77.87 -7.88 71.18 
  -Metal & Non Metallic 341.65 262.40 -83.66 378.35 259.82 255.75 480.07 221.43 354.65 507.51 
  -Electrical appliances 264.31 424.99 507.23 981.29 214.93 327.44 797.01 908.29 1,080.91 380.53 
  -Machinery & Transport 
equipment 661.17 392.84 655.48 578.81 644.45 653.10 1,280.34 1,369.98 1,402.81 1,236.34 
  -Chemicals 226.00 7.48 393.38 167.77 334.09 295.90 387.34 472.39 173.95 -141.95 
  -Petroleum Products 328.66 8.57 29.30 179.93 -50.16 95.25 22.49 -72.60 332.18 378.58 
  -Construction materials 23.35 37.87 57.82 0.18 31.37 -7.89 45.05 21.66 7.85 31.42 
  -Others 163.82 19.62 161.58 413.27 345.42 459.39 398.36 455.58 606.25 1,066.92 
Financial Institutions 842.14 247.13 132.97 -186.17 67.34 -24.52 221.65 1,550.89 2,490.21 1,882.23 
Trade 1,051.45 1,042.29 67.79 1,069.13 682.21 817.88 182.91 295.19 787.97 602.79 
Construction 191.69 -151.77 -1.70 4.53 19.32 42.98 70.67 29.89 -86.00 46.33 
Mining & Quarrying 21.71 -41.82 -274.74 759.32 146.61 270.62 192.29 -110.99 206.05 808.43 
Agriculture 0.49 1.90 0.70 -4.22 3.20 28.22 5.72 12.60 -1.94 3.19 
Services 276.16 485.02 448.28 155.90 740.64 362.23 303.27 330.94 711.19 1,055.78 
Investment 363.77 570.80 99.12 -33.69 -655.97 374.70 -236.66 173.64 2,133.33 321.81 
Real Estate 27.71 148.53 69.11 70.88 67.58 126.40 -343.96 43.34 262.64 1,207.13 
Others 160.70 -9.04 461.05 252.04 495.50 757.88 774.10 747.77 -92.60 620.19 
Total 5,142.19 3,561.69 2,813.26 5,048.00 3,411.00 5,165.00 4,956.00 6,503.16 10,479.74 10,199.09 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
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2.3 Literature Review 
2.3.1 Sunk Entry Costs and the Decision to Export 
The costs to a firm of becoming and remaining an exporter are composed of two components: 
sunk costs and fixed costs.  The former refer to the costs that arise before a firm enters the 
export market; the latter occur as long as a firm remains in the export market, e.g. transport and 
service costs and marketing costs. 
More specifically, sunk costs are defined as an initial large and one-off investment faced by a 
firm in order to enter the export market.  Such a cost can be considered as a combination of 
R&D spending to improve product quality in order, for example, to conform to standards and 
safety regulations of a target country, and the setting up of business and marketing connections 
in foreign countries.  Baldwin (1988) describes sunk costs as the costs of establishing a 
distribution and service network, and the costs of launching a product or brand advertising. 
Each individual firm faces a different sunk entry cost which will depend upon firm-specific 
characteristics including geographical location.  However, when a firm that has previously exited 
a market wants to re-enter, it will still face a sunk cost which will vary depending on how long it 
has been absent from the market.  Theoretically, we follow Roberts and Tybout (1997). 
For a given firm, the export status of firm i  is given by itY  where itY equals 1 if firm i  exports 
at time t , and 0 otherwise.  The export experience of firm i  through period t  is given by 
( ) 0i t jY j− | ≥ .  In the current period, a firm chooses the infinite sequence of values of 
( ) 0i t jY j+ | ≥  that maximises the expected present value of revenue.  The function of the 
maximised revenue can be written as: 
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( ) 0
( ) max ( )
i t j
j t
it it t ij itY j j t
V E Rδ
+
∞ −
| ≥ =
Ω = |Ω∑  (2.1) 
where j t= , i j itR R= , and thus itR  is the current revenue of firm i .  itΩ  is the current specific 
information set of firm i .  tE  represents the expected value in the current period which is 
conditional on the firm specific information set of firm i  available in period t  and δ  is the 
discount rate.  By applying Bellman’s equation to the export decision, the current export status 
of firm i  written as itY  satisfies: 
 ( )( ) 0 ( 1) ( 1) ( ) 0( ) max ( ) ( ( ) )
it
it it it i t j j t i t i t i t j jY
V R Y E V Yδ− | ≥ + + − | ≥Ω = + Ω |  (2.2) 
From the maximisation of the revenue in Equation (2.2), we can define the current profit 
function $( )itπ  as current revenue plus the difference in the expected value of the maximised 
revenue of firm i , conditional on the firm’s export status.  Thus, $ itπ  can be written as: 
 $ ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( ( ) 1) ( ( ) 0)it it t i t i t it t i t i t itR E V Y E V Yδ δ+ + + +⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤π ≡ + Ω | = − Ω | =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦   (2.3) 
where ( 1)i t +Ω  is the information set of firm i  in period 1t + . 
In each period, firm i  has to decide whether to export or not.  Firm i  exports in period t  if the 
expected gross profit and revenue of firm i  at time t  $( )itπ exceeds the current period cost ( )itc  
including the sunk entry cost ( )iS .  Otherwise, firm i  chooses not to export.  The export 
decision by firm i  is therefore represented as: 
 
$
( 1)1  if * (1 )      
0  otherwise
it it i i t
it
c S Y
Y −
⎧ π > + −⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
 (2.4) 
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Sunk entry costs( )iS  are varied across firms, so previous experience including the characteristics 
of each particular firm affects a firm’s decision to export. 
Since the main aim of this chapter is to examine the factors that influence the export decision of 
a firm, firm characteristics are included in the empirical model in order to identify the 
probability of exporting.  We therefore specify the export decision model as: 
 ( 1)
1  if * (1 ) 0
    
0  otherwise
it i i t it
it
Z S Y
Y
β ε−− − + >⎧= ⎨⎩
 (2.5) 
where itZ  represents a vector of firm-specific characteristics.  Details on the variables we 
include in vector Z  are discussed in Section 2.4. 
2.3.2 Empirical Analysis of Firm Heterogeneity, Sunk Entry Costs and 
Exporting 
Numerous studies have examined the factors that affect a firm’s decision to export taking 
advantage of the increased availability of firm-level data sets.  The primary question these studies 
address is whether good firms become exporters or whether exporters become good firms.  See 
López (2005), Wagner (2007), and Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for detailed surveys of the 
firm heterogeneity and international market participation literature. 
In this sub-section, we briefly outline the current state of the literature looking at first developed 
and second, developing country studies.  One of the first US papers was Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) who investigate the factors that affect a firm’s export decision using plant-level 
characteristics and lagged endogenous variables as independent regressors.  They found 
evidence to suggest that good firms become exporters.  The statistical significance of entry sunk 
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costs indicates that firms who have had previous export experience (either one or two years ago) 
seem to re-enter and remain as exporters in the following year.  Firm size, wage, and 
productivity, all significantly increase the probability of exporting.  Bernard and Jensen (2004) 
extend their 1999 model to include foreign ownership, spillovers and subsidies and also apply 
alternative estimation techniques including a linear probability model without plant effects, a 
linear probability model with fixed effects and generalized method of moment (GMM) in first 
differences.  Sunk entry costs are generally positive and significant.  The results from the 
spillover variables are of limited economic significance. 
For the UK, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) find that lagged exports have a positive and 
significant effect on the probability of a firm exporting.  Firm size and wage are also positive 
and significant determinants and productive firms are likely to enter the export market.  One 
additional result of interest is that both industrial and geographical agglomerations are significant 
determinants of entry into export markets.  In a more recent paper, Greenaway et al. (2007) 
examine a firm’s export decision using firm-level financial indicators to indicate the financial 
health status of each firm.  They hypothesise that the stronger the financial health of the firm, 
the more likely it is to enter the export market.  Distinguishing between different types of 
exporters, they find that continuous exporters seem to have higher liquidity and lower leverage 
ratio than starters.  Consistent with other studies, they find that small and domestic firms are 
less likely to enter the export market than large and foreign firms.  However, in contrast to other 
UK studies, TFP is insignificant and in some specifications the sign on wage is negative.  In a 
recent study of French manufacturing firms, Marinov et al. (2008) find that both the incidence 
and volume of foreign sales increase with size although they find no minimum threshold for 
entering export markets. 
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In a third UK study, Kneller and Pisu (2004) examine the export behaviour of foreign firms.  
Again, foreign firms appear to export more than domestic firms.  Other results reveal a positive 
relationship between the decision to export and firm size, the proportion of the workforce that 
is skilled and productivity.  One interesting result is that the origin of ownership of the firm is 
found to be important.  The significance of several country groupings is consistent with the 
export-platform FDI hypothesis with firms, for example from the US and Canada, being more 
likely to export rather than those from Australia. 
To test more accurately the self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypotheses, Girma et al. 
(2004), Greenaway et al. (2005) and Arnold and Hussinger (2005) apply matching techniques to 
examine the export performance of firms from the UK, Sweden and Germany respectively.5  In 
addition to the standard size, age and productivity effects, young firms are more likely to 
become exporters.  For Sweden, there is no evidence of differences in productivity between 
exporters and non-exporters affecting pre- or post-export market entry.  Bernard and Wagner 
(2001) in a study of German firms provide consistent findings. 
Fariñas and Martín-Marcos (2007) use Spanish manufacturing sector data to analyse the 
performance of exporting and non-exporting firms.  Exporting is positively correlated with 
productivity size, wages and innovation.  Prior to entering an export market, new-entry 
exporters have a better performance than non-exporters.  Fariñas and Martín-Marcos (2007) 
also provide evidence to support the proposition that firms self-select to exit export markets as 
continuing exporters have a higher performance than firms that exit.  These results are 
consistent with the self-selection hypothesis, a result also found for Taiwanese firms by Aw et al. 
(2000 and 2007). 
                                                 
5 A single index identifying the probability of entry that captures all information about the characteristics of the firm 
pre-entry is based on the use of matching techniques. 
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For developing countries specifically, Roberts and Tybout (1997) investigate the factors that 
affect the export decision of Colombian firms using firm-level data from 1981 to 1989.  They 
present a dynamic discrete-choice model as a theoretical explanation of a firm’s behaviour in 
entering and exiting export markets with firms more likely to enter an export market if current 
net operating profits exceed sunk costs.  In determining the export decision, sunk costs and a 
vector of firm-specific characteristics are included.  The results confirm the existence of sunk 
entry costs.  Unobserved plant heterogeneity is used to determine the probability of exporting. 
Three other developing countries, Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco, are studied by Clerides et al. 
(1998).  They investigate whether marginal costs affect the export decision of the firm and 
whether the export experience has an effect on the firm’s costs.  The results can be interpreted 
as saying that plants with low marginal costs and a large capital stock are more likely to export.  
Moreover, past export experience also appears to determine current export participation.  There 
is also some evidence of geographic spillovers for Colombian plants. 
Chilean manufacturing plants between 1990 and 1996 are considered by López (2004) and 
Alvarez and López (2005).  TFP is found to be important, indicating that firms learn to export 
and also that firms invest in technology in order to be able to produce high quality export goods 
which leads to productivity upgrading in the pre-entry period.  As productivity improves, firms 
are then able to enter the export market.  In addition, Alvarez and López (2005) find some 
evidence of learning-by-exporting by which productivity increases after the firm becomes an 
exporter. 
In studies from the same geographical region as our own, three recent studies examine 
Indonesian firms.  Sjöholm (2003) emphasises foreign networks as a determinant of exporting.  
Imports and foreign ownership significantly increase the probability of a firm exporting.  
However, spillovers from FDI have no significant effect on the decision to start exporting.  
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Other variables such as size, the share of skilled labour, capital stock per worker, and R&D 
expenditure appear to be positive and significant.  These results are consistent with the results 
from other developed and developing countries.  Blalock and Gertler (2004) find some evidence 
of an increase in productivity after entering into export market thereby supporting learning-by-
exporting rather than the self-selection hypothesis.  When considering the effect of the Asian 
crisis on exports, Blalock and Roy (2007) discover that the devaluation of the Indonesian 
currency caused an increase in entry and exit from export markets.  Continuing exporters were 
found to be those firms that were owned by foreign investors, that engaged in R&D and that 
also carried out considerable staff training. 
Finally, Van Biesebroeck (2005) focuses on nine sub-Saharan African countries in order to 
observe the export performance of firms from low-income countries.  The analysis reveals 
significant evidence to support both the self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypotheses. 
2.4 Methodology and Data 
2.4.1 Model 
In this sub-section, we identify those factors that are believed to affect a firm’s export decision 
building on best practice from the existing theoretical and empirical literature for both 
developed and developing countries.  Differences in firms’ characteristics determine the 
individual performance and the capacity of a firm to export.  In addition, sunk entry costs are 
included to investigate the link between sunk costs and exporting.  The model we test specifies 
the relationship between the export decision and various factors given by: 
 ( )EX f Z=  (2.6) 
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where EX is the export decision of the firm.  Z  is a vector of firm characteristics.  
All independent variables are lagged by one year to control for potential endogeneity problems 
whereby previous characteristics of the firm determine the export decision in the current period.  
We include the lagged dependent variable to capture the effect of sunk entry costs: 
 1 ( 1) ( 1)it i t k i t itEX EX Zα β β ε− −= + + +  (2.7) 
whereε  is the error term. 
Our vector of firm characteristics is based on the previous literature.  Our final specification is: 
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 (2.8) 
where   
EX is the export dummy of firm i . 
FOREIGN is a dummy to indicate the structure of foreign ownership where a dummy 
equals   1 if least 10% of the firm’s shares are foreign owned. 
TFP is total factor productivity of the firm.  
SMALL is a dummy variable to represent a small firm. 
LARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a large firm. 
VLARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a very large firm. 
w ag e  is measured by the log of wages per employee.  
SKILL  is the ratio of skilled labour to total labour. 
TRAIN  represents the training dummy. 
RD  is a dummy variable of whether a firm engages in R&D. 
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REGION  is a vector of five regional dummies to indicate the regional location of a 
firm. 
2.4.2 Variables 
The detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Table 2A.1 of the Appendix 2A.  The 
dependent variable is the export dummy ( )itEX  which equals 1 if there is positive export within 
the firm, and 0 otherwise.  Our independent variables are as follows: 
The lagged dependent variable ( 1)( )i tEX −  is the previous export experience of a firm that can be 
used to captures for evidence of sunk entry costs.  The significant of export experience is 
typically interpreted as the evidence of sunk entry costs and persistence because the theoretical 
model by Krugman (1989) suggests that the participation of a firm in export market is usually 
characterised by the persistence of export behaviour which is assumed due to the existence of 
sunk entry costs.  According to Robert and Tybout (1997), the sunk-cost hysteresis framework 
can be tested by asking whether, given the current period gross profit, a firm the export 
experience helps to explain the export status in the current period or not.6  If the sunk entry 
costs are important, they appear directly in the binary response of participation decision in the 
export history.  Thus, a firm that has learned from their past experiences and exported in the 
previous year tend to also export in the current year.  We expect a positive relationship between 
sunk entry cost and the decision to export.  
                                                 
6 Several studies have shown that sunk-cost hysteresis has an effect on the entry and exit decisions of a firm (see e.g. 
Baldwin 1988, Dixit 1989a and 1989b, Krugman 1989).  In addition, Baldwin (1989) point out that the width and 
position of the hysteresis band is affected by the size of the sunk costs, the volatility of uncertainty and the degree 
of persistence of a shock.  The one of the findings shows that hysteresis band tends to widen with the greater sunk 
costs.   This implies that if a firm has incurred in high sunk costs the ability to export in any period is an indicator 
of continuing long-term exports while the failure to export in the short-term may also have negative long-term 
impact. 
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Foreign ownership ( 1)( )i tFOREIGN −  captures the structure of a firm’s ownership.  A firm is 
defined as foreign if at least 10% of its shares are foreign owned.  In this case, we generate a 
dummy equal to 1 if a firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise.  In our sensitivity analysis we 
define our foreign ownership dummy at 25% and 50% levels.  We expect foreign ownership to 
have a positive effect on the decision to export. 
In this chapter, we measure total factor productivity ( 1)( )i tTFP −  using three different methods.  
The first technique employs the semi-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) by 
taking unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks into account where the unobserved shock is 
measured by the use of intermediate inputs. The estimation procedure is provided in Appendix 
2B. The second method is the estimation of a semi-parametric and nonlinear least square 
regression of Buettner (2003) which also considers endogenous R&D in the TFP calculation 
(see Appendix 2C). 7   Finally, we measure productivity using a simple labour productivity 
measure which is calculated from the log of value added over total labour.  TFP is an indicator 
of plant success and is based on the argument that good firms become exporters (Bernard and 
Jensen, 2004).  Assuming firms with high TFP levels export, we expect to see a positive 
relationship between the two variables. 
Firm size is another important determinant of exporting as it is a measure of a firm’s success.   
Large firms tend to have higher productivity and are therefore more likely to engage in export 
activity.  In this chapter, we categorise firm size into small, medium, large and very large to 
investigate how size differences affect a firm’s decision to enter export markets.  Small firm 
( 1)( )i tSMALL −  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the total number of workers in firm i at time 
1t −  is in the first quartile distribution of the total workforce for all firms operating in the same 
                                                 
7 Buettner (2003) points out that R&D investment should be taken into account as part of the consideration for 
measuring the TFP because firms normally engage in R&D activities with the aim of improving productivity within 
firms.  Therefore, recent R&D investment would yield a direct effect on future productivity. 
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two-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) level (Revision 3) as firm i at 
time 1t − .  Medium ( 1)( )i tMEDIUM − , large ( 1)( )i tLARGE − and very large firm ( 1)( )i tVLARGE −  
are calculated using the same principle for the second, third and fourth quartile of the total 
worker distribution respectively.  MEDIUM  is the omitted category. 
Wage ( 1)( )i tw ag e − is the log of wages per employee calculated from the ratio of total wage 
payments to total workers less owners who do not receive a wage.  Wage is employed as an 
indicator of labour quality.  An increase in wages follows an increase in the quality of labour.  
Firms that pay high wages are expected to have a higher probability of exporting. 
Skilled labour ( 1)( )i tSKILL −  is the ratio of professional and skilled worker to total worker and is 
a proxy for workforce quality within a firm.  In general, export goods are assumed to have a 
higher quality than domestically produced goods (to meet the standards of import countries).  
The higher the quality of workers, therefore, the better the quality of goods that can be 
produced.  Thus, we expect the share of skilled workers to positively influence the probability of 
exporting. 
Training ( 1)( )i tTRAIN −  represents a training dummy that equals 1 if the workforce within a firm 
received any formal training and 0 otherwise.  Formal training may consist of in-house training, 
outside training or both.  Trained workers are assumed to be more efficient. 
R&D expenditure has the potential to enhance product quality and also to generate cost savings 
in the production process, two factors that may increase the likelihood of a firm entering the 
export market.  R&D ( 1)( )i tRD −  is categorised into two groups: R&D in product development 
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and R&D in process development.8  The former, R&D in product ( 1)( )i tRDPRO DUCT − , is a 
dummy variable for product improvement; it equals 1 if a firm conducts R&D in the product 
and 0 otherwise.  The latter, R&D in process ( 1)( )i tRDPRO CESS − , is an indicator for cost 
saving in the production process where a dummy variable equals 1 if a firm carries out R&D in 
production processes and 0 otherwise. 
Regional location variables ( )rREGION  are included to measure fixed regional effects.  We 
divide regional location into six regions namely, the Bangkok Metropolitan Area ( )BKKM , 
Central ( )CENTRAL , East( )EAST , North( )NO RTH , Northeast ( )NO RTHEAST  and South 
( )SO UTH .  The Northeast, the poorest region of Thailand, is the omitted category. 
2.4.3 Data 
Our data consist of a four year unbalanced panel from the Annual Survey of Thailand’s 
manufacturing industry by the Office of Industrial Economics (OIE), Ministry of Industry, 
Thailand for the period between 2001 and 2004.  All monetary variables are converted into US 
dollars using the market exchange rate from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and are 
expressed in 2001 constant prices using inflation rate data from IFS (2005) CD-Rom.  The 
survey covers 79 types of manufacturing activity at the four-digit ISIC level that consist of 23 
two-digit ISIC industries and includes small, medium, and large firms.9  The sample can be 
considered representative of the manufacturing industry in Thailand with the value added of 
firms included in the survey accounting for 95% of total manufacturing GDP (OIE, 2001).  The 
questionnaire includes twenty-five major questions that cover different aspects of a firm’s 
                                                 
8 We do not include both R&D variables in the model at the same time because both R&D are highly correlated 
(see Table 2A.3 of the Appendix 2A).  
9 In 2001 a questionnaire was sent out to 6,735 firms.  The response rate was around 60%.  Approximately 35% of 
firms were are small, 32% medium and 33% large. 
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characteristics and performance including balance sheet information.  We control for possible 
outliers by excluding 0.5% tails of all the regression variables except for binary dummies.  Our 
final unbalanced panel comprises 15,115 observations for the period 2001 to 2004.10 
As all regressors in the model are lagged by one year to minimise possible simultaneity problems, 
the data in the estimated sample includes 9,049 observations.  Descriptive statistics are provided 
in Table 2A.2 of the Appendix 2A. A correlation matrix is provided in Table 2A.3 of the 
Appendix 2A.  The raw correlations tend to match the expected signs except for the relationship 
between the export dummy and the ratio of skilled labour.  In addition, the correlation matrix 
shows that three pairwises are highly correlated. The first two pairwises are wage and TFP 
( BUETTNERTFP  and LABPRODTFP ), but we cannot drop any of these variables due to their 
importance and we retain the consistency of variables included in the model.  Correlation 
between wage and LPTFP  is relatively lower.  This may suggest the appropriateness of using 
LPTFP rather than alternative TFP variables.  Another pairwise that is highly correlated is 
product R&D and process R&D because they could capture similar things.  Thus, we do not 
include both R&D variables in the model at the same time. 
Table 2.7 presents the mean values of different characteristics between exporters and non-
exporters.  We compare three groups; all firms, foreign firms, and domestic firms.  For all firms, 
exporters have higher output, capital stock, productivity, wage and employment compared to 
non-exporters.  However, the differences are reasonably small for wage per worker.  Capital 
stock, output and employment of exporters is four times larger than that of non-exporters while 
no difference in the ratio of skilled labour is observed.  Foreign exporters are more productive 
than foreign non-exporters and have considerably higher output, capital and employment levels.  
                                                 
10 Each year some firms do not respond or even shut down which causes our data set to have an unbalanced 
structure.  To compensate for the closure or none response of some firms in 2004 the sampling was extended and 
data collected for additional plants (OIE, 2004).  Unfortunately we do not have specific data on firm deaths. 
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Surprisingly, the results show that foreign exporters have a slightly lower ratio of skilled to total 
labour.  This could be explained by export-platform FDI where foreign investors use Thailand 
as a production base in order to export and utilise Thailand’s relatively high stock of unskilled 
labour. 
In the case of domestic firms, there are differences between domestic exporters and non-
exporters in terms of output, capital stock, productivity, wage, ratio of skilled labour, 
employment.  Output of domestic exporters is twice that of domestic non-exporters.  These 
differences are even more pronounced for capital stock and employment. 
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Table 2.7: Mean Characteristics of Exporters vs. Non-Exporters in 2003 
  All firms  Foreign Firms Domestic Firms 
 Exporters Non-Exporters Exporters Non-Exporters Exporters Non-Exporters 
Output (million $US) 22.400 5.475 33.500  8.691 13.500  5.030 
Capital Stock (million $US) 11.300  2.369 15.100  6.211 8.297 1.833 
Total Factor Productivity 9.712  9.003  9.770  9.605  9.666  8.919  
Labour Productivity 9.308  8.847  9.624  9.428  9.054  8.763  
Employment 596.184  137.375 683.867  240.392  525.345  123.034  
Wage per Worker ($US) 3256.014 2434.465  4000.662  3918.826  2654.413  2227.832  
Ratio of Skilled Labour  0.530  0.529  0.517  0.540  0.535  0.528  
Notes: Capital stock is total fixed assets.  Total factor productivity is obtained from the estimation technique of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Labour productivity is the log 
of value added over total labour. 
35 
 
2.4.4 Econometric Methodology 
In our model, the dependent variable is a binary response dummy variable for export status.  
The explanation for the binary choice model can be written in the form of latent variable as: 
 * ' ( 1)it i t itEX Zα β ε−= + +  (2.9) 
where Z  is a 1K ×  vector of firm characteristic parameters and i tε  is the error term.  Rather 
than observing the latent variable *( )itEX  in Equation (2.9) we only observe a binary response 
( )itEX  which indicates the sign of 
*
itEX  where 1itEX = if * 0itEX > and 0itEX =  if * 0itEX ≤ . 
Because of the discrete dummy variable for export status, a probit model is used for our 
estimation methodology.  With certain assumptions, the error term ( )itε  follows a normal 
cumulative distribution function. 
The literature suggests a number of alternative estimation methods to deal with the 
characteristics of a binary choice model, such as GMM in first differences and the linear 
probability model (LPM).  However, the GMM first difference estimator for dynamic panel data 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) requires two or more lags of the right-hand-side variables as 
instruments.  Because of our relatively short panel we cannot use GMM in first differences.  For 
LPM, the relationship between the occurring probability and the independent variables is 
assumed to be linear.  However, LPM seems not to be an appropriate method of estimation for 
a binary choice framework because of several deficiencies.  First, the value of the disturbance 
comprises of only two specific values.  Therefore, LPM fails to fulfil the ordinary least square 
(OLS) requirement of a normal distribution of the disturbances.  Second, LPM appears to have 
a problem of heteroscedastic variances of disturbances because the variances of disturbances 
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follow the change in the dependent variables.  Finally, there is the possibility that the predicted 
probability of LPM lies outside the range of 0 to 1, so the estimated coefficients are likely to be 
biased.  Although the problem of heteroscedastic standard errors can be corrected by using a 
robust variance estimator the first and third problems persist.11 
Within our available firm-level panel data, we have unobserved firm heterogeneity.  For each 
specification, unobserved firm heterogeneity should be modelled as fixed effects or random 
effects depending on which is the more appropriate.  The error term ( )itε  from the latent 
variable model in Equation (2.9) comprises of two components where it i itε μ η= + .  iμ  is the 
unobserved firm specific effect and itη is the stochastic disturbance term. 
The fixed effects estimator captures firm specific effects.  This approach assumes that iμ  are 
fixed parameters to be estimated that vary over the individual firm and itη  are independently 
and identically distributed over individuals, itη ~ 2(0, )IID ησ .  The explanatory variables are also 
assumed to be independent of itη  for all i and t.  In contrast, the random effects estimator treats 
iμ  as a random variable so iμ ~ 2(0, )IID μσ , itη ~ 2(0, )IID ησ  and iμ  are independent of itη .  In 
addition, the assumption requires the unobserved explanatory variables to be independent of iμ  
and itη  for all i and t (Baltagi, 2005). 
The random effects estimator however is inappropriate as the assumption that the independent 
variables are strictly exogenous conditional on iμ  is likely to be violated as we include a lagged 
dependent variable as a measure of sunk entry cost in the model.  Plant characteristics are also 
correlated with the unobserved firm heterogeneity such as technology within the firm, 
                                                 
11 For further discussion see Gujarati (1995) pp. 542-546. 
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managerial capability, etc.  Regarding the lagged dependent variable, the fixed effects estimator 
would produce biased and inconsistent results (Bernard and Jensen, 2004). 
By choosing among the models and available specifications, we employ a pooled probit model 
to estimate the decision of a firm to engage in export markets. The response probability for the 
probit model can be written as: 
 ( 1) ( 1)( 1 ) ( )it i t i tP EX Zβ− −′= | Ζ = Φ  (2.10) 
where P stands for outcome probability. ( 1)i tZ −  is a vector of firm characteristics including sunk 
entry costs.  (.)Φ  is a normal cumulative distribution function of the error term which is 
assumed to lie between the range of 0 and 1, 0 (.) 1< Φ < . 
We add industry dummies and time dummies to control for unobserved industry fixed effects 
and time varying effects.  The former ( )jINDUS  are categorised according to the three-digit 
ISIC level (Revision 3); there are 51 industries in total.  For the time dummies ( )tT , only two-
year dummies are included to the model as we lag all the independent variables by one year.  We 
correct for the problem of heteroscedastic errors by using a robust variance estimation that 
allows for clustering at the two-digit industry level.  Thus, the estimated model of the export 
decision becomes: 
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In our estimated results, the coefficients obtained from the probit estimation are the predicted 
probabilities of belonging to one of the categories.  We calculate marginal effect to indicate the 
slope of the expected change in the probability of the outcome when the independent variable is 
changed one at a time.  In the probit model, the marginal effect is calculated at the mean of each 
continuous independent variable (except for the dummy variable) and is given by: 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
[ ( 1 )] [ ( )][ ( )] ( )it i t i tit i t k
ki t ki t ki t
P EX Z ZE EX Z
Z Z Z
β β β− − −
− − −
′∂ = | ∂ Φ∂ ′= = = Φ∂ ∂ ∂  (2.12) 
where Φ  is the probability density function for a standard normal variables.  kZ  is the sample 
mean of each independent variable and kβ  is the estimated coefficient from the probit 
regression where 1, 2, 3, ...,k n= .  When the independent variable is a dummy, the marginal 
effect reported is the effect of the discrete change of a dummy variable from zero to one. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Firm Characteristics and a Firm’s Decision to Export 
Table 2.8 provides the marginal effect estimations, calculated at the mean of each independent 
variable (except for a dummy variable). 12   Three different TFP calculation techniques are 
performed for the purpose of sensitivity analysis.  Columns (1) and (2) includes LPTFP  obtained 
from the estimation procedure of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  Columns (3) and (4) and 
Columns (5) and (6) are our alternative TFP measures denoted BUETTNERTFP and LABPRODTFP  
from Buettner’s (2003) method and the log of labour productivity respectively. 
                                                 
12 In Table 2D.1 of the Appendix 2D, we also present the results obtained from marginal effects estimation where 
different columns demonstrate how the model is built.  
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The results show that the past experience of a firm have a positive and significant effect on the 
export decision.  The coefficient on past export experience is identical and consistent across all 
three columns and indicates that if a firm exports in the previous period, the probability of its 
exporting in the current period is increased by 0.91.  This strong result simply reflects a high 
degree of persistence in export behaviour that means that the rate of the entry into and exit 
from export markets are reasonably low.  In general, the significance of the export experience is 
interpreted as evidence of sunk costs (Robert and Tybout 1997, Bugamelli and Infante 2003, 
Bernard and Jensen 2004, and Greenaway and Kneller 2004).  From the width of hysteresis in 
exports by Baldwin (1989), the hysteresis band tends to widen with the greater sunk costs.  
Therefore, a high degree of persistence could imply that sunk entry costs are large so the ability 
to export in any period is an indicator of continuing long-term exports while the failure to 
export in the short-term may also have negative long-term impact. 
For foreign ownership, it is clearly seen that foreign ownership is positively correlated with the 
probability of exporting.  Hence, being a foreign-owned firm increases the probability of 
exporting by 7 percentage points relative to being a domestically-owned firm.  The results for all 
three TFP variables are similar and are a positive and significant determinant of the decision to 
export.  For example, the coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) can be interpreted as increasing 
TFP by one unit increases the probability of exporting on average by 3.2 percentage points.  
As expected, firm size is another important determinant of the export decision.  The three size 
groupings provide different results.  The negative and significant coefficient on small firms 
indicates that small firms are less likely to become exporters.  As firm sizes increase, we observe 
increasingly positive and significant results.  The coefficients of large and very large firms 
indicate that the larger the size, the more likely the firm is to enter the export market.   
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The quality of the workforce (proxied by average wage) is also a factor that could determine the 
probability of exporting.  However, Table 2.8 shows that wage has an insignificant effect.  Other 
firm characteristics such as the ratio of skilled labour, training, R&D in the product, and 
production process have a positive effect on the probability of exporting. 13  However, such 
variables appear to be insignificant except for product R&D.  The evidence for Thailand shows 
that various measures of labour quality such as wage, ratio of skilled labour and training have the 
expected sign but are insignificant.  This perhaps can be explained by differences in the 
characteristic of products exported.  Some products do not require skilled labour or training in 
their production while some do.  In addition, some firms export mass-produced products or 
intermediate inputs that are produced using cheap labour costs.  Therefore, in Thailand, the 
probability of exporting is not significantly determined by wage, ratio of skilled labour nor 
training.  
For the location variables, the coefficients of the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Central, East, 
North and South are positive relative to the North-Eastern region.14  The Southern region is 
significant at the 1% level. 15   The probability of exporting will be on average about 16.5 
percentage points higher for firms located in the South compared to other regions.  One 
explanation for the significant coefficient may be that a firm located in the South has lower 
                                                 
13 We have some concerns about the quality of our skilled labour variable from the raw data as some firms may not 
specify the quantity of labour skill differences correctly.  When we exclude this variable there are no differences in 
the results for the other regressors.  The sign, the significant or insignificant of all other variables in the model are 
broadly the same (see Table 2D.2 in Appendix 2D). 
14 According to the 2002 Gini Coefficient and Gross Regional per Capita of 2006 from Office of the National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the Northeast is the poorest region of Thailand. 
15  We also try an alternative categorisation of location following the Board of Investment (BOI) ranking of 
privileges by location.  Due to the decentralisation of industrial investment, since 1993 the BOI has divided the 
country into three different investment promotion zones.  Approved foreign applicants will receive different 
privileges (tax-based and non-tax privileges) according to their establishment location.  In our regression, for a firm 
export’s decision, Zone 3-Group 2 (low-income provinces) is the omitted category.  The results show that Zone 1, 
Zone 2 and Zone 3-Group 1 (high-income provinces) all have positive and significant effect on the probability of 
exporting.  However, as we have some difficulty in identifying whether foreign-owned firms in our sample actually 
receive these privileges we do prefer our original specification. 
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transportation costs.  Surface transport within the continent (e.g. exports to Malaysia) may be 
used instead of more costly aerial or ocean shipping. 
As a further sensitivity check we investigate the effect of sunk entry costs and firm 
characteristics on the probability of exporting using different definitions of foreign ownership.  
Rather than define a firm as foreign when only 10% is foreign owned, we use 25% and 50% as 
alternative cut-off points (see Tables 2E.1 and 2E.2 of the Appendix 2E).  Our results show that 
the higher the percentage share used to classify foreign ownership, the greater the effect on the 
probability of exporting.  All other variables are almost identical to those in Table 2.8.  We also 
perform other sensitivity checks on size variable by classifying size according to total fixed assets 
instead of total employment.  The results presented in the Appendix 2E are generally consistent.  
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Table 2.8: Pooled Probit Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914***(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
( 1)−i tFOREIGN  0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070***(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.032*** 0.032***  (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.030* 0.030*   (0.016) (0.016)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.037*** 0.036*** (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)−i tSMALL  -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.110*** -0.110***(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)−i tLARGE  0.106*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.114*** 0.114***(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tVLARGE  0.155*** 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.170*** 0.171***(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.049 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.040 0.040(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.022 0.021 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.022(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.071* 0.068* 0.070* (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.077 0.075  0.076 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.058)
BKKM  0.093 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.096 0.096
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068)
CENTRAL  0.071 0.071 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.070
(0.091) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090)
EAST  0.071 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070
(0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078)
NORTH  0.090 0.089 0.093 0.091 0.095 0.094
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
SOUTH  0.166*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.164***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All 
the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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2.5.2 Country of Origin of Parent Company and a Firm’s Decision to Export 
In this sub-section, we examine the effect of the country of origin of firm ownership on a firm’s 
decision to export by disaggregating our foreign dummy into different countries of origin.  The 
details of the different country of origin groupings that we include in the model are provided in 
Table 2A.4 of the Appendix 2A.16  Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show the results of the estimated 
marginal effects in which foreign ownership is characterised by at least 10% and 50% of shares 
owned by foreigners. 
In Columns (1) to (6) of Table 2.9, firm-specific characteristics and regional location variables 
are very similar to the results previously discussed.  Results of regional location variables are not 
included in the table for reasons of space.  For the effect of country of origin on a firm’s 
decision to export, the estimated marginal effect results show that the coefficients for Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Australia and Canada and UK are significant at the 10% level and Southeast 
Asia and US are significant at the 5% level.17 
Foreign firms from Japan, Malaysia, Australia and Canada, UK and US are more likely to export 
compared to domestic firms where the probability of exporting is increased by average values of 
0.10, 0.23, 0.16, 0.11 and 0.12, respectively.  In contrast, Korean- and Southeast Asian-owned 
firms are less likely to export.  Interestingly, there is no significant coefficient on China, the 
second largest investor in Thailand.  The results imply that different countries invest in Thailand 
for different reasons.  It appears that firms from Japan, Malaysia, Australia and Canada, UK, US 
and perhaps China invest in Thailand in order to use Thailand as an export-platform whereas 
firms with their parent companies from Korea and Southeast Asian countries intend to supply 
only the domestic market.   
                                                 
16 See Table 2A.1 of the Appendix 2A for the definitions of each individual country and region dummy. 
17 Southeast Asia consists of Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines. 
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Thailand is an attractive site for value-added manufacturing because workforces are highly 
skilled and have a strong knowledge base.  Even though the labour costs in Thailand may not be 
the cheapest in the region, they are relatively cheaper compared to the costs in the home 
countries.  Therefore, firms from Japan, Malaysia, Australia and Canada, UK and US tend to 
concentrate on the knowledge-based and efficiency-seeking investment especially in the capital-
intensive industries.  For example, numerous foreign automotive manufactures from Japan and 
the US use Thailand to as an export-platform to sell their product worldwide.  Another 
motivation is tariff-jumping FDI.  Some countries may try to avoid certain tariffs by using 
Thailand as a production based to distribute products to countries within ASEAN free trade 
area.  
Typically, motivations of Korean investors investing in Thailand are attempting to develop local 
and third countries markets as well as to reduce the production costs by taking advantage of low 
wages.  Our result shows that Korean-owned firms are less likely to export and tend to target on 
domestic market. It is not surprising that we do not find evidence for export platform FDI.  
Similarly to Thailand, Korea is a country that is most affected by the currency crisis in 1997.  
The devaluation of Korean currency, falling prices and wages cause Korea to be an attractive 
site for investment.  However, this incentive of investment may change as recently BOI have 
been trying to attract more FDI inflows from Korea by open investment promotion office in 
South Korea with the aim to increase attract more investment in various industries such as 
electronic, electrical appliances and vehicles.  For investors from South East Asia (Indonesia, 
Myanmar and the Philippines), they invest in Thailand to seek for market opportunities where 
the price of certain products can be sold at a higher price.   
To check the sensitivity of these results we re-estimate the model using the alternative cut-off 
points for foreign ownership.  The results presented in Table 2.10 are for the 50% cut-off point 
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of foreign-owned share.18  The main difference in the results is that the behaviour of Chinese, 
Malaysian, Singaporean and UK firms is now different to those from Japan and the US.  As the 
percentage share owned by China and Singapore increases the probability of Chinese- and 
Singaporean-owned firms exporting also increases.  However, for Malaysian and UK firms, it 
appears that an increase in the percentage of foreign-owned share does not have any significant 
effect on the probability of exporting.  Even though foreign firms from Malaysia, non-EU and 
other countries do not significantly determine the probability of exporting, we observe that the 
coefficients turn out to be negative when 50% of foreign-owned share is used as a cut-off point.  
The explanation for the change in some results is that as the percentage of foreign-owned share 
increases, foreign shareholders will play a greater role in defining the strategies and policies of 
the firm.  We also perform a sensitivity check using different definitions of our size variable but 
the results are generally unchanged (see Tables 2E.7 to 2E.9 of the Appendix 2E). 
Our results lead to several policy implications. The significance of export experience is 
interpreted as the evidence of sunk entry costs, therefore, policymakers should stress on the 
entry promotion policies that help to reduce sunk entry costs faced by each firm such as finance 
trade fair, finance market research, support export credit insurance, etc.  At the same time, 
government should actively utilise export promotion policies and focus on the export 
promotion in the less effected market in order to help exporters to expand their export share.  
Foreign ownership is also important in determining the probability of exporting.  This implies 
that attracting more FDI inflows particularly export platform FDI will help to stimulate more 
exports.  However, the policymakers need to think carefully about how and whom they target 
their inward FDI policies as the results from the break down countries of origin show that 
different countries have different incentives of investment.  To encourage more FDI inflows, 
                                                 
18 Using 25% of foreign-owned share as a cut-off point, results presented in Table 2E.3 of the Appendix 2E are 
broadly similar to those in Columns (1) to (6) of Table 2.9 except for Korean-owned firms which now have no 
significant impact on the probability of exporting. 
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the government should continuously open investment promotion offices in various countries 
that help to provide investment information to foreign investors.  In addition, the investment 
promotion packages should focus on the strategic targeting of investment such as technology, 
R&D and human resource development need of industry.   
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Table 2.9: Pooled Probit Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export - 
10% Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.915***(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.032*** 0.032***  (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.030* 0.030*   (0.015) (0.015)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.036*** 0.036*** (0.012) (0.012)
( 1)−i tSMALL  -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.108*** -0.108***(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)−i tLARGE  0.107*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.115***(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tVLARGE  0.153*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.169*** 0.170***(0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.046 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.038 0.038(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.022 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.068* 0.066* 0.068* (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.074 0.072  0.073 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.058)
( 1)−i tCHINA  0.053 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.050(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
( 1)−i tEU  0.035 0.036 0.031 0.033 0.029 0.030(0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
( 1)−i tJAPAN  0.098* 0.099* 0.097* 0.098* 0.097* 0.097*(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
( 1)−i tKOREA  -0.127* -0.126* -0.128* -0.127* -0.125* -0.123*(0.074) (0.073) (0.070) (0.069) (0.072) (0.071)
( 1)−i tMALAYSIA  0.225* 0.224* 0.225* 0.224* 0.223* 0.222*(0.118) (0.118) (0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116)
( 1)−i tNO NEU  0.077 0.079 0.080 0.082 0.080 0.082(0.134) (0.135) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133)
( 1)−i tOTHER  0.054 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.051(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
( 1)−i tAUSCAN  0.164* 0.163* 0.161* 0.160* 0.165* 0.164*(0.098) (0.098) (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.097)
( 1)−i tSOUTHASIA   -0.038 -0.037 -0.031 -0.029 -0.031 -0.029(0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
( 1)−i tSEASIA  -0.197** -0.192** -0.197** -0.193** -0.197** -0.193**(0.094) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.098)
( 1)−i tSINGAPORE  0.038 0.036 0.044 0.043 0.036 0.034(0.061) (0.061) (0.067) (0.067) (0.062) (0.062)
( 1)−i tUK  0.110* 0.110* 0.110* 0.109* 0.108* 0.107*(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
( 1)−i tUS  0.124** 0.126** 0.122** 0.124** 0.122** 0.125**(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Region, time and three-digit industry dummies are 
included.  All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
48 
 
Table 2.10: Pooled Probit Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export - 
50% Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.914*** 0.914*** 0.913*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.036*** 0.035***  (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.035** 0.034**   (0.015) (0.015)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.040*** 0.039*** (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)−i tSMALL  -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.111*** -0.112***(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)−i tLARGE  0.104*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.112*** 0.113***(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
( 1)−i tVLARGE  0.152*** 0.152*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.169*** 0.170***(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.047 0.047 0.043 0.043 0.037 0.037(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.027 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.027(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.015 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.075* 0.071* 0.074* (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.081 0.078  0.080 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.058)
( 1)−i tCHINA  0.177** 0.177** 0.175** 0.175** 0.174** 0.174**(0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
( 1)−i tEU  0.130 0.134 0.129 0.133 0.128 0.131(0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.126)
( 1)−i tJAPAN  0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.136***(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
( 1)−i tKOREA  -0.063 -0.061 -0.069 -0.067 -0.063 -0.061(0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071)
( 1)−i tMALAYSIA  -0.062 -0.064 -0.056 -0.057 -0.064 -0.065(0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.055)
( 1)−i tNO NEU  -0.028 -0.026 -0.024 -0.021 -0.022 -0.019(0.084) (0.085) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.083)
( 1)−i tOTHER  -0.070 -0.071 -0.073 -0.074 -0.074 -0.075(0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077) (0.077)
( 1)−i tAUSCAN      
( 1)−i tSOUTHASIA   -0.044 -0.044 -0.041 -0.041 -0.042 -0.043(0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
( 1)−i tSEASIA      
( 1)−i tSINGAPORE  0.206*** 0.204*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.209*** 0.207***(0.053) (0.054) (0.068) (0.068) (0.057) (0.057)
( 1)−i tUK  0.109 0.107 0.109 0.107 0.110 0.109(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
( 1)−i tUS  0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149***(0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Observations 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Region, time and three-digit industry dummies are 
included.  All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the export decision of firms using a firm-level dataset from the 
manufacturing industry in Thailand over the period 2001 to 2004.  Consistent with both the 
theoretical and past empirical explanations, the export experience is the most important 
determinant of the probability of exporting in the current period.  The significant of export 
experience is interpreted as the evidence of sunk entry cost.  Firms enter the export market if 
the expected profit of the current period is greater than the sunk entry costs.  Once firms export, 
they are likely to gain experience from being exporters. 
To estimate the effect of productivity we employ three alternative estimation techniques to 
measure TFP; a standard labour productivity measure; a semi-parametric approach that takes 
account of unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks and a system estimation which allows 
for endogenous R&D.  The estimated results are robust with positive and significant coefficients 
implying that firms with high productivity have a higher probability of exporting.  For our other 
independent variables, the results show a positive and significant relationship between foreign 
ownership and export status.  Firms with high wages are likely to enter export markets and firm 
size is also important, small firms are less likely to export but the larger a firm then becomes the 
more likely it is to export. 
One of the key contributions of this chapter is to disaggregate the level of foreign ownership 
into different countries and regions of origin in order to examine the effect on the decision of a 
firm to export.  The results show that certain countries or regions such as China, Japan, 
Singapore, US and UK are more strongly reliant on Thailand as an export platform.  We also 
observe that the behaviour of Chinese- and Singaporean-owned firms are different to others 
with the probability of exporting correlated with the size of the foreign-owned share. 
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Overall, the determinants of a firm’s export decision from a Thai perspective are broadly 
consistent with those findings from other developed and developing country studies.  We can 
conclude that good firms become exporters whereas firms self-select into the export market 
based on differences in their export experience, productivity, location and other firm-specific 
characteristics.  More importantly, we show that country of origin matters in determining the 
export decision of a firm.  Finally, the effects of export experience and foreign ownership 
appear to be more pronounced for firms in Thailand than those of other studies.  We believe 
that this reflects the importance of exporting to the previous, current and future development 
strategy of the new Asian Tigers.  This is an analysis that until now had not been undertaken. 
The implication of our results for governments of developing countries is the need to think 
carefully about how and to whom they target their inward FDI policies as a means of growth.  
The heterogeneous behaviour of multinationals from different nations means that policies 
targeting specific regions or countries may be preferable to general tax concessions or the 
implementation of special economic zones that are open to all. 
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Appendix 2A: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2A.1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
itEX  
A dummy variable for export status where itEX equals 1 if firm i
exports and 0 otherwise. 
( 1 )i tEX −  
Export experience that is a dummy variable for export status at time 
1t −  where ( 1)i tEX − equals 1 if firm i  at time 1t −  exports and 0 
otherwise. 
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 10% are foreign owned. 
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 25% are foreign owned. 
( 1)50i tFOREIGN −  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 50% are foreign owned. 
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  
Total factor productivity that is obtained from the estimation of the 
semi-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  
Total factor productivity that is obtained from a system estimation of 
Buettner (2003). 
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  
Labour productivity that is calculated from the log of value added 
divided by total labour. 
( 1)i tSMALL −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if the total labour of the firm i  at time 1t −  
is in the first quartile of the distribution of the total labour of all firms 
operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as firm i  at time 
1t − . 
( 1)i tLARGE −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if the total labour of the firm i  at time 1t −  
is in the third quartile of the distribution of the total labour of all firms 
operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as firm i  at time 
1t − . 
( 1)i tVLARGE −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if the total labour of the firm i  at time 1t −  
is in the forth quartile of the distribution of the total labour of all firms 
operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as firm i  at time 
1t − . 
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  
A firm is categorised as small firm if total fixed assets of firm i  at time 
1t −  is in the first quartile of the distribution of the total fixed assets of 
all firms operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as firm i  at 
time 1t − . 
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  
A firm is categorised as large firm if the total fixed assets of firm i  at 
time 1t −  is in the third quartile of the distribution of the total fixed 
assets of all firms operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as 
firm i  at time 1t − . 
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  
A firm is categorised as very large firm if the total fixed assets of firm i  
at time 1t −  is in the forth quartile of the distribution of the total fixed 
assets of all firms operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as 
firm i  at time 1t − . 
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( 1)i tw ag e −  
The log of wage per employee from the ratio of total labour payments 
over total labour less owner’s wage. 
( 1)i tSKILL −  The ratio of professional and skilled labour to total labour. 
( 1)i tTRAIN −  
A training dummy equals 1 if the workforce within a firm has received 
formal training either in-house training or outside training or both at 
least once, and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm carries out R&D in product 
development and 0 otherwise.  
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm performs R&D in the development 
of production processes and 0 otherwise.  
BKKM  
A dummy variable identifies whether firm locates in Bangkok 
Metropolitan Area or not.  
CENTRAL A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Central region excluding Bangkok and Metropolitan Area and 0 otherwise. 
EAST  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Eastern region and 0 otherwise. 
NORTH  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the North of Thailand 
and 0 otherwise. 
SOUTH  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the South of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tCHINA −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by Chinese including 
Taiwan and Hong Kong and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tEU −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by one of the country in 
EU-14 which does not include UK and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tJAPAN −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by Japanese and 0 
otherwise. 
( 1)i tKOREA −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by South Korean and 0 
otherwise. 
( 1)i tMALAYSIA −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by Malaysian and 0 
otherwise. 
( 1)i tNO NEU −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by a country in Europe 
excluding countries in the EU-15 and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tAUSCAN −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by either Australian or 
Canadian and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tSO UTHASIA −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by a country in the South 
Asia (India and Pakistan ) and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tSEASIA −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by a country in the 
Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines) and 0 
otherwise. 
( 1)i tSINGAPORE −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by Singaporean and 0 
otherwise. 
( 1)i tUK −  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by UK and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tUS −  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by US and 0 otherwise. 
( 1)i tOTHER −  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm owned by countries in Africa, 
Middle East, Caribbean, Central America, Oceania and South Pacific 
Ocean and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
itEX   9049 0.50 0.50 0 1
( 1)i tEX −    9049 0.50 0.50 0 1
( 1)i tFOREIGN −    9049 0.28 0.45 0  1
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  9049 0.24 0.43 0 1
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  9049 0.14 0.35 0  1
( 1)i tSMALL −   9049 0.26 0.44 0  1
( 1)i tLARGE −  9049 0.24 0.43 0 1
( 1)i tVLARGE −  9049 0.25 0.43 0 1
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  9049 0.26 0.44 0 1
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  9049 0.24 0.43 0 1
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  9049 0.25 0.43 0  1
( 1)i tw ag e −  9049 7.71 0.54 3.08 10.29
( 1)i tSKILL −  9049 0.53 0.33 0  1
( 1)i tTRAIN −  9049 0.87 0.33 0  1
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  9049 0.06 0.23 0 1
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −  9049 0.04 0.20 0 1
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  9049 9.22  1.83  0.47 16.69
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  9049 10.19  1.28  1.21  15.31
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  9049 8.98  1.04  1.45  14.00
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Table 2A.3: Correlation Matrix 
 
E
X
 
E
X
i
(
t
-
1
)
 
F
O
R
E
G
I
N
 
F
O
R
E
G
I
N
2
5
 
F
O
R
E
G
I
N
5
0
 
S
M
A
L
L
 
L
A
R
G
E
 
V
L
A
R
G
E
 
S
M
A
L
L
A
 
L
A
R
G
E
A
 
V
L
A
R
G
E
A
 
w
a
g
e
 
S
K
I
L
L
 
T
R
A
I
N
 
R
D
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
 
R
D
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
 
T
F
P
L
P
 
T
F
P
L
A
B
P
R
O
D
 
T
F
P
L
A
B
P
R
O
D
 
EX 1.00     
EXi(t-1) 0.94 1.00    
FOREGIN 0.37  0.37 1.00    
FOREGIN25 0.36  0.37  0.92 1.00    
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LARGE 0.14  0.13  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.34 1.00    
VLARGE 0.36  0.36  0.22  0.21  0.20  -0.34  -0.33 1.00    
SMALLA -0.37  -0.37  -0.24  -0.22  -0.20  0.58  -0.26  -0.33 1.00    
LARGEA 0.14  0.13  0.07  0.06  0.05  -0.24  0.28  -0.03  -0.34 1.00   
VLARGEA 0.34  0.34  0.27  0.26  0.26  -0.34  -0.04  0.63  -0.34  -0.33 1.00   
wage  0.28  0.27  0.41  0.40  0.34  -0.23  0.08  0.18  -0.32  0.11 0.31 1.00   
SKILL -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  0.11  -0.05  -0.06  0.06  -0.04 -0.02  0.08 1.00   
TRAIN  0.22  0.22  0.14  0.13  0.11  -0.28  0.11  0.19  -0.25  0.09 0.20  0.21  -0.03 1.00   
RDPRODUCT 0.13  0.13  0.05 0.05  0.04  -0.10  0.01  0.15  -0.10  0.04 0.11  0.08  -0.04  0.08 1.00   
RDPROCESS 0.10  0.10  0.05  0.04  0.02  -0.08  0.02  0.11  -0.09  0.02 0.10  0.08  -0.02  0.07  0.58 1.00   
TFPLP 0.21  0.20  0.15  0.13  0.08  -0.26  0.07  0.25  -0.26  0.06 0.30  0.42  -0.04  0.17  0.08  0.08 1.00   
TFPBUETTNER 0.40  0.40  0.38  0.36  0.31  -0.46  0.13  0.44  -0.50  0.12 0.55  0.65  -0.03  0.29  0.15  0.13  0.63 1.00  
TFPLABPROD 0.27  0.26  0.35  0.33  0.28  -0.25 0.08  0.22  -0.38  0.10 0.41  0.70  0.01  0.22  0.11  0.10  0.61  0.93 1.00 
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Table 2A.4: Country of Origin of a Parent Company by Year 
Country 
2001 2002 2003 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Foreign:    
China 210  6.27  195  6.33 167  6.38  
EU-14 75  2.24  73  2.37  62  2.37  
Japan 359  10.72  344  11.16  322  12.30  
Korea 17  0.51  18  0.58  19  0.73  
Malaysia 15  0.45  13  0.42  9  0.34  
Non EU-15 22  0.66  23  0.75  16  0.61  
Australia and Canada 10  0.30  9  0.29  6  0.23  
South Asia 12  0.36  12  0.39  9  0.34  
Southeast Asia 4  0.12  4  0.13  6  0.23  
Singapore 57  1.70  46  1.49  44  1.68  
UK 34  1.01  34  1.10  24  0.92  
US 67  2.00  65  2.11  55  2.10  
Other Countries 9  0.27  13  0.42  10  0.38  
Domestic:    
Thailand 2,459  73.40  2,233  72.45  1,868  71.38  
Total 3,350  100.00 3,082  100.00 2,617  100.00
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Appendix 2B: TFP Estimation Using Levinsohn and Petrin’s 
(2003) Method 
In the chapter, the estimation of TFP is accomplished using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and the semi-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  The approach was 
adapted from Olley and Pakes (1996) which considered the endogeneity problem by taking 
unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks into account. 
A consequence of the endogeneity problem is that OLS yields biased and inconsistent results in 
productivity estimations because it fails to take unobserved productivity shock into account.  
Olley and Pakes (1996) resolve the endogeneity problem by using an investment proxy to 
control for the simultaneity problem between the correlation of input levels and unobserved 
productivity shocks. 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) point out that such an investment proxy may not respond to the 
productivity shock smoothly due to adjustment costs.  Additionally, such a variable is valid only 
among those firms who report non-zero investment.  Firms with zero investment have to be 
dropped from the sample. 
To avoid the zero investment and adjustment problems, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) introduce, 
with the modification of Olley and Pakes (1996), the use of intermediate inputs to measure the 
correlation between input levels and productivity shocks.  If intermediate inputs are less costly 
to adjust, they may perhaps respond smoothly and fully to productivity shocks. 
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TFP in the chapter is separately estimated for each of the two-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors, 
22 in total.19  The estimated production function can be expressed as follow: 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ߱௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2B.1) 
where ݕ௜௧ is the log of value added of plant ݅ at time ݐ defined as sales net raw material costs, ݈௜௧ 
is the log of total labour20, ݇௜௧ is the log of plant’s capital stock which is defined as value of fixed 
assets.  The error terms comprises two components, ߱௜௧  and ߟ௜௧ , where the former is 
unobserved productivity shocks which are correlated with the input choice while the latter is the 
error term which has no impact on the firms’ decision. 
The demand function for intermediate input is a function of state variables – capital and 
unobserved productivity shock – as given in Equation (2B.2) 
 ݉௜௧ ൌ ݉௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ߱௜௧ሻ (2B.2) 
The relationship between intermediate inputs and unobserved firm productivity shocks is 
assumed to be monotonic where firms respond to positive productivity shocks by using more 
intermediate inputs so as to enlarge their output.  Thus, the demand function for intermediate 
input in Equation (2B.2) can be inverted.  Unobserved productivity shocks can be written as a 
function of capital and intermediate inputs as follows: 
 ߱௜௧ ൌ ߱௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ (2B.3) 
where ݉௜௧ denotes log of a fuel and energy cost as a proxy for intermediate inputs. 
With substitution of (2B.3) into (2B.1) 
                                                 
19 Due to the insufficient observations, the manufacture of tobacco products is grouped with the manufacture of 
food products and beverages. 
20 We use total labour rather than the number of skilled and unskilled workers.  This is because of concerns that we 
have previously expressed about the quality of our raw data as some firms may be mis-specifying the number of 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
58 
 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ߱௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2B.4) 
Since ߱௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ is an unknown function of intermediate input and capital, Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) has generated a function of ߶௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ in order to estimate the parameters. 
 ߶௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ߱௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ (2B.5) 
So,  
 ߱௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ ൌ ߶௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ െ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ (2B.6) 
Substituting (2B.6) into (2B.4) gives us the production function as if a fuel and energy cost is 
used as the proxy variable. 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൅ ߶௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2B.7) 
The estimation procedure in the chapter follows the two stage estimation in the value-added 
case as discussed in Petrin et al. (2004). 
In the first stage, the estimation of production function (2B.7) using OLS by the substitution of 
߶௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ݉௜௧ሻ with a third-order polynomial in ݇௜௧ and ݉௜௧ yields ߚመ௟ and ߶෠௜௧ (up to the intercept). 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൅ ∑ ∑ ߙ௛௝݇௜௧௛ ݉௜௧
௝ ൅ ߟ௜௧
ଷି௛
௝ୀ଴
ଷ
௛ୀ଴  (2B.8) 
Once the estimated elasticity of ߚ௟  and ߶௜௧  in the first stage is achieved, the next stage is to 
identify the residual of the production function and the estimated ߚመ௞. 
The relationship of the estimate residual from the production function can be written as 
 ߟప௧ ൅ ߦప௧෣ ൌ ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟෡ ݈௜௧ െ ߚ௞כ݇௜௧ െ ܧሾ߱ప௧|߱ప௧ିଵ෣ ሿ (2B.9) 
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where ߦ௜௧  is the error term namely the productivity innovation uncorrelated to capital, ߚ௞כ  is 
computed from a prediction of ෝ߱௜௧ ൌ ߶෠௜௧ െ ߚ௞כ݇௜௧ , while ܧሾ߱ప௧|߱ప௧ିଵ෣ ሿ  is a predicted 
unobserved productivity shock from a nonparametric approximation regression of ෝ߱௜௧ ൌ ߣ଴ ൅
ߣଵ߱௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߣଶ߱௜௧ିଵ
ଶ ൅ ߣଷ߱௧ିଵଷ ൅ ߤ௜௧. 
The estimate ߚመ௞ is defined as to minimise ߚ௞כ the solution of 
 minఉೖכ ∑ ∑ ሺݕ௜௧ െ ߚመ௟݈௜௧ െ ߚ௞
כ݇௜௧ െ ܧሾ߱ప௧|߱ప௧ିଵ෣ ሿሻଶ௧௜  (2B.10) 
The estimated elasticities of inputs obtained from the procedure of Petrin et al. (2004) are 
eventually used to predict the level of productivity. 
 ෝ߱௜௧ ൌ exp ሺݕ௜௧ െ ߚመ௟݈௜௧ െ ߚመ௞݇௜௧ሻ (2B.11) 
The number of bootstrap replications performed in the chapter is 250 to estimate standard 
errors. 
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Appendix 2C: TFP Estimation Using Buettner’s (2003) Method 
Firms normally engage in R&D activities with the aim of improving productivity within firms.  
Recent R&D investment would yield a direct effect on future productivity.  Therefore, Buettner 
(2003) points out that R&D investment should be taken into account as part of the 
consideration for measuring the TFP.  The study provides the estimation framework on the 
distribution of the future productivity conditionally based on the R&D investment and current 
productivity.  In addition, the structural model for firm dynamics is used to build up the 
estimation of the unobserved productivity state.  
To begin with Cobb-Douglas’s production function can be written as follows: 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ߱௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧  (2C.1) 
Here ݕ௜௧ is the log of the value added of plant ݅ at time ݐ.  ݈௜௧ and ݇௜௧ are the log of the total 
labour and plant’s capital stock respectively.  There are two components of the error terms in 
Equation (2C.1), ߱௜௧ is the productivity shock which correlates with the input choice while ߟ௜௧ 
represents the measurement error that has no impact on the firms’ decision. 
Buettner (2003) explains the estimation algorithm in two stages.  Stage one is indistinguishable 
from Olley and Pakes’s (1996) technique in the estimation of factors of input(s) coefficient.  
However, in the second stage, Buettner (2003) had modified Olley and Pakes (1996) in the 
estimation of the quasi-fixed inputs by assuming that the future productivity depends on current 
productivity and also the current R&D investment.  
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Stage one: Estimation of the Coefficients of the Variable Input(s) 
The nonparametric approach is used as the estimation strategy to control the unobserved 
productivity shock which has an impact on the firms’ decisions. 
The level of firm investment i  at time t  is a function of the state variables, current capital stock 
(݇௜௧) and current productivity shock (߱௜௧), as given; ݅௜௧ ൌ ݅௜௧ሺ݇௜௧, ߱௜௧ሻ.  This level of investment 
function has a monotonic property – a positive productivity shock influences firms to invest 
more.  Thus, the investment function can be inverted and rewritten so the relationship of the 
unobserved productivity is:  
 ߱௜௧ ൌ ෥߱௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ21 (2C.2) 
Substituting (2C.2) into Cobb-Douglas’s production function (2C.1) gives us: 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ෥߱௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.3) 
Since ෥߱௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ has an unknown functional form, Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) have generated another unknown function of ߶௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ which can be written as 
the Equation (2C.4): 
 ߶௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ෥߱௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ (2C.4) 
Hence,   
 ෥߱௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ ൌ ߶௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ െ ߚ଴ െ ߚ௞݇௜௧ (2C.5) 
Substitute (2C.5) into (2C.3) to obtain the production function to give: 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൅ ߶௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.6) 
                                                 
21 Similarly, unobserved productivity can also be written as the function of next period and current capital of firm ݅: 
߱௜௧ ൌ ෥߱௜௧ሺ݇௜௧ାଵ, ݇௧ሻ because next period capital is formed as ݇௜௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ݇௜௧ ൅ ݅௜௧. 
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Buettner (2003) estimates the semi-parametric regression model (2C.6) using OLS which yields a 
consistent estimation of coefficient ߚ௟ ; however, it does not identify the coefficient of ߚ௞ . 
Stage two: Estimation of the Coefficients of the Quasi-fixed Input(s) 
This stage aims to obtain the production function coefficient(s).  Buettner (2003) applies the 
identical strategy in stage two as Olley and Pakes (1996), but the only difference is that Buettner 
(2003) controls the expected productivity restricted on the past information at time ݐ െ 1 for 
the reason that it correlates with the current period’s capital stock which was chosen at time 
ݐ െ 1. 
Rearrange the Equation (2C.3) as similarly: 
 ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ෥߱௜௧ሺ݅௜௧, ݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.7) 
The expectation of the transformed dependent variable in Equation (2C.7) is restricted on the 
information at time ݐ െ 1 and survival until ݐ, can be written as: 
 ܧሾሺݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݈௜௧ሻ|ܫ௜௧ିଵ, ߯௜௧ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ܧሾ߱௜௧|߰௜௧, ߯௜௧ ൌ 1ሿ (2C.8) 
where ܫ௜௧ିଵ is the past information at time ݐ െ 1, ߯௜௧ represents the survival firm, ߰௜௧ denotes 
the current distribution choice of the productivity which is influenced by the firm decision on 
the R&D investment. 
Regarding Markov’s assumption for the productivity process, the function of productivity 
condition on survival can be written as: 
 ߱௜௧ ൌ ܧሾ߱௜௧|߰௜௧, ߯௜௧ ൌ 1ሿ ൅ ߦ௜௧ (2C.9) 
where ߦ௜௧ is the productivity innovation which is uncorrelated with ݇௜௧. 
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Substitute (2C.9) into (2C.7) to obtain the second stage estimation equation: 
 ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ܧሾ߱௜௧|߰௜௧, ߯௜௧ ൌ 1ሿ ൅ ߦ௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.10) 
In order to obtain the consistent coefficient of ߚ௞ from the estimation of the Equation (2C.10), 
the expected productivity condition on survival is needed to be controlled.  The next step is 
similar to the approach in the first stage.   Since the expectation ܧሾ߱௜௧|߰௜௧, ߯௜௧ ൌ 1ሿ is an 
unknown function, we have to generate another unknown function of g(.) and estimate g(.) 
using the non-parametrically approach.  From the distribution choice of the policy function, 
߰௜௧ ൌ ෨߰ሺ߱௜௧ିଵ, ݇௜௧ିଵሻ, the expectation term of the current productivity shock becomes: 
 ܧሾ߱௜௧|߰௜௧, ߯௜௧ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ܧሾ߱௜௧|߰௜௧ሿ ൌ ׬ ߱௜௧ାଵ݀ܨሺ߱௜௧ାଵ| ߰௜௧ሻ (2C.11) 
   ؠ ݃ሺ߰௜௧ሻ െ ߚ଴                  
No R&D: 
In the model of Olley and Pakes (1996) by means of the absence of R&D, the productivity 
distribution only depends on the productivity shock at time ݐ െ 1, ߰௜௧ ൌ ߱௜௧ିଵ.  The second 
state estimation equation, then, becomes: 
 ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ݃ሺ߱௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߦ௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.12) 
where ߱௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߶௜௧ିଵ െ ߚ௞݇௜௧ିଵ െ ߚ଴ .  Equation (2C.12) is estimated by the nonlinear least 
square of which ݃ሺ߱௜௧ିଵሻ can be approximated by the nonparametric approach in ߶௜௧ିଵ െ
ߚ௞݇௜௧ିଵ.  Consequently, the coefficient of ߚ௞ is obtained from the estimation of the linear term 
ߚ௞݇௜௧ and nonlinear function in ߶௜௧ିଵ െ ߚ௞݇௜௧ିଵ. 
64 
 
R&D:  
For endogenous R&D, firms improve the next period productivity shock ߱௜௧ାଵ by increasing 
the R&D investment in the current period.  Rather than having a direct effect, ߱௜௧ାଵ is affected 
by the R&D investment and ߱௜௧ the current period productivity shock through the ߰௜௧ାଵ.  The 
policy function indicates the current distribution choice of productivity as a function of 
productivity shock and capital at time ݐ െ 1, ߰௜௧ ൌ ෨߰ሺ߱௜௧ିଵ, ݇௜௧ିଵሻ. 
The R&D investment can be written as a function of the current distribution and previous 
period productivity shock, ݎሺ߰௜௧, ߱௜௧ିଵሻ.  The relationship is assumed to be monotonic with the 
increase in ߰௜௧ for fixed ߱௜௧ିଵ, thus, the R&D function can be inverted. 
 ߰௜௧ ൌ ݎିଵሺݎ௜௧ିଵ, ߱௜௧ିଵሻ (2C.13) 
where ݎ௜௧ିଵ is the observed R&D investment of a firm ݅ at time ݐ െ 1.  Buettner (2003) uses the 
Equation (2C.13) to control the current distribution choice of the productivity.  Therefore, the 
second stage estimation equation becomes: 
 ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ݃ሺݎିଵሺݎ௜௧ିଵ, ߱௜௧ିଵሻሻ ൅ ߦ௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.14) 
Replace ݃ሺݎିଵሺݎ௜௧ିଵ, ߱௜௧ିଵሻሻ  with the nonlinear function of ෤݃ሺ. , . ሻ  in ݎ௜௧ିଵ  and ߶௜௧ିଵ െ
ߚ௞݇௜௧ିଵ and rewrite the Equation (2C.14) as follows: 
 ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ෤݃ሺݎ௜௧ିଵ, ߶௜௧ିଵ െ ߚ௞݇௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߦ௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.15) 
The assumption for a consistent estimation of the Equation (2C.15) requires R&D to be 
uncorrelated with the error terms.  In the chapter, R&D expenses are used in the computation 
of value added; therefore, the estimation of the Equation (2C.15) is likely to be violated.  
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By avoiding R&D data, the second alternative approach of the estimation in stage two develops 
the property of structural model by referring to the choice of distribution.  The optimal choice 
of distribution ߰௜௧ is as a function of the state variable ߱௜௧ିଵ and the optimal choice of capital 
݇௜௧.  The relationship can be written as: 
 ߰௜௧ ൌ ത߰ሺ߱௜௧ିଵ, ݇௜௧ሻ (2C.16) 
There is no direct relationship of ߰௜௧ on ݇௜௧ିଵ.  ݇௜௧ିଵ affects ߰௜௧ only through the link of ݇௜௧.  
For the endogenous R&D model, the stage two estimation equation becomes: 
 ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ௞݇௜௧ ൅ ݃ሺ ത߰ሺ߱௜௧ିଵ, ݇௜௧ሻሻ ൅ ߦ௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (2C.17) 
             ൌ ׬ሺ߶௜௧ିଵ െ ߚ௞݇௜௧ିଵ, ݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ߦ௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧ 
Rather than a partially linear semi-parametric equation, the Equation (2C.17) becomes a fully 
nonlinear equation.  Therefore, we run the nonlinear least square regression of the Equation 
(2C.17) on a nonparametric function in ߶௜௧ିଵ െ ߚ௞݇௜௧ିଵ and ݇௜௧ to obtain a consistent estimate 
of ߚ௞ . 
In the chapter, we work with a system estimation of Equations (2C.6) and (2C.17) which yields 
consistent estimate coefficients of ߚ௟ and ߚ௞ .  As a consequence, log of ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ is measured from 
ݕ௜௧ െ ߚ௟݇௜௧ െ ߚ௞݇௜௧. 
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Appendix 2D: Additional Results  
Table 2D.1: Building a Pooled Probit Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
( 1)−i tEX  0.933*** 0.928*** 0.921*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.913*** 0.913*** 0.914*** 0.914*** (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
( 1)−i tFOREIGN   0.136*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.064** 0.064** 0.065** 0.065** 0.065** 0.072*** 0.072***  (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP    0.091*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031** 0.032*** 0.032***   (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
( 1)−i tSMALL    -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.102***   (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
( 1)−i tLARGE    0.107*** 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.107***   (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
( 1)−i tVLARGE    0.152*** 0.152*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.156***   (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tw ag e    0.054** 0.053** 0.052** 0.052** 0.052** 0.049 0.049   (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) 
( 1)−i tSKILL    0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.021   (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
( 1)−i tTRAIN    0.015 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015   (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT    0.070* 0.071*    (0.037) (0.038)  
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS    0.078 0.077   (0.057) (0.058) 
BKKM    0.093 0.093 
  (0.069) (0.069) 
CENTRAL    0.071 0.071 
  (0.091) (0.090) 
EAST    0.071 0.070 
  (0.078) (0.077) 
NORTH    0.090 0.089 
  (0.071) (0.071) 
SOUTH    0.166*** 0.165*** 
  (0.057) (0.057) 
Observations 9058 9057 9057 9057 9057 9053 9053 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2D.2: Pooled Probit Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export (Excluding ( 1)−i tSKILL  )  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914***(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
( 1)−i tFOREIGN  0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070***(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.033*** 0.032***  (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.030* 0.030*   (0.016) (0.016)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.037*** 0.036*** (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)−i tSMALL  -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.108*** -0.108***(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
( 1)−i tLARGE  0.106*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.113*** 0.114***(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tVLARGE  0.154*** 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.170*** 0.170***(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.051* 0.051* 0.049 0.049 0.042 0.042(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.015 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.071* 0.068* 0.070* (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.077 0.075  0.076 (0.057) (0.057)  (0.058)
BKKM  0.093 0.092 0.094 0.093 0.096 0.095
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
CENTRAL  0.071 0.072 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.071
(0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090)
EAST  0.070 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.069
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077)
NORTH  0.091 0.090 0.094 0.093 0.097 0.095
(0.072) (0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
SOUTH  0.166*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.163***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All 
the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 2E: Sensitivity Analysis  
In the Appendix 2E, we present a range of sensitivity checks on our independent variables by 
using different definitions of foreign ownership and firm size. 25% and 50% cut-off points of 
foreign-owned share are used instead of 10%.  We also classify the firm size according to total 
fixed assets instead of the total employment.  In Sections 2E.1.1 and 2E.2.1, we report the 
marginal effects of the pooled probit model using different cut-off points for foreign ownership 
and classifying size by total employment whereas results presented in Sections 2E.1.2 and 2E.2.2 
are from the model estimations that classify size by total fixed assets.  
Using 25% and 50% of foreign-owned share as alternatives cut-off points, results in Tables 2E.1 
and 2E.2 are consistent with those in Table 2.8. The coefficients of sunk entry costs, foreign 
ownership, TFP, large and very large firms and product R&D are positive and significant whilst 
being a small firm has a negative and significant effect on the probability of exporting. Different 
percentage share used to classify foreign ownership show that the higher the percentage, the 
greater the effect on the probability of exporting. When total fixed assets instead of total 
employment are used to classify firm size, results in Tables 2E.3 to 2E.5 are generally consistent.  
For the origin of ownership, results in Table 2E.6 are broadly similar to Table 2.9 except for 
Korean-owned firms which now have no significant impact on the probability of exporting.  
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2E.1 The Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export 
2E.1.1 Classified Size by Total Labour 
Table 2E.1: The Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export with 25FO REIGN , SMALL , 
LARGE  and VLARGE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.914*** 0.914*** 0.913*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914***(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
( 1)25i tFOREIGN −  0.092*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.090***(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.033*** 0.033***  (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.031* 0.031*   (0.016) (0.016)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.037*** 0.037*** (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)−i tSMALL  -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.110*** -0.110***(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)−i tLARGE  0.107*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.115***(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tVLARGE  0.154*** 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.170*** 0.171***(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.045 0.045 0.043 0.042 0.036 0.036(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.023 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.070* 0.067* 0.070* (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.076 0.074  0.075 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.058)
BKKM  0.092 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.095
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068)
CENTRAL  0.070 0.070 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.069
(0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091)
EAST  0.064 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.063 0.063
(0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
NORTH  0.085 0.084 0.088 0.087 0.090 0.089
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
SOUTH  0.165*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.162***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All 
the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2E.2: The Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export with 50FO REIGN , SMALL , 
LARGE  and VLARGE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)50i tFOREIGN −  0.127*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.127***(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.035*** 0.035***  (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.033** 0.033**   (0.015) (0.015)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.040*** 0.039*** (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)−i tSMALL  -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.109*** -0.110***(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)−i tLARGE  0.104*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.113*** 0.113***(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
( 1)−i tVLARGE  0.151*** 0.152*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.169*** 0.169***(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.046 0.046 0.044 0.043 0.036 0.036(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.024 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.074* 0.071* 0.074* (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.082 0.079  0.080 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.058)
BKKM  0.098 0.097 0.099 0.099 0.101 0.100
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
CENTRAL  0.067 0.068 0.064 0.065 0.066 0.067
(0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093)
EAST  0.065 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.064
(0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.079)
NORTH  0.088 0.087 0.092 0.090 0.094 0.093
(0.071) (0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
SOUTH  0.162*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.160***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All 
the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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2E.1.2 Classified Size by Total Fixed Assets 
Table 2E.3: The Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export with FO REIGN , ASMALL , 
ALARGE  and AVLARGE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.917***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  0.068** 0.068** 0.068** 0.068** 0.069*** 0.069***(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.047*** 0.047***  (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.039** 0.040**   (0.017) (0.017)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.020 0.019 (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.070** -0.069** -0.084*** -0.084***(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.079** 0.081** 0.077** 0.078** 0.089*** 0.090***(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.134*** 0.135*** 0.130** 0.131** 0.161*** 0.163***(0.048) (0.048) (0.056) (0.056) (0.047) (0.047)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.012 0.012 0.017 0.017 0.034 0.035(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.010 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.008(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.038 0.039(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.074** 0.072** 0.079** (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.079 0.078  0.085 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.057)
BKKM  0.117* 0.116* 0.116 0.116 0.115 0.114*
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069)
CENTRAL  0.075 0.075 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092)
EAST  0.071 0.071 0.070 0.069 0.068 0.067
(0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
NORTH  0.107 0.106 0.111 0.109 0.112 0.110
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072)
SOUTH  0.164*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.163***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All 
the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2E.4: The Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export with 25FO REIGN , ASMALL , 
ALARGE  and AVLARGE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.917***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)25i tFOREIGN −  0.086*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086***(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.048*** 0.048***  (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.040** 0.040**   (0.017) (0.017)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.021 0.020 (0.015) (0.015)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.070** -0.070** -0.085*** -0.084***(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.079** 0.080** 0.077** 0.078** 0.089*** 0.090***(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.132*** 0.133*** 0.128** 0.129** 0.160*** 0.162***(0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.030 0.031(0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.011 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.038 0.039(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.074* 0.072* 0.078** (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.078 0.077  0.084 (0.057) (0.057)  (0.057)
BKKM  0.116 0.116 0.115 0.115 0.113 0.113
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069)
CENTRAL  0.074 0.074 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.072
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093)
EAST  0.066 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.062 0.062
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080)
NORTH  0.103 0.102 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.106
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.072)
SOUTH  0.163*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.162***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All 
the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2E.5: The Model for a Firm’s Decision to Export with 50FO REIGN , ASMALL , 
ALARGE  and AVLARGE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.917***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)50i tFOREIGN −  0.127*** 0.126*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.125*** 0.125***(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.050*** 0.050***  (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.043** 0.043**   (0.017) (0.017)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.023 0.023 (0.015) (0.015)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.070** -0.069** -0.085*** -0.085***(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.077** 0.079** 0.074** 0.076** 0.087*** 0.089***(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.127*** 0.128*** 0.122** 0.123** 0.155*** 0.157***(0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.010 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.031 0.032(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.012 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.010(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.039 0.040(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.078** 0.076** 0.082** (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.083 0.082  0.089 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.057)
BKKM  0.121* 0.121* 0.121* 0.121* 0.119* 0.118*
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069)
CENTRAL  0.072 0.072 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070
(0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095)
EAST  0.067 0.067 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.063
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.080)
NORTH  0.105 0.104 0.109 0.108 0.110 0.109
(0.073) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.072)
SOUTH  0.160*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.159***
(0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  All 
the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
2E.2 The Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export 
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2E.2.1 Classified Size by Total Labour 
Table 2E.6: The Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export with, 
SMALL, LARGE  and VLARGE  at 25% Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.914***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.032*** 0.032***  (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.030* 0.030*   (0.016) (0.016)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.037*** 0.036*** (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)−i tSMALL  -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.110*** -0.110***(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)−i tLARGE  0.107*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.115*** 0.115***(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
( 1)−i tVLARGE  0.153*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.169*** 0.170***(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.042 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.033 0.033(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.023 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.068* 0.065* 0.067* (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.073 0.070  0.071 (0.057) (0.056)  (0.058)
( 1)−i tCHINA  0.081 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
( 1)−i tEU  0.059 0.062 0.058 0.060 0.056 0.058(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095)
( 1)−i tJAPAN  0.105* 0.106* 0.104* 0.105* 0.104* 0.104*(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
( 1)−i tKOREA  -0.046 -0.045 -0.052 -0.050 -0.046 -0.044(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
( 1)−i tMALAYSIA  0.139* 0.138* 0.142* 0.140* 0.138* 0.136*(0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
( 1)−i tNO NEU  0.082 0.083 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.086(0.133) (0.133) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.131)
( 1)−i tOTHER  0.056 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.053(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105)
( 1)−i tAUSCAN  0.150 0.149 0.147 0.146 0.150 0.150(0.102) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
( 1)−i tSOUTHASIA   0.088 0.090 0.091 0.092 0.090 0.092(0.100) (0.100) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
( 1)−i tSEASIA  -0.192** -0.188* -0.193** -0.188* -0.192** -0.188*(0.097) (0.099) (0.097) (0.100) (0.098) (0.100)
( 1)−i tSINGAPORE  0.054 0.053 0.062 0.061 0.053 0.052(0.065) (0.064) (0.072) (0.072) (0.066) (0.066)
( 1)−i tUK  0.126** 0.124** 0.124** 0.122** 0.123** 0.121**(0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
( 1)−i tUS  0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.177***(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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2E.2.2 Classified Size by Total Fixed Assets 
Table 2E.7: The Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export with, 
ASMALL , ALARGE  and AVLARGE  at 10% Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.917***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.047*** 0.047***  (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.039** 0.039**   (0.017) (0.017)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.020 0.019 (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.068** -0.068** -0.082*** -0.082***(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.079** 0.081** 0.077** 0.078** 0.089*** 0.090***(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.130*** 0.131*** 0.126** 0.127** 0.158*** 0.159***(0.047) (0.047) (0.056) (0.056) (0.046) (0.046)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.009 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.031 0.032(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.009 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.038 0.038(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.072* 0.070* 0.076** (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.077 0.076  0.083 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.057)
( 1)−i tCHINA  0.046 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.043(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
( 1)−i tEU  0.022 0.022 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.022(0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072)
( 1)−i tJAPAN  0.096* 0.097* 0.097* 0.097* 0.098* 0.099**(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
( 1)−i tKOREA  -0.113 -0.113 -0.114 -0.113* -0.103 -0.103(0.075) (0.074) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.070)
( 1)−i tMALAYSIA  0.196 0.195 0.199* 0.198 0.199 0.198(0.124) (0.124) (0.121) (0.121) (0.123) (0.124)
( 1)−i tNO NEU  0.085 0.087 0.094 0.095 0.107 0.108(0.129) (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.130)
( 1)−i tOTHER  0.084 0.084 0.081 0.080 0.069 0.068(0.104) (0.103) (0.105) (0.105) (0.109) (0.108)
( 1)−i tAUSCAN  0.172* 0.172* 0.167* 0.167* 0.168* 0.168*(0.090) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086)
( 1)−i tSOUTHASIA   -0.023 -0.022 -0.010 -0.008 0.000 0.001(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038)
( 1)−i tSEASIA  -0.175* -0.170* -0.175* -0.171* -0.183** -0.179*(0.092) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094) (0.091) (0.092)
( 1)−i tSINGAPORE  0.027 0.026 0.036 0.035 0.028 0.027(0.064) (0.064) (0.072) (0.072) (0.062) (0.062)
( 1)−i tUK  0.113** 0.112** 0.113** 0.113** 0.121** 0.121**(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051)
( 1)−i tUS  0.124** 0.126** 0.122** 0.124** 0.126** 0.128**(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
76 
 
Table 2E.8: The Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export with, 
ASMALL , ALARGE  and AVLARGE  at 25% Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.917***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.048*** 0.047***  (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.040** 0.040**   (0.017) (0.017)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.020 0.020 (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.070** -0.070** -0.085*** -0.085***(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.080** 0.081** 0.077** 0.078** 0.089*** 0.090***(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.129*** 0.130*** 0.125** 0.126** 0.157*** 0.158***(0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.006 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.028 0.028(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.011 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.038 0.039(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.071* 0.069* 0.075** (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.075 0.074  0.081 (0.057) (0.057)  (0.057)
( 1)−i tCHINA  0.075 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.071(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051)
( 1)−i tEU  0.039 0.040 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.041(0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085)
( 1)−i tJAPAN  0.100* 0.101* 0.101* 0.101* 0.101** 0.101**(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
( 1)−i tKOREA  -0.027 -0.026 -0.035 -0.034 -0.028 -0.028(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
( 1)−i tMALAYSIA  0.120 0.118 0.127 0.125 0.121 0.119(0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.085) (0.085)
( 1)−i tNO NEU  0.088 0.090 0.097 0.098 0.109 0.111(0.127) (0.127) (0.125) (0.126) (0.128) (0.128)
( 1)−i tOTHER  0.085 0.084 0.081 0.081 0.067 0.066(0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.108) (0.107)
( 1)−i tAUSCAN  0.157* 0.157* 0.153* 0.153* 0.154* 0.154*(0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088)
( 1)−i tSOUTHASIA   0.116 0.118 0.121 0.122 0.124 0.126(0.094) (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) (0.089) (0.089)
( 1)−i tSEASIA  -0.169* -0.164* -0.170* -0.165* -0.178* -0.174*(0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097) (0.093) (0.095)
( 1)−i tSINGAPORE  0.040 0.039 0.050 0.050 0.040 0.039(0.066) (0.065) (0.075) (0.075) (0.064) (0.064)
( 1)−i tUK  0.118** 0.116** 0.118** 0.117** 0.127** 0.125**(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054)
( 1)−i tUS  0.174*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175***(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2E.9: The Model for Country of Origin and a Firm’s Decision to Export with, 
ASMALL , ALARGE  and AVLARGE  at 50% Cut-off Point for Foreign Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)−i tEX  0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.917***(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
( 1)−
LP
i tTFP  0.051*** 0.050***  (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)−
BUETTNER
i tTFP   0.045*** 0.044***   (0.016) (0.016)  
( 1)−
LABPROD
i tTFP   0.024* 0.023 (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.069** -0.069** -0.085*** -0.085***(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.076** 0.078** 0.073** 0.074** 0.086*** 0.088***(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.126*** 0.127*** 0.120** 0.121** 0.155*** 0.157***(0.048) (0.048) (0.056) (0.056) (0.047) (0.047)
( 1)−i tw ag e  0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.032 0.033(0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
( 1)−i tSKILL  0.015 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)−i tTRAIN  0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.040 0.040(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)−i tRDPRODUCT  0.079** 0.076** 0.083** (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)−i tRDPRO CESS   0.083 0.082  0.089 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.057)
( 1)−i tCHINA  0.177** 0.177** 0.174** 0.174** 0.171** 0.171**(0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076)
( 1)−i tEU  0.110 0.111 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.112(0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
( 1)−i tJAPAN  0.139*** 0.139*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.138***(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
( 1)−i tKOREA  -0.030 -0.029 -0.041 -0.040 -0.037 -0.036(0.077) (0.076) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
( 1)−i tMALAYSIA  -0.092 -0.094 -0.084 -0.085 -0.094 -0.096(0.082) (0.081) (0.078) (0.077) (0.083) (0.082)
( 1)−i tNO NEU  -0.016 -0.013 -0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.005(0.078) (0.079) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.076)
( 1)−i tOTHER  -0.028 -0.029 -0.034 -0.035 -0.057 -0.058(0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.084) (0.085)
( 1)−i tAUSCAN      
( 1)−i tSOUTHASIA   0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.010(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.075)
( 1)−i tSEASIA      
( 1)−i tSINGAPORE  0.198*** 0.195*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.188*** 0.186***(0.047) (0.047) (0.063) (0.064) (0.049) (0.049)
( 1)−i tUK  0.101 0.099 0.102 0.100 0.102 0.099(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076)
( 1)−i tUS  0.152*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.149***(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057)
Observations 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049 9049
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, time and three-digit industry dummies are included.  
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3 
Exporting and Financial 
Health  
 
 
Equation Chapter 3 Section 1 
3.1 Introduction 
Export promotion policies are adapted by both developed and developing countries as a means 
to encourage growth through trade.  Many studies have tried to investigate and answer the 
question of whether firms should self-select into export markets or not.  However, in practice 
we observe that not every firm exports, perhaps because firms have different specific 
characteristics and performances.  As a result, it can be concluded that the entry decision to 
export is determined by various factors (see e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997, Bernard and Jensen 
1999, 2004, Kimura and Kiyota 2006).  The majority of studies have concentrated on developed 
rather than developing countries.  Recently, developing countries, especially the NICs, have 
managed to grow rapidly through an openness to trade strategy (World Bank 1993, and Edwards 
1993 and 1998).  It is therefore interesting to focus on the factors that influence the export 
strategies of developing countries. 
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For the new Asian Tigers (Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia), there are a 
limited number of studies that examine export activities and the probability of exporting (see e.g. 
Hallward-Driemeier et al. 2002 for East Asia, Sjöholm 2003, Blalock and Gertler 2004, Blalock 
and Roy 2007 for Indonesia).  Some studies try to answer whether exporters become good firms 
by investigating the effect on productivity after firms export.  For evidence of learning-by-
exporting, productivity or output or both should increase after firms export (see for example 
Clerides et al. 1998, Van Biesebroeck 2005, Alvarez and López 2005, Kimura and Kiyota 2006).  
Apart from firm-specific characteristics, sunk entry costs are considered to be one of the 
important factors that determine the decision to enter export markets due to the fact that sunk 
entry costs are arguably a barrier to the entry (Cabral and Ross, 2008).  Melitz (2003) also argues 
that firms must pay the variable and sunk entry costs of exporting in order to enter export 
markets.  Such costs that are faced by firms prior to export are considered as a form of 
investment.  However, because of imperfect capital markets, firms are likely to face credit 
constraints.  Therefore, the investment decision arguably depends upon internal finance.  Thus, 
one may argue that the financial balance sheet and financial variables will have a significant 
impact on the capability of firms’ investment.  
From a developed countries perspective, Greenaway et al. (2007) investigate the relationship 
between financial factors and firms’ investment in the UK.  However, the nature of developed 
countries is different from developing countries, for example they may have different stages of 
financial market development or financial sector reform.  Since financial markets are the sources 
to obtain external funding for investment, we can therefore assume that the investment 
behaviour of firms and the factors affecting the probably of exporting are likely to be different 
in countries with different levels of development.  In addition, if we consider the relationship 
between the structure of ownership and access to funding, domestic firms may face some 
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obstacles to obtain external funding as they rely only on borrowing from domestic financial 
markets.  In contrast, foreign-owned firms are less likely to face a credit constraint problem 
because they are typically large and tend to receive support from their parent company. 
This chapter is an extension of Chapter two where we emphasise on how the financial health of 
a firm relates to its export decision.  We re-examine the factors that affect a firm’s entry decision 
into export markets using the same data set.  The model in Chapter two is extended by including 
financial variables in our estimations because they indicate a firm’s ability to invest in order to 
enter and operate in export markets.  We assume that the financial balance sheet and investment 
are linked.  Different specific characteristics such as the structure of ownership, productivity, 
wage, firm size, etc. are also included in our estimations.  In addition, we investigate factors 
affecting the entry decision into export markets of different sub-samples according to the 
structure of ownership.  Once a firm participates in exporting, we further examine how various 
factors affect the export intensity. 
We find that the entry decision into export markets depends upon various factors that are 
consistent with results in Chapter two.  Foreign ownership positively affects a firm’s decision to 
enter export markets.  Large firms are more likely to export compared to small firms.  
Productivity also increases the probability of exporting. Most importantly for this chapter, the 
financial health of a firm is found to have a significant effect on the decision to export.  Firms 
that have a high liquidity ratio are more likely to become exporters.  In contrast, if we measure 
firm’s financial health by the leverage ratio, high leveraged firms are less likely to export.  After 
firms export, we find some evidence that financial health affects their export intensity.  Other 
firm characteristics also determine the elasticity of export sales.  These findings for Thailand are 
potentially important for government policy not only in the implementation of entry-promotion 
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and export promotion policies but also in signalling about the financial market development and 
the importance of financial sector reform.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 3.2 summarises the theoretical 
and empirical literature.  Section 3.3 outlines and discusses the empirical model, variables and 
data.  Section 3.4 provides the discussion of the estimated results.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Firm Characteristics and the Decision to Export  
As discussed in Chapter two, a firm’s decision to export is determined by a number of factors.  
Theoretically, Roberts and Tybout (1997) explain the model of export market participation as 
firstly each firm i has to maximise its revenue subject to the current information available to 
firm i.  The current profit function $( )itπ  therefore is a combination of the current revenue ( )itR  
and the difference in the expected value of maximise revenue if a firm exports and if not.  
Once a firm is able to indentify its expected profit and revenue then a firm can decide whether 
or not to enter the export market or even decide to exit conditional upon Equation (2.4) in 
Chapter two where firm i at time t chooses to export if the expected gross profit and revenue 
$( )itπ  is greater than the current period cost ( )itc together with sunk entry costs ( )iS .  Roberts 
and Tybout (1997) point out that a firm’s export decision not only depends upon its profit and 
revenue but also depends upon differences in firm characteristics ( )itZ .  Therefore, the 
estimated model can be specified as Equation (2.5) in Chapter two. 
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In the empirical analysis, Roberts and Tybout (1997) use data for Columbian firms from 1981 to 
1989.  They include sunk entry costs and firm characteristics such as wage, firm size, age, etc. in 
a vector Z.  Sunk entry costs are positive and significantly determine a firm’s decision to export 
in Columbia.  Large firms and old firms are more likely to become exporters.  Such findings lead 
to the implication of entry-promotion policies which reduce the entry costs faced by firms.  
Many empirical studies are based on the framework of Roberts and Tybout (1997) and extend 
the model to investigate firm-level characteristics and other factors that would influence the 
export decision in both developed and developing countries (see for instance, the US (Bernard 
and Jensen 1999, 2004); the UK (Greenaway and Kneller 2004, Kneller and Pisu 2004); 
Germany (Bernard and Wagner 2001); Spain (Fariñas and Martín-Marcos 2007); Taiwan (Aw et 
al. 2000, 2007); Japan (Kimura and Kiyota 2006)).  López (2005), Wagner (2007), and 
Greenaway and Kneller (2007) present detailed surveys of the empirical literature on exporting 
and firm heterogeneity. 
Bernard and Jensen (1999 and 2004) try to identify factors that affect the probability of 
becoming an exporter using US manufacturing firm-level data.  Various firm characteristics such 
as firm size, productivity, wage, etc. are included.  All independent variables are lagged by one 
year in order to avoid possible simultaneity problems.  One and two years lagged are used as 
proxies for sunk entry costs.  Both studies found that past export experience or sunk entry costs 
have positive and significant effects on a firm’s entry decision.  Similar positive and significant 
results are also found for the coefficients of firm size, productivity wage and product changed.  
Bernard and Jensen (2004) include additional factors such as structure of ownership (foreign 
owned or domestic owned), government subsidies and spillovers.  Being foreign owned 
increases the probability of exporting.  Spillover effects from export activities are negligible.  
Export promotion subsidies have no impact on the probability of exporting.   
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Greenaway and Kneller (2004) also perform an empirical analysis of the determinant of a firm’s 
decision to export in the UK.  Other than firm characteristics, they include additional factors 
capturing industrial and geographical agglomeration in the model.  The results for sunk entry 
costs, firm size, productivity and wage are consistent with the findings of the US with positive 
and significant coefficients.  Industrial and geographical agglomerations also influence the entry 
decision.  Kneller and Pisu (2004) extend the decision to export model by emphasising the 
importance of structure of ownership and origin of ownership.  Foreign-owned firms are more 
likely to export.  The positive significance of some origins suggests that the findings are 
consistent with the export-platform FDI hypothesis. 
Another UK study by Girma et al. (2004) applies matching and difference-in-differences 
techniques to investigate the link between exporting and firm performances.  Girma et al. (2004) 
find that exporters and non-exporters typically differ in size and productivity.  Exporters are 
larger and more productive than non-exporters.  They also find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that firms self-select into export markets and learn by exporting whereas productive 
firms are more likely to export and their productivity tends to be further increased after firms 
export.  Greenaway et al. (2005), and Arnold and Hussinger (2005) also employ similar 
techniques to Girma et al. (2004) to examine exporting and firm performance in Sweden and 
Germany, respectively.  For Sweden, there is no evidence of learning-by-exporting since 
productivity pre- and post-entry do not differ.  For Germany, Arnold and Hussinger (2005) find 
that more productive firms self-select into export markets.  This evidence supports the self-
selection hypothesis which is consistent with the findings in the previous studies of German 
firms by Bernard and Wagner (1997 and 2001).  However, firm productivity does not improve 
after the entry into export markets (Arnold and Hussinger, 2005). 
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Kimura and Kiyota (2006) employ a random probit model to identify factors that affect the 
decision to export and to engage in FDI in Japan between 1994 and 2000.  They find that the 
coefficient for sunk entry costs, FDI dummy, foreign ownership dummy, TFP, firm size and 
R&D are all positive and significant.  These findings support the statement that good firms 
become exporters.  
Delgado et al. (2002) examine firm productivity and exporting of the Spanish manufacturing 
firms.  Their results support the hypothesis that highly-productive firms self-select into export 
markets.  A recent study of Spanish firms by Fariñas and Martín-Marcos (2007) find that 
exporters differ from non-exporters in size, productivity, wages and innovation.  They find 
evidence of firms self-selecting into, and out of, export markets.  
Campa (2004) investigates the relationship between the fluctuation of exchange rates and a 
country’s trade balances.  The rise and fall in exchange rates affect a country’s trade balance 
through the export and import behaviour of individual firms.  Campa (2004) examines Spanish 
manufacturing firms to explain the relationship between the changes in exchange rates and the 
export participation of each firm for the entry decision and the level of output exported.  Sunk 
costs are found to be one of the important factors determining the entry into or exit from 
export markets.  However, the results show that sunk costs are not related to the exchange rate.  
As the exchange rate changes, only the volume of output alters, meaning firms respond to the 
changes by adjusting quantities of exports rather than number of exporting firms (Campa, 2004). 
For studies on developing countries, Alvarez and López (2005) test the existence of both the 
self-selection and the learning-by-exporting hypothesis using Chilean plants.  Productivity, firm 
size, foreign capital, foreign licences, ratio of skill labours, age and investment are significant 
factors that affect the probability of beginning to export.  Apart from age, all variables are more 
likely to increase the probability of beginning to export.  Such findings support the self-selection 
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hypothesis.  In addition, Alvarez and López (2005) also find the evidence of learning-by-
exporting for the new entrants where productivity is further increased after firms export. 
Blalock and Roy (2007) emphasise the effect of the financial crisis on the export behaviour of 
Indonesian firms.  They find that the rate of entry into and exit from export markets increased 
significantly.  The financial crisis and the devaluation of the Indonesian currency had an effect 
on firms’ liquidity constraints so some exporters may have chosen to exit the market.  In the 
mean time, some firms may find the depreciation of the exchange rate to be profitable and 
therefore decide to enter the export markets.  Foreign-owned firms in the pre-crisis that 
invested in R&D and training were more likely to continue exporting.  Surprisingly, the 
productivity in the pre-crisis period has no impact on the decision to continue exporting.  
In summary, heterogeneous firms have different specific characteristics hence the decision of 
each firm to enter export markets is different.  Various factors are used to examine a firm’s entry 
decision into export markets.  The results for both developed and developing countries are 
broadly consistent with sunk entry costs, productivity, structure of ownership, size, etc. being 
important factors in determining the entry decision.  Next, we provide a summary of the 
literature emphasising financial factors and explain how they are linked to investment and 
exporting.  
3.2.2 Firm-Level Investment and Financial Constraints  
A numbers of financial constraints or financial variables have been studied and investigated with 
regard to their links with different types of a firm’s investment such as fixed investment and 
inventory investment.  In the case of imperfect capital markets, it is difficult for financially 
constrained firms to obtain external sources of funds.  Therefore, investment should depend 
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positively on internal finance especially liquid assets such as cash flow.  Inventory investment is 
arguably more sensitive to financial variables than fixed investment because of its high liquidity 
and can be adjusted more easily at low costs (Carpenter et al. 1994 and Guariglia and Mateut 
2005).  For that reason, recent studies place more emphasis on the relationship between 
inventory investment and financial constraints. 
Bond and Meghir (1994) investigate the importance of a firm’s investment that relates to the 
accessibility of internal funds in the UK.  The assumption of the hierarchy of the finance model 
is different from the standard neoclassical model because it assumes that an investment funded 
by internal finance costs less than using external sources of funds.  An empirical result from an 
estimation of dynamic investment models using GMM estimation technique reveals that a firm’s 
investment in the UK is sensitive to internal funds (Bond and Meghir 1994). 
Many empirical studies have found that cash flow only proxies the shift in demand for 
investment but does not sufficiently capture financial constraints.  Fazzari and Petersen (1993) 
try to fill in the gap by emphasising the role of working capital as a measure of liquidity in order 
to investigate the effect of financial constraints on fixed investment.  They found evidence that 
working capital investment is sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow.  Therefore, when firms face 
financial constraints, they tend to use working capital as a source of funds to smooth fixed 
investment relative to cash-flow shocks (Fazzari and Petersen 1993). 
Rather than focus only on the explanation of fixed investment, a few studies have tried to 
examine the effect of internal finance on inventory investment.  Kashyap et al. (1994) try to 
explain the movement of inventory investment particularly during the tight monetary policy 
period (1981-1982) in the US.  They found evidence that financial factors affected the change in 
inventory investment within firms.  
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Similar results are found in the study of Carpenter et al. (1994) using quarterly panel data of US 
manufacturing firms.  They explain that the fluctuation of internal finance has a direct impact on 
inventory investment.  Because of imperfect capital markets, the shock in internal finance leads 
to an adjustment in investment (Carpenter et al. 1994 and Hubbard 1998).  Carpenter et al. 
(1994) found that fixed investment of financially constrained firms decreases proportionally less 
than a reduction in inventory investment because inventory investment can be adjusted at lower 
cost relative to others.  
Guariglia (1999) also finds a significant relationship between internal finance and inventory 
investment in the UK.  During recessions, financial constrained firms tend to suffer more and 
therefore reduce their inventory investment especially of work-in-process and raw material 
inventories.  In addition, Guariglia and Mateut (2005) employ augmented error-correction 
inventory investment equations to examine the evidence of financial constraints, firm’s 
investment and global engagement status in the UK using micro-level panel data between 1993 
and 2003.  They found that inventory investment is significantly affected by financial variables 
of which the level of the effect depends upon the possibility of facing financial constraints.  If 
firms participate in global activities, they are less likely to face financial constraints problems as 
they have greater access to both domestic and international financial markets.  Therefore, the 
inventory investment of those firms is less sensitive to financial variables than is the case for 
domestic firms.  The findings from the study of Guariglia and Mateut (2005) suggest that trade 
openness is good for a country because trade helps to reduce the level of financial constraints 
faced by firms and stimulates investment.   
In other European countries, Vermeulen (2002) investigates the relationship of financial 
accelerator and investment using data for Germany, France, Italy and Spain between 1983 and 
1997.  The evidence shows that a financial accelerator affects a firm’s investment spending.  
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Financial health and firm size also matter such that the investment spending of small firms that 
have a weak balance sheet is affected the most.  Another European study by Konings et al. 
(2003) examines the link between investment and financial constraints in transition economies, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania from 1994 to 1999.  Firms’ investment 
decisions in Poland and the Czech Republic are more sensitive to internal finance constraints 
than in Bulgaria and Romania.  This can be explained by the soft budget constraints that occur 
in the two least advanced transition economies, Bulgaria and Romania, which means that firms 
in these two countries cannot operate under liquidity constraints conditions (Konings et al. 
2003). 
Bond et al. (2003) use financial factors to explain a firm’s investment behaviour in Belgium, 
France, Germany and the UK with the aim to distinguish whether different financial systems in 
each country have different impacts on financial constraints and investment.  For UK firms, 
internal finance seems to be an important source of investment.  If the desired investment could 
not be funded by internal finance, firms are likely to face investment constraints.  Such a finding 
is clearly explained by the structure of the market-oriented financial system in the UK, which 
does not perform very well in channelling investment funds compared to the continental 
European financial system. 
Harrison and McMillan (2003) examine the Ivory Coast’s direct foreign investment and 
domestic credit constraints by using an augmented Euler investment model that includes the 
proxies for financial distress, i.e. debt to asset ratio and the interest coverage ratio.  Since 
domestic credit constraints are one of the obstacles for future investment of firms, the inflow of 
direct foreign investment would alleviate domestic credit constraints.  The finding from the 
Ivory Coast suggests that overall domestic firms suffer more from the domestic credit 
constraints than foreign firms.  In addition, Harrison and McMillan (2003) split the sample into 
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public and private firms.  For domestic public firms, the investment decisions do not depend 
upon the debt to asset ratio and interest coverage.  However, for domestic private firms, their 
investment decisions are more likely to be affected by credit constraints compared to foreign 
firms.   
In summary, there are a growing number of studies that examine the impact of financial factors 
on investment decisions.  Based on the assumption of imperfect capital markets, some firms 
may face obstacles to external finance.  Therefore, their investment decision depends upon the 
internal finance or financial health of firms.  Empirical results from the literature support the 
hypothesis that investment such as inventory and fixed investment is sensitive to internal 
finance.  In the next sub-section, we summarise the literature that studies the relationship 
between financial factors and a firm’s investment in sunk entry costs and variable costs in order 
to start exporting and to remain in the export markets. 
3.2.3 Financial Factors and Firm’s Export Behaviour 
In order to enter export markets, a firm faces a form of investment known as sunk entry costs 
(Melitz 2003, Roberts and Tybout 1997, Bernard and Jensen 2001, 2004 and Chaney 2005).  
Such investment will be influenced by the financial health or financial constraints of a firm. 
Many studies have considered both directly and indirectly the relationship between financial 
factors and the decision to export.  
A study by Campa and Shaver (2002) considers the indirect link and focuses on the liquidity 
constraint and capital investment of exporters and non-exporters.  They expected that multi-
nation exporters should receive more stable income through the diversification of export 
destinations than single nation exporters.  Using Spanish manufacturing sector data for 9 years, 
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they show that exporters receive more stable cash flows and have more stable capital investment 
compared to non-exporters.  In addition, exporters are likely to have fewer liquidity constraint 
problems.  In contrast, non-exporters seem to suffer more than exporters during the domestic 
business cycle. 
Chaney (2005) emphasises the effect of currency devaluation on the trade balance and develops 
a model of international trade where liquidity constraints are one of the essential determinants 
of being an exporter.  In international trade, firms need to pay fixed costs including sunk entry 
costs in order to enter export markets.  This indicates that firms’ financial health is very 
important in determining export behaviour.  Firms that are able to generate sufficient liquidity 
seem to enter export markets while liquidity constrained firms are unable to export as they do 
not have adequate funds to cover sunk entry costs.  However, when the exchange rate 
appreciates, it means there is an increase in domestic assets in terms of foreign price so some of 
those firms that have liquidity constraints are able to start exporting during that period. 
More recent studies consider the impact of financial factors on the decision to export.  
Greenaway et al. (2007) find evidence for the UK that the financial health of exporters is better 
than non-exporters.  Among exporters, continuous exporters have a healthier financial balance 
sheet than starters.  The results also show that financial factors of firms such as liquidity and 
leverage determine firms’ likelihood to export.  Greenaway et al. (2007) find that liquidity has a 
positive and significant effect on the decision to export while leverage has a negative and 
significant effect.  In addition, once a firm participates in export markets, it helps to improve the 
firm’s financial health.  For other firm characteristics, foreign ownership and subsidiaries have 
positive and significant effects on the decision to export.  Firm sizes that are very small, small, 
medium and large have negative and significant coefficients.  The results of TFP are mixed with 
insignificant coefficients. 
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Another recent study by Garcia-Veg and Guariglia (2007) focuses on the explanation of income 
volatility on financial constraints that affects the probability of exporting.  Garcia-Veg and 
Guariglia (2007) build a model by assuming that each firm has to borrow from external sources 
in order to operate in the market.  In addition, the model also assumes that each particular firm 
faces a normally distributed income shock.  Garcia-Veg and Guariglia (2007) try to link firms’ 
productivity and volatility to the ability of firms to access external sources of borrowing.  They 
explain that more productive and less volatile firms are able to acquire cheaper loans while less 
productive and more volatile firms are more likely to face a higher cost of borrowing.  It can be 
concluded that the cost to obtain external funds depends positively upon the degree of volatility. 
When a country is open to trade, exporting firms are likely to face two possible contrasting 
effects.  First, if firms are able to pay sunk entry costs and enter export markets, their financial 
constraints are likely to decrease.  Second, an increase in competition in export markets causes 
an increase in the probability to exit or to go bankrupt for some firms, which therefore raises the 
difficulty to gain access to external sources of funds.  Using UK data, Garcia-Veg and Guariglia 
(2007) find empirical evidence that more volatile firms are more likely to go bankrupt so in 
order to continue to operate in the market they have to be more productive, and therefore are 
more likely to become exporters. 
From these empirical studies, we found that financial factors and investment in the entry 
decision to export are linked as each firm faces sunk entry costs prior to export.  If firms can 
afford to pay such costs, they thus enter the export markets.  In the next section, we build a 
model to investigate whether financial factors and firm characteristics actually affect a firm’s 
export decision. 
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3.3 Methodology and Data 
In this chapter, we follow the economic methodology as previously discussed in Chapter two.  
We extend the empirical model in Chapter two by including measures of a firm’s financial health 
in order to explain how financial health affect the export participation.  We discuss our model 
and briefly about methodology in the first sub-section.  We then describe variables included in 
the model and finally about data. 
3.3.1 Model 
Our empirical model includes factors based on guidance from the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature.  We extend the empirical model (Equation 2.8) in Chapter two where we 
include different measures of a firm’s financial health in the model.  Since a firm’s financial 
status or financial health is considered to be an indicator of a firm’s ability to pay sunk entry 
costs in order to enter export markets and also the capacity to export for the existing exporters, 
we exclude the lag of export status from the model.  Similarly to Chapter two, we lag all 
independent variables by one year to avoid possible simultaneity problems.  Thus, our model is 
given by:  
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where  EX  is a dummy for export status of firm i . 
 FINANCE  is a firm’s financial variable or financial ratio. 
FOREIGN  is a dummy variable to indicate the structure of ownership whether it is 
foreign or domestic owned. 
TFP  is total factor productivity of a firm.  
ASMALL  is a dummy variable to represent a small firm. 
ALARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a large firm. 
 AVLARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a very large firm. 
w age  is the log of wages per employee.  
SKILL  is a ratio of skilled labour to total labour. 
TRAIN  is a dummy variable for both in-house and outside training. 
RD  is a dummy variable of whether a firm engages in R&D. 
REGION  is a vector of five regional dummies which indicate the regional location of a 
firm. 
ε is the error term.  
Our model is estimated using pooled probit estimation even though there are several alternative 
estimation techniques suggested by the previous empirical literature such as fixed and random 
effects probit, a linear probability model and a GMM first differences estimator.  Due to our 
relatively short panel compared to other studies, the implementation of these alternative 
estimation techniques is not possible. 
Apart from region dummies, we also include twenty-two two-digit industry and two year 
dummies to control for unobserved industry and time varying effects.  Additionally, we allow 
for robust clustering at two-digit industry level.  The robust variance estimation alleviates the 
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problem of heteroscedasticity in the error terms and the clustering helps to relax the 
independence assumption and requires only that the observations are independent across 
industries. 
3.3.2 Variables  
For financial variable ( 1)( )i tFINANCE − , which represent the financial health of a firm, we use 
different proxies with different definitions of the financial ratio, i.e. liquidity and leverage, based 
on previous studies of financial constraints (see e.g. Fazzari and Petersen 1993, Chaney 2005, 
Greenaway et al. 2007).  First, liquidity is used to measure a firm’s ability to invest as a proxy of 
the capacity of a firm to pay sunk entry costs in order to start exporting.  In this chapter, we 
define liquidity ratio ( 1)( )i tLIQUIDITY −  follow Greenaway et al. (2007) and measured as the 
current assets less liabilities divided by total assets.  Second, two alternative definitions are used 
to classify the financial leverage ratio.  Our first definition ( 1)( 1 )i tLEVERAGE −  represents 
short-term debt to asset ratio defined as the current liabilities divided by current assets while our 
second definition ( 1)( 2 )i tLEVERAGE −  represents the long-term debt to asset ratio and is 
defined as total liabilities divided by total assets.  We expect that the liquidity ratio will have a 
positive effect on a firm’s decision to export.  Firms that have a high liquidity ratio are more 
likely to export.  In contrast, the leverage ratio would be expected to have a negative effect on 
the export decision. 
Foreign ownership ( 1)( )i tFOREIGN −  captures the structure of a firm’s ownership.  We define a 
firm as foreign owned if at least 10% of its shares belong to foreigners.  Therefore, we generate 
a dummy equal to 1 if a firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise.  We also define our foreign 
ownership dummy at 25% and 50% levels ( ( 1)25i tFO REIGN − and ( 1)50i tFO REIGN − ) in our 
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sensitivity analysis.  Foreign firms invest in a host country for different reasons, for example as 
an export-platform or resource seeking or market seeking.  The estimated sign of coefficient for 
this variable would reveal the incentive for investment.  Since we know that foreign firms tend 
to have more advanced technologies and a higher ratio of skilled labour than domestic firms, 
such advantages would therefore enhance the productivity of foreign-owned firms.  We 
therefore expect a positive relationship between foreign ownership and the export decision. 
Total factor productivity ( 1)( )i tTFP −  is an indicator of a firm’s efficiency in the production 
process.  We use a semi-parametric approach following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) that takes 
account of unobserved firm-specific productivity shock 
( 1 )
( )
i t
LPTFP − .  We also use other alternative 
techniques to measure TFP in the sensitivity analysis.  First, an R&D estimator of TFP 
( 1)
( )
i t
BUETTNERTFP −  by Buettner (2003) is the estimation of a semi-parametric and nonlinear least 
square regression that accounts for endogenous R&D.  Second, 
( 1 )i t
LABPRODTFP −  is the simple labour 
productivity which is defined as the log of value added divided by total labour.  The existing 
empirical evidence suggests that highly productive firms are more likely to enter export markets 
(Bernard and Jensen 1999, 2004, Greenaway and Kneller 2004, Kneller and Pisu 2004, Fariñas 
and Martín-Marcos 2007).  Therefore, we expect TFP to have a positive effect on a firm’s 
decision to export. 
Firm size is considered as one of the important factors that determine export decisions because 
it is a measure of firm’s success.  We believe that large firms are more likely to export than small 
firms because large firms tend to have higher production capacity.  In this chapter, we classify 
firm size slightly different from Chapter two.  Since this chapter relates to the financial status of 
a firm, we classify firm size into different groups according to total fixed assets rather than total 
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employment.1  For small firm ( 1)( )
A
i tSMALL − , a dummy variable equals 1 if the total fixed assets 
in firm i  at time 1t −  falls in the first quartile distribution of the capital stock for all firms 
operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Revision 3) as firm i  at time 1t − .  For medium 
( 1)( )
A
i tMEDIUM − , large ( 1)( )−
A
i tLARGE  and very large firm ( 1)( )−
A
i tVLARGE , we use the same 
method as we classify small firm, total fixed assets of firm i  at time 1t −  falls in the second, 
third and forth quartile of the total fixed assets distribution respectively.  In the analysis, we omit 
MEDIUM firms. 
Wage ( 1)( )i tw ag e −  is an indicator of the quality of the workforce.  Wage is defined as the log of 
wages per employee where wages per employee are the ratio of total wage payments to total 
workers less owners who do not receive wages.  Employees who receive high wages tend to be 
the skilled and professional workers whereas low wage employees tend to be unskilled workers.  
It can be concluded that the quality of the workforce has a positive effect on wage income.  
Therefore, firms that pay high wages, which means firms have high quality of labour, are 
expected to have higher probability of exporting.  Another indicator for the quality of workforce 
is ratio of skilled labour ( 1)( )i tSKILL −  which is defined as the ratio of professional and skilled 
worker to total worker. 
For training ( 1)( )i tTRAIN − , a dummy is equal to 1 if employees within a firm receive formal 
training either in-house or outside training or both at least once, and 0 otherwise.  Workers who 
receive training tend to have had an increase in their working expertise and competence.  
Training is expected to be positively correlated with the probability of exporting. 
                                                            
1 A previous empirical study on financial factors and exporting by Greenaway et al (2007) also uses assets to classify 
different categories of firm size.  
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In terms of R&D ( 1)( )i tRD − , we distinguish R&D activities into different types.  First, product 
R&D ( 1)( )i tRDPRO DUCT −  represents an enhancement in the quality of existing products and 
new product lines.  A dummy equals 1 if a firm carries out R&D in products and 0 otherwise.  
Firms that invest in product R&D are more likely to export as such investment is expected to 
improve the quality of products to meet the qualify standard of exporting.  Second, production 
process R&D ( 1)( )i tRDPRO CESS −  is an improvement in production technology to produce a 
higher quality of product at a lower cost of production.  A dummy equals 1 if a firm carries out 
R&D in the production process and 0 otherwise.  Firms that perform production process R&D 
are also more likely to export as they are assumed to have lower costs of production. 
3.3.3 Data  
We use the same data set as Chapter two which is an unbalanced panel of firm-level data during 
the period 2001 and 2004 from the Annual Survey of Thailand’s manufacturing industry by the 
OIE.  The data includes information on standard firm characteristics for example exports, 
output, productivity, structure of ownership, R&D, employment, training as well as financial 
balance sheet information that allows us to generate our financial ratio variables. 
Details of definitions and descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 3A.1 and 3A.2 of the 
Appendix 3A.  The raw correlations presented in Table 3A.3 show that export status is 
positively correlated with liquidity ratio whilst negatively correlated with leverage ratio. 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of a firm’s characteristics including financial ratio variables 
that proxy the financial health in the firm’s balance sheet.  We report the means and standard 
deviations for different groups; total sample, non-exporting firms and exporting firms.  For 
exporting firms, we divide the sample into two sub-samples.  The first sub-sample is firms that 
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export in the current year.  The second sub-sample is firms that export in the current period but 
did not export in the previous year. 
In terms of output, sales, assets, capital stock and employment, exporting firms are larger than 
non-exporting firms.  However, exporting firms that do not export in the previous year are 
slightly smaller than firms that export in the current period ( 1)itEX = .  These findings and 
figures are consistent with the stylised facts from developed countries such as the US (Bernard 
and Jensen 1999, 2004), the UK (Greenaway and Kneller 2004 and Greenaway et al. 2007) and 
Germany (Arnold and Hussinger 2005) and developing countries such as Indonesia (Blalock and 
Gertler 2004). 
For productivity using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)’s method, exporting firms are more 
productive than non-exporting firms.  In addition, employees who work in exporting firms 
receive higher wages compared to those working in non-exporting firms.  The number of 
foreign-owned exporters is also greater relative to foreign non-exporters. 
If we look at the financial variables, we find that exporters have a slightly higher liquidity ratio 
compared to non-exporters.  A higher liquidity ratio indicates a greater ability to invest.  If we 
proxy financial health using the leverage ratio, different definitions of leverage reveal similar 
results.  Exporters seem to have a lower leverage ratio than non-exporters.  This indicates that 
non-exporters are relatively illiquid and are more likely to face a high debt to asset ratio. 
Different groups of sample have different characteristics.  Large, highly productive firms with 
high liquidity or low leverage ratio seem to enter export markets.  Such specific characteristics 
including a firm’s financial health may influence a firm’s decision to participate in export 
markets.  We now econometrically investigate this link and present results in the next section. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Total Sample 
Non-Exporting 
Firms
Exporting Firms 
 
0itEX = 1itEX =  
1itEX = and 
( 1) 0i tEX − =
Output 184.427 
(534.93) 
80.714 
(335.61)
252.876 
(623.63) 
133.042 
(394.12)
Sales 225.100 
(628.46) 
103.614 
(402.76)
305.281 
(729.70) 
172.416 
(504.66)
Assets 206.514 
(701.417 
99.936 
(397.51)
276.854 
(836.75) 
178.211 
(500.18)
Capital stock 91.816 
(421.73) 
37.253 
(166.67)
127.828 
(523.13) 
105.375 
(366.11)
Labour 454.638 
(884.72) 
174.025 
(333.94)
639.839 
(1067.49) 
372.725 
(899.45)
Productivity 9.512 
(1.92) 
9.259 
(1.84)
9.679 
(1.95) 
9.757 
(1.78)
Wage 30.508 
(47.45) 
27.606 
(58.19)
32.424 
(38.65) 
36.254 
(31.63)
Foreign 0.335 
(0.47) 
0.150 
(0.36)
0.457 
(0.50) 
0.261 
(0.44)
Liquidity 0.080 
(0.52) 
0.077 
(0.66)
0.082 
(0.40) 
0.043 
(0.48)
Leverage1 1.187 
(4.34) 
1.385 
(6.51)
1.057 
(1.82) 
1.197 
(1.92)
Leverage2 0.778 
(2.56) 
0.838 
(1.05)
0.738 
(3.18) 
0.771 
(0.77)
Observation 9,945 3,954 5,991 138
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.  Capital stock is a firm’s total fixed assets. Labour is total 
employment including owners.  Productivity is obtained from the estimation technique of Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003).  Wage is the ratio of total labour costs to total employment less owners who do not receive wage.  Liquidity 
is the ratio of a firm’s current asset less current liabilities over total assets.  Two definitions of leverage ratio are 
used; leverage1 is defined as the ratio of current liabilities over current assets, and leverage2 is defined as the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets.  Output, sales and capital stock are measured in hundreds of thousands of US Dollars 
while wage is measured in hundred of US Dollars.  
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3.4 Results 
The summary statistics in the previous section suggest a link between financial variables and 
export status.  Before providing our econometric results, Table 3.2 presents the mean values of 
financial variables for non-exporters and exporters in the full sample and different sub-samples 
according to the quartile distribution of capital stock.  We also provide the test statistics for 
whether there is any difference in the financial variables between non-exporters and exporters 
within each individual group. 
In Table 3.2, the mean values show that exporters overall have higher liquidity ratio and lower 
leverage than non-exporters.  For the liquidity ratio of small, large and very large firms, the t-
statistic results suggest that exporters are significantly different from non-exporters.  If we 
consider the leverage ratio rather than liquidity, we also find the differences between dissimilar 
groups in all samples especially in the definition of leverage1. 
We now report the empirical results that affect the entry of a firm into export market in Tables 
3.3 and 3.4.  Finally, we present the estimated results of factors that affect the elasticity of a 
firm’s export sales in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.  Results reported in Table 3.3 are from the marginal 
effect estimations calculated at the mean of each continuous independent variable (except for 
the dummy variable).  Three different financial variables are included for the purpose of our 
sensitivity analysis.  Columns (1) and (2) include a measurement of liquidity based on the 
definition of Greenaway et al.  (2007).  Other columns use different definitions of leverage 
denoted by 1LEVERAGE  and 2LEVEAGE . 
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Table 3.2: Mean of the Financial Ratios for Different Groups of Sample 
 Liquidity Leverage1 Leverage2 Observation
Entire Sample     
   Non-Exporters 0.076 1.383 0.839 4,153
   Exporters 0.082 1.055 0.737 6,250
   Coefficient    
   t-statistic 
0.007 
(0.67) 
-0.332*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.128** 
(-2.39) 
Small Firms     
   Non-Exporters 0.183 0.942 0.908 1,162
   Exporters 0.210 0.852 0.805 451
   Coefficient    
   t-statistic    
0.097** 
(2.08) 
-0.268)** 
(-2.13 
-0.148** 
(-2.24) 
Medium Firms    
   Non-Exporters 0.114 1.272 0.825 1,264
   Exporters 0.124 0.957 0.776 1,190
   Coefficient    
   t-statistic 
0.021 
(0.84) 
-0.490** 
(-2.18) 
-0.045 
(-1.05) 
Large Firms    
   Non-Exporters -0.024 1.479 0.870 1,041
   Exporters 0.096 1.017 0.688 1,897
   Coefficient    
   t-statistic 
0.109*** 
(5.52) 
-0.409*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.167*** 
(-4.50) 
Very Large Firms    
   Non-Exporters -0.043 2.302 0.712 638
   Exporters 0.030 1.168 0.747 2,627
   Coefficient    
   t-statistic 
0.053 
(2.75)*** 
-0.904 
(-3.31)*** 
0.080 
(0.40)  
Notes: Tables reports the mean values of liquidity and leverage ratios for non-exporters ( 0)i tEX =  and exporters
( 1)itEX =  in different groups according to the quartile distribution of capital stock for all firms operating in the 
same two-digit industry.  Small firms is defined as if the observations fall in the first size quartile while medium, 
large and very large firms are defined as if the observations fall in the second, third and forth quartile, respectively.  
The row labelled coefficient and t-statistic present the coefficient and t-statistic of export status ( )i tEX  in a regression 
of financial ratio on export status, region, two-digit industry and time dummies, i.e.  
5 22 3
0 1
1 1 1
/it it it r r j j t t it
r j t
LIQUIDITY LEVEARGE EX REGION INDUS Tα α α α α ε
= = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ . * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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The results show that the financial health of a firm has a significant influence on a firm’s export 
decision.  When we use liquidity to measure a firm’s financial health, the positive and significant 
coefficient indicates that adding one unit to the liquidity ratio will add to the probability of 
exporting around 3.7 percentage points.  In contrast to liquidity, the coefficient for the leverage 
ratio has a negative and significant effect for both measures.  In Columns (3) and (4) and 
Columns (5) and (6), the results mean that adding one unit to the liquidity ratio will decrease the 
probability of exporting by 1.4 and 1.9 percentage points respectively. 
Considering our other independent variables, we observe that foreign ownership has a positive 
and significant effect on the decision to export across all specifications.  Being a foreign-owned 
firm increases the probability of exporting by 24 percentage points relative to a domestically-
owned firm.  As expected, the results for TFP are positive and significant.  This means the 
higher the TFP, the higher the probability of a firm to become an exporter.  In Columns (1) to 
(6), increasing TFP by one unit increases the probability of exporting on average by 5.5 
percentage points. 
Another important factor that determines a firm’s decision to export is the size of a firm.  We 
classify size into different groups and the results show that different groupings have different 
outcomes.  The coefficient for small firms is negative and significant while large and very large 
firms have positive and significant results.  Small firms are less likely to export. However, as firm 
size increases so does the likelihood of becoming an exporter. 
Wage and the ratio of skilled labour have negative coefficients but neither is significant.2  
Because both variables are proxies of the quality of labour, the negative outcome may imply that 
firms in Thailand specialises in exporting mass-produced products or intermediate inputs that 
                                                            
2 Greenaway et al. (2007) also find a negative result on wage variable.  They explain that this puzzle may arise from 
the fact that wages are correlated with productivity and firm size. 
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are produced using cheap labour costs.  In addition, we find that the training variable is positive 
and significant.  This significant result indicates that the probability of exporting will be on 
average about 10.3 percentage points higher for firms that provide training to their employees 
compared to firms that do not provide any.  It is known that Thailand is abundant with 
unskilled labour so training becomes another important factor that determines the export entry 
decision. 
In Columns (1), (3) and (5), product R&D has a positive and significant impact on a firm’s 
decision to export.  Firms that invest in product R&D to develop and improve quality of goods 
are more likely to export.  Production process R&D also has positive and significant coefficient 
in Columns (2), (4) and (6).  The investment in production process R&D helps firms to develop 
advanced technology that permits efficiency in the production process and results in a reduction 
in production costs.  
For further analysis, we split our sample according to structure of ownership using 10% of 
foreign-owned shares as a cut-off point between foreign and domestic.3  The marginal effect 
estimations from the pooled probit are presented in Table 3.4. 
The liquidity coefficient in both groups is positive but not significant.  For our other financial 
ratios, leverage has a negative coefficient but only 1LEVERAGE  in the domestic sample is 
significant.  Hence, increasing leverage ratio of domestic firms by one unit decreases the 
probability of exporting by 1.3 percentage points.  This finding implies that the entry decision of 
                                                            
3 This breakdown sample into domestic and foreign sub-samples is verified via a likelihood ratio test.  The 
likelihood ratio test involves estimating and comparing between two models by assuming that the model A 
(standard specification) is nested with model B (standard specification plus the interaction term between foreign 
and independent variables).  The test statistic reports the chi-squared value for the test (48.70) and the p-value for a 
chi-square with nine degrees of freedom suggests that the difference between the two models is statistically 
significant. This means that the less restive model (model B) fits better than the more restrictive model (model A).  
The consequence of adding the interaction terms between the foreign and independent variables as predictor 
variables in the model result in statistically significant improvement of the model.  Therefore, we can separately 
estimate models for domestic and foreign sub-samples.  
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domestic firms into export markets depends upon their financial health.  Financially constrained 
firms especially those that are domestically owned may find it difficult to obtain external finance 
to invest in exporting.  We find that the financial health of foreign-owned firms does not have 
any significant effect on the export entry decision.  For foreign firms, their entry decisions 
typically depend on the incentive of investment such as export platform FDI.  
The relationship between productivity and the decision to export is positive and significant 
across all specifications.  For example, the coefficient in Column (1) show that increasing TFP 
of domestic firms by one unit raises the probability of exporting by 6.3 percentage points.  In 
both samples, small firms are less likely to export whilst large and very large firms are more 
likely to export.  Wage has a negative coefficient and significant only in foreign firms sample.  
This negative and significant result may possibly imply that foreign firms invest in Thailand to 
seek cheap labour that provides a low cost of production.  Therefore, increasing wage rate of 
foreign firms by one unit decreases the probability of exporting by approximately 7 percentage 
points.  The ratio of skilled labour in domestic and foreign firms also has a negative effect on a 
firm’s decision to export but neither is significant. 
Firms carry out training because it permits workers to improve their working skills and perform 
more efficient works.  For both domestic and foreign firms, training has positive coefficient.  
For domestic firms, all six columns are significant meaning that the probability of exporting will 
be on average about 11 percentage points higher for domestic firms that provide training to 
their employees compared to domestic firms that do not provide any.  
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Table 3.3: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.037* 0.037*  (0.019) (0.019)  
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.014*** -0.014***   (0.005) (0.005)  
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.019* -0.019* (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)i tFO REIGN −  0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.238*** 0.240*** 0.239***(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.054*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.056***(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.188*** -0.184*** -0.183***(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.127*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.123*** 0.125***(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.255*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.249*** 0.250***(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.051 -0.052 -0.050 -0.051 -0.052 -0.053(0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.102*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.104***(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.101*** 0.101***  0.102*** (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)
Observations 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.4: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export for Domestic and Foreign Firms (Dep. Var. is itEX ) 
 Domestic Firms Foreign Firms
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.039 0.040 0.023 0.023(0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018)
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −    -0.013** -0.013**  -0.012 -0.012  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007)
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −    -0.013 -0.013  -0.024 -0.024   (0.015) (0.015)  (0.017) (0.017) 
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.063*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.034** 0.035** 0.033** 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.184*** -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.182*** -0.178*** -0.177*** -0.109 -0.109 -0.105 -0.105 -0.101 -0.102 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) 
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.136*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.077*** (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.245*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.250*** 0.238*** 0.240*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.176*** 0.176*** (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.071** -0.072** -0.071** -0.072** -0.074** -0.075** (0.071) (0.075) (0.071) (0.075) (0.072) (0.075) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.110*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.067 0.068 0.064 0.065 0.061 0.062 (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) 
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.187***  0.187*** 0.189*** 0.028 0.029 0.027(0.020)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.147*** 0.146*** 0.149***  0.015 0.016 0.014  (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Observations 4626 4626 4626 4626 4626 4626 2335 2335 2335 2335 2335 2335 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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In terms of R&D, product R&D and production process R&D have positive coefficients and 
are significant only for domestic firms.  The implication of such a finding is that domestic firms 
should invest in either product R&D or production process R&D or both.  For example, 
domestic firms carry out product R&D in order to improve their product quality up to the 
standard level or expand their varieties to be able to enter export markets.  R&D of foreign 
firms does not significantly affect the probability of exporting.  One explanation is that R&D 
activities of foreign firms may be undertaken in the home country rather than the host country.  
Some foreign firms invest in Thailand in order to set up the production plants and use a country 
as an export platform. 
The next stage was to investigate how various factors affect export intensity among exporters by 
replacing the export status dummy in Equation (3.1) with the log of export sales.  Tables 3.5 and 
3.6 present the estimated results obtained using a pooled OLS estimation technique. 
Table 3.5 shows that the liquidity ratio has a positive and significant effect on a firm’s export 
sales.  This indicates that a higher liquidity ratio results in higher elasticity of export sales.  In 
contrast, our leverage ratios have negative coefficients but only 1LEVERAGE  is significant 
which indicates that if a firm face a short-term debt to asset ratio, its elasticity of export sales is 
likely to decrease.  The long-term leverage ( 2)LEVERAGE  does not have any significant 
effect.  These results imply that a short-term debt to asset is significantly more important than 
the long-term one.  Foreign ownership, productivity and size are consistent with the 
determinants of export status results in Table 3.3 where foreign-owned and high productive 
firms are more likely to increase their export sales.  In addition, the elasticity of export sales 
increases further due to the increase in firm size. 
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Wage has a negative and significant impact on the elasticity of export sales.  An increase in the 
wage rate means a firm’s production costs are also increased.  Thus, a firm may reduce the 
amount of goods exported which causes a decrease in a firm’s export sales revenue.  Training 
and product R&D positively influence a firm’s export sales.  If firms engage in product R&D, 
their elasticity of export sales is likely to increase.  However, production process R&D has an 
insignificant effect.  
Finally, we split our sample into domestic and foreign firms using the 10% of foreign-owned 
shares as a cut-off point.4  Results are presented in Table 3.6.  For our financial ratios, liquidity 
has positive coefficients whilst leverage has negative coefficients but only  1LEVERAGE  in 
the foreign sample is significant.  In both groups, productivity, training, large and very large 
firms have positive and significant effects on firms’ export sales.  In contrast, a dummy for small 
firm has a negative and significant coefficient that means being a small firm is likely to decrease 
their elasticity of export sales.  
The negative and significant result of the wage variable in Table 3.6 is now explained by the 
dominant effect of foreign-owned firms rather than domestic firms.  Product R&D of only 
domestic firms is also important in determining their elasticity of export sales.  The magnitude 
of the effect means that the elasticity of export sales is about 24 percentage points higher for 
domestic firms that carry out product R&D compared to domestic firms that do not engage in 
any product R&D.  The investment in product R&D helps domestic firms to develop and 
improve their product qualities or even continue to expand their product lines.  R&D of foreign 
firms does not have any significant effect on their elasticity of export sales.  This insignificant 
                                                            
4 This breakdown sample into domestic and foreign sub-samples is verified via a likelihood ratio test. The test 
statistic reports the chi-squared value for the test (71.44) and the p-value for a chi-squared with nine degrees of 
freedom suggesting that the difference between the two models is statistically significant.  This means that if we do 
allow for differences in the coefficients across ownership it results in the improvement of the model so we can 
separately estimate model for domestic and foreign sub-samples. 
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result is explained by the fact that R&D activities of foreign firms are perhaps undertaken in the 
home country rather than in the host country.    
In a sensitivity analysis, we use different measures of TFP ( BUETTNERTFP  and LABPRODTFP ) and 
use alternative cut-off points for foreign ownership (25% and 50%).  The results can be found 
in the Appendix 3B and are broadly consistent with the results discussed in Tables 3.3 and 3.5. 
The evidence from our empirical results shows that financial ratios provide a partial explanation 
of a firm’s investment ability to enter export markets.  The liquidity ratio has positive and 
significant effect while the leverage ratio has negative impact on the probability of exporting.  
An illiquid firm may find it difficult to invest in sunk entry costs in order to export.  This result 
leads to the suggestion that the Thai government should highlight on the entry promotion 
policies that help to reduce sunk entry costs.  Such policies would encourage new entry and 
some financial constrained firms could afford to pay sunk costs to enter export markets.  In 
addition, the government should develop financial markets and financial sectors.  This would 
help firms and especially firms that face short-term debt to gain greater access to funding so 
some firms are able to enter export markets while some exporters would have sufficient funds 
to finance their production.  The export promotion policies are also important as they facilitate 
the existing exporters to expand their export sales.  
The government should stress on the policies that attract more FDI inflows because foreign 
ownership is one of the significant factors that determine the entry decision into export markets 
and the elasticity of export sales.  The insignificant result from R&D of foreign firms implies 
that R&D activities may perhaps be undertaken in the home country rather than the host 
country.  From technology and R&D spillovers perspective, government should encourage 
foreign firms to undertake R&D in the home country by granting investment promotion 
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because the R&D investment may generate positive spillovers to domestic firms.  Training is 
also important because it helps to support Thai workforce to specialise in specific production 
technique and increase their competence.  However, corporate institutes that provide special 
training to industry are limited to certain industries such as automotive and electrical industries.  
Government may support or set up institutes that provide special training to various industries.   
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Table 3.5: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.226* 0.229*   (0.131) (0.131)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.065* -0.065*    (0.037) (0.037)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.102 -0.106 (0.084) (0.083)
( 1)i tFO REIGN −  0.426*** 0.422*** 0.425*** 0.420*** 0.426*** 0.421***(0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.721*** 0.725*** 0.723*** 0.726*** 0.726*** 0.729***(0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.947*** -0.951*** -0.931*** -0.934*** -0.919*** -0.922***(0.183) (0.185) (0.181) (0.183) (0.181) (0.183)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.753*** 0.757*** 0.750*** 0.755*** 0.738*** 0.742***(0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  1.894*** 1.901*** 1.882*** 1.889*** 1.861*** 1.868***(0.186) (0.187) (0.184) (0.185) (0.180) (0.181)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.443*** -0.446*** -0.438*** -0.442*** -0.453*** -0.456***(0.150) (0.150) (0.153) (0.153) (0.151) (0.151)
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.037 0.031 0.037 0.030 0.046 0.040(0.130) (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.132)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.408** 0.423** 0.407** 0.422** 0.412** 0.426**(0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184) (0.185)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.168* 0.171* 0.165*  (0.096) (0.096) (0.093)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.044 -0.041  -0.044 (0.097) (0.097)  (0.097)
Constant 10.323*** 10.309*** 10.357*** 10.342*** 10.446*** 10.439***
(1.195) (1.209) (1.201) (1.215) (1.127) (1.143)
Observations 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.6: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales for Domestic and Foreign Firms (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) 
 Domestic Firms Foreign Firms
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.073 0.082 0.333* 0.332*(0.143) (0.144) (0.169) (0.170)
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −    -0.030 -0.032  -0.130* -0.128*  (0.036) (0.037)  (0.065) (0.065)
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −    -0.062 -0.071  -0.080 -0.080   (0.113) (0.114)  (0.084) (0.084) 
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.758*** 0.761*** 0.756*** 0.758*** 0.756*** 0.758*** 0.635*** 0.639*** 0.636*** 0.641*** 0.654*** 0.658*** (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102) (0.102) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.094) (0.093) 
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.941*** -0.947*** -0.938*** -0.943*** -0.929*** -0.934*** -0.986*** -0.989*** -0.968*** -0.970*** -0.968*** -0.970*** (0.219) (0.222) (0.222) (0.226) (0.228) (0.231) (0.274) (0.275) (0.273) (0.274) (0.280) (0.281) 
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.610*** 0.624*** 0.611*** 0.624*** 0.604*** 0.617*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 0.993*** 0.993*** 1.008*** 1.007*** (0.113) (0.111) (0.112) (0.110) (0.108) (0.107) (0.123) (0.126) (0.124) (0.127) (0.128) (0.131) 
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  1.466*** 1.485*** 1.466*** 1.484*** 1.459*** 1.477*** 2.339*** 2.337*** 2.326*** 2.324*** 2.302*** 2.299*** (0.193) (0.196) (0.186) (0.189) (0.187) (0.190) (0.243) (0.242) (0.239) (0.239) (0.242) (0.242) 
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.416 -0.418 -0.411 -0.413 -0.419 -0.422 -0.457*** -0.461*** -0.455*** -0.459*** -0.469*** -0.473*** (0.285) (0.288) (0.286) (0.289) (0.284) (0.287) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.105 0.095 0.103 0.094 0.111 0.102 0.053 0.049 0.051 0.047 0.049 0.046 (0.144) (0.148) (0.144) (0.148) (0.145) (0.148) (0.180) (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.179) (0.179) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.306 0.325 0.306 0.326 0.314 0.334* 0.683** 0.691** 0.662** 0.670** 0.676** 0.683** (0.193) (0.192) (0.194) (0.193) (0.191) (0.190) (0.295) (0.297) (0.280) (0.282) (0.295) (0.297) 
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −
 
0.241**  0.241** 0.236** 0.148 0.158 0.144
(0.107)  (0.108)  (0.100)  (0.158)  (0.159)  (0.160)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.049 -0.049 -0.054  0.015 0.024 0.015  (0.117) (0.117) (0.115)  (0.173) (0.173) (0.171) 
Constant 10.501**
* 
10.466**
* 
10.516**
* 
10.480**
* 
10.573**
* 
10.550**
* 
10.765**
* 
10.748**
* 
10.907**
* 
10.887**
* 
10.829**
* 
10.814**
* 
(1.688) (1.723) (1.692) (1.729) (1.569) (1.604) (1.016) (1.025) (0.996) (1.005) (1.072) (1.083) 
Observations 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter is an extension of Chapter two that emphasises the importance of financial 
variables that are used to proxy for a firm’s financial health and links them with the decision to 
enter export markets using a firm-level data for Thailand between 2001 and 2004.  We base our 
hypothesis on the assumption that investment and a firm’s internal finance are related.  Since 
exporting is also considered as a form of investment, i.e. investment in sunk entry costs and 
variable costs, the entry decision into export markets should be connected with a firm’s financial 
health as well. 
Financial variables are used to indicate firms’ ability of investment to enter export market.  We 
also include other firm specific characteristics in the regression and use different financial ratios 
to test for robustness.  In general, liquidity is positive whilst leverage is negative and both ratios 
are significant.  Firms that have high liquidity are more likely to export. In contrast, firms with 
high leverage are less likely to become exporters.  For TFP, we find positive and significant 
results but this evidence from Thailand is in contrast with the findings of the UK by Greenaway 
et al. (2007).  Other firm characteristics such as foreign ownership, firm size, training and R&D 
are also important in determining the entry decision into export markets.  The significant results 
for the foreign ownership variable support the findings in Guariglia (1999) that if firms are 
involved in global activities, they are less likely to face financial constraints and are therefore 
more likely to enter export markets. 
For export intensity, firm characteristics are used to test the effects on the size of exports.  
Financial health is found to be important as it reveals a firm’s capability to produce goods for 
export.  Foreign ownership, size differences, wage, training and R&D also have significant 
effects on the elasticity of firms’ export sales. 
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In summary, the entry decision of a firm into export markets is determined by various firm 
characteristics and performance.  Financial ratios provide a partial explanation for a firm’s ability 
to invest in sunk entry costs in order to enter export markets.  If firms face liquidity constraints, 
it means that firms have no sufficient funds to afford to pay sunk entry costs in order to enter 
export markets.  Once firms enter export markets, financial health also affects the elasticity of 
export sales because firms’ financial status indicates how much firms can actually afford to 
produce in order to supply the markets. 
The finding for Thailand leads to the suggestion that government should develop financial 
markets and the financial sector so some currently constrained firms can gain greater access to 
external funding in order to invest and be able to enter export markets.  The government should 
also highlight entry promotion as well as export promotion policies because the entry promotion 
policies help to reduce sunk entry costs faced by firms, so some financial constrained firms can 
afford the costs that would encourage new entry, while export promotion policies favour 
existing exporters to stimulate their export sales.  In addition, the Thai government should 
promote policies that attract FDI inflows as foreign ownership is one of the significant factors 
that determine the entry decision into export markets and the elasticity of export sales. 
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Appendix 3A: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3A.1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
itEX  
A dummy variable for export status where a dummy equals 1 if firm i  at 
time t has positive export sales and 0 otherwise. 
itEXSALES  The log of export sales of firm i  at time t . 
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  
A firm’s liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of current assets minus 
liabilities to total assets.  
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −  
A firm’s financial leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of current liabilities 
to current assets 
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −  
Another definition of a firm’s financial leverage ratio is defined as the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
−( 1)i tFO REIGN  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 10% are foreign owned. 
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 25% are foreign owned. 
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 50% are foreign owned. 
−( 1)
LP
i tTFP  
Total factor productivity that is obtained from the estimation of the semi-
parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  
Total factor productivity that is obtained from system estimation, a semi-
parametric and nonlinear least square regression, of Buettner (2003). 
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  
Labour productivity that is calculated from the log of value added divided 
by total labour.  
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  
For a small firm variable, a dummy variable is equal to 1 if the total fixed 
assets of the firm i at time −1t  is in the first quartile of the distribution 
of the total fixed assets of all firms operating in the same two-digit ISIC 
level (Revision 3) as firm i  at time −1t . 
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  
For a large firm variable, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the total fixed 
assets of the firm i at time −1t  is in the third quartile of the distribution 
of the total fixed assets of all firms operating in the same two-digit ISIC 
level (Revision 3) as firm i  at time −1t . 
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  
A very large firm variable, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the total fixed 
assets of the firm i at time −1t  is in the forth quartile of the distribution 
of the total fixed assets of all firms operating in the same two-digit ISIC 
level (Revision 3) as firm i  at time −1t . 
−( 1)i tw ag e  
The log of wage per employee where wage per employee is calculated 
from the ratio of total labour payments over total labour less owners. 
( 1)i tSKILL −  The ratio of professional and skilled labour to total labour. 
( 1)i tTRAIN −  
A training dummy equals 1 if the workforce within a firm has received 
formal training either in-house training or outside training or both at 
least once, and 0 otherwise. 
−( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm carries out R&D in product 
development and 0 otherwise.  
116 
 
−( 1)i tRDPRO CESS  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm performs R&D in the development 
of production processes and 0 otherwise.  
BKKM  A dummy variable identifies whether firm locates in Bangkok and Metropolitan Area or not.  
CENTRAL A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Central region excluding Bangkok and Metropolitan Area and 0 otherwise. 
EAST  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Eastern region and 0 otherwise. 
NORTH  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the North of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
SOUTH  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the South of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max
itEX  6961  0.61  0.49  0 1
itEXSALES  4217 14.74  2.20  4.95  20.33
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  6961 0.08  0.51  -10.45  0.99
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −  6961 1.19  4.91  0.01  239.68
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −  6961  0.75 0.80  0.01  13.32
−( 1)i tFO REIGN  6961 0.34  0.47  0 1
−( 1)25i tFO REIGN  6961 0.30  0.46 0 1
( 1)50i tFOREIGN −  6961 0.18  0.38 0 1
−( 1)
LP
i tTFP  6961 9.50  1.86  0.47  16.69
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  6690 10.51  1.20  1.21  15.31
−( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP  6961  9.17  1.02  1.45  14.00
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  6961 0.16  0.37  0  1
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  6961  0.29  0.45  0 1
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  6961 0.32  0.46  0 1
−( 1)i tw ag e  6961 7.82  0.51  4.19  10.07
( 1)i tSKILL −  6961 0.53  0.32  0 1
( 1)i tTRAIN −  6961  0.92  0.28  0  1
−( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT  6961  0.09  0.29  0  1
−( 1)i tRDPRO CESS  6961 0.07  0.27  0  1
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Table 3A.3: Correlation Matrix 
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EXit 1.00     
LIQUIDITY 0.01 1.00    
LEVERAGE1 -0.04 -0.54 1.00    
LEVERAGE2 -0.09 -0.58 0.32 1.00    
FOREIGN 0.32 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 1.00    
FOREIGN25 0.32 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.92 1.00    
FOREIGN50 0.28 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.66 0.72 1.00    
TFPLP 0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.08 0.04 1.00    
TFPBUETTNER 0.31 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.58 1.00   
TFPLABPROD 0.17 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.57 0.92 1.00   
SMALLA -0.29 0.11 -0.03 0.07 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 -0.40 -0.27 1.00   
LARGEA 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.28 1.00   
VLARGEA 0.29 -0.10 0.03 -0.06 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.53 0.38 -0.30 -0.43 1.00   
wage 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.61 0.68 -0.19 0.03 0.27 1.00   
SKILL -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 1.00   
TRAIN 0.16 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.22 0.15 -0.16 0.03 0.18 0.13 -0.02 1.00   
RDPRODUCT 0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.05 0.07 1.00  
RDPROCESS 0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.57 1.00 
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Appendix 3B: Sensitivity Analysis 
In the Appendix 3B, we present a range of sensitivity checks on our independent variables in 
both models by using different definitions of foreign ownership and different techniques to 
measure TFP.  For foreign ownership, 25% and 50% cut-off points of foreign-owned share are 
used instead of 10%.  In terms of TFP, we use BUETTNERTFP  and LABPRODTFP .  We only perform 
the sensitivity checks for the entire sample.  
Tables 3B.1 to 3B.8 report the marginal effects of the pooled probit model for the determinants 
of a firm’s decision to export using different cut-off points for foreign ownership and different 
measurement of TFP.  In Tables 3B.1 and 3B.2, results are broadly consistent with those in 
Table 3.3.  Liquidity has a positive whilst leverage has a negative effect on the entry of a firm 
into export markets.  Other independent variables such as foreign ownership, firm size, training, 
and R&D are also significant.  For TFP, only BUETTNERTFP  has positive and significant 
coefficient.  Results for LABPRODTFP  are negative and insignificant.  This puzzle may arise from 
the fact that LABPRODTFP  is correlated with wage (see Table 3A.3).   
Using 25% and 50% of foreign-owned share as our cut-off points, shown in Tables 3B.3 to 3B.8 
are consistent with results from using 10% cut-off point.  One interesting finding is that 
different percentage share used to classify foreign ownership shows that the higher the 
percentage, the greater the effect on the probability of exporting. 
Tables 3B.9 to 3B.16 provide the estimated results from the pooled OLS model for the 
determinants of a firm’s export sales.  Results in Tables 3B.9 and 3B.10 are broadly similar to 
those in Table 3.5. Liquidity has a positive whilst leverage ratio has a negative coefficient.  
However, in Table 3B.9 only 1LEVERAGE  is significant.  When we use LABPRODTFP  as a 
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measure of productivity in Table 3B.10, all of financial variables are significant.  In Table 3B.10, 
wage is insignificant.  Using different cut-off points of foreign-owned share in Tables 3B.11 to 
3B.16, results also show that the higher the percentage, the greater the effect on the elasticity of 
export sales. 
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3B.1 The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export  
3B.1.1 At the 10% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 3B.1: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
FOREIGN  and BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.032* 0.032*  (0.019) (0.019)  
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.013*** -0.013***   (0.005) (0.005)  
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.013 -0.014 (0.010) (0.010)
( 1)i tFO REIGN −  0.247*** 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.245*** 0.247*** 0.247***(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.049** 0.050*** 0.047** 0.048** 0.050*** 0.051***(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.174***(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.130*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.130***(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.248*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.253*** 0.243*** 0.245***(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.046 -0.048 -0.045 -0.047 -0.047 -0.049(0.052) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.099*** 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.101***(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.097*** 0.097***  0.098*** (0.029) (0.029)  (0.029)
Observations 6690 6690 6690 6690 6690 6690
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.2: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
FOREIGN  and LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.046** 0.047**  (0.019) (0.019)  
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.017*** -0.017***   (0.005) (0.005)  
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.024** -0.025** (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)i tFO REIGN −  0.240*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.241*** 0.240***(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.199*** -0.199***(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.144*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.142***(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.298*** 0.300*** 0.299*** 0.301*** 0.291*** 0.293***(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
( 1)i tw ag e −  0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.112*** 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.114***(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133*** (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.104*** 0.104***  0.105*** (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)
Observations 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3B.1.2 At the 25% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 3B.3: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
25FOREIGN  and LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.039** 0.039**   (0.020) (0.019)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.015*** -0.015***    (0.005) (0.005)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.020* -0.020* (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248***(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.056*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.058***(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.188*** -0.187***(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.126*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.124***(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.255*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.248*** 0.249***(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.053 -0.055 -0.053 -0.054 -0.054 -0.056(0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.100*** 0.103*** 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.102***(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129***  (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.101*** 0.100***  0.101*** (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)
Observations 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.4: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
25FOREIGN  and BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.034* 0.034*   (0.019) (0.019)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.013*** -0.013***    (0.005) (0.005)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.014 -0.015 (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  0.255*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.255***(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.051*** 0.052*** 0.049** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.053***(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.184*** -0.183*** -0.184*** -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.178***(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.129*** 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.126*** 0.128***(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.247*** 0.249*** 0.250*** 0.252*** 0.241*** 0.243***(0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.049 -0.051 -0.048 -0.050 -0.050 -0.052(0.052) (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.097*** 0.100*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.099***(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134***  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.096*** 0.096***  0.096*** (0.030) (0.030)  (0.030)
Observations 6690 6690 6690 6690 6690 6690
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
125 
 
Table 3B.5: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
25FOREIGN  and LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.049** 0.049**   (0.020) (0.019)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.017*** -0.017***    (0.005) (0.005)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.025** -0.026** (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  0.248*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.248*** 0.248***(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.203*** -0.203***(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.144*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.142***(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.299*** 0.301*** 0.300*** 0.302*** 0.292*** 0.294***(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
( 1)i tw ag e −  0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.110*** 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.112***(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132***  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.104*** 0.103***  0.105*** (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)
Observations 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3B.1.3 At the 50% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 3B.6: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
50FOREIGN  and LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.040** 0.040**  (0.019) (0.019)  
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.015*** -0.015***   (0.005) (0.005)  
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.021* -0.021* (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  0.261*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.261*** 0.261***(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.058*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.060***(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.190*** -0.190*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.184*** -0.184***(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.125*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.123***(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.251*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.244*** 0.245***(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.030 -0.032 -0.030 -0.032 -0.032 -0.034(0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.020 -0.021(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.100*** 0.103*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.098*** 0.101***(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133*** (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.106*** 0.106***  0.107*** (0.024) (0.024)  (0.024)
Observations 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.7: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
50FOREIGN  and BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.036* 0.036*   (0.019) (0.019)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.014*** -0.014***    (0.005) (0.005)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.016 -0.016 (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  0.267*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.267*** 0.267***(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.054*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.056***(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.181*** -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.174***(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.128*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.131*** 0.124*** 0.127***(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.242*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.246*** 0.236*** 0.238***(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.026 -0.028 -0.025 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029(0.052) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.054)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.096*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.098***(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.137*** 0.137*** 0.136***  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.103*** 0.104***  0.104*** (0.028) (0.028)  (0.028)
Observations 6690 6690 6690 6690 6690 6690
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.8: The Determinants of a Firm’s Decision to Export (Dep. Var. is itEX ) with 
50FOREIGN  and LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.050** 0.050***   (0.019) (0.019)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.017*** -0.017***    (0.005) (0.005)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.026** -0.027** (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  0.258*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.258***(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.200*** -0.200***(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.143*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.141***(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  0.295*** 0.297*** 0.296*** 0.298*** 0.288*** 0.290***(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
( 1)i tw ag e −  0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.031(0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.110*** 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.112***(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137***  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.110*** 0.109***  0.110*** (0.024) (0.024)  (0.024)
Observations 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3B.2 The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales 
3B.2.1 At the 10% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 3B.9: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
FOREIGN  and BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.194 0.195   (0.115) (0.114)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.057* -0.056*    (0.032) (0.032)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.069 -0.071 (0.072) (0.071)
( 1)i tFO REIGN −  0.756*** 0.760*** 0.757*** 0.761*** 0.761*** 0.765***(0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059) (0.061)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.431*** 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.426*** 0.431*** 0.428***(0.095) (0.094) (0.096) (0.095) (0.093) (0.092)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.802*** -0.803*** -0.788*** -0.788*** -0.778*** -0.778***(0.169) (0.171) (0.167) (0.169) (0.167) (0.169)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.630*** 0.636*** 0.628*** 0.634*** 0.618*** 0.623***(0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.096) (0.095)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  1.619*** 1.626*** 1.609*** 1.616*** 1.590*** 1.597***(0.168) (0.169) (0.168) (0.169) (0.168) (0.169)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.537*** -0.539*** -0.533*** -0.535*** -0.545*** -0.547***(0.127) (0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.128) (0.130)
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.027 0.021 0.027 0.021 0.034 0.028(0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) (0.128) (0.129)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.379** 0.390** 0.378** 0.389** 0.382** 0.393**(0.179) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.181) (0.182)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.179 0.183 0.178  (0.106) (0.107) (0.105)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.039 -0.034  -0.038 (0.125) (0.125)  (0.124)
Constant 7.692*** 7.645*** 7.719*** 7.671*** 7.742*** 7.699***
(1.338) (1.356) (1.344) (1.363) (1.276) (1.295)
Observations 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.10: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
FOREIGN  and LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.320** 0.324**   (0.131) (0.130)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.093** -0.094**    (0.036) (0.036)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.154* -0.160* (0.088) (0.087)
( 1)i tFO REIGN −  0.307*** 0.305*** 0.311*** 0.309*** 0.308*** 0.306***(0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.098) (0.093) (0.095)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.470*** 0.465*** 0.468*** 0.463*** 0.469*** 0.464***(0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.101)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -1.032*** -1.036*** -1.009*** -1.013*** -0.992*** -0.996***(0.174) (0.176) (0.170) (0.173) (0.171) (0.173)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.876*** 0.883*** 0.872*** 0.879*** 0.855*** 0.862***(0.087) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087) (0.091) (0.090)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  2.264*** 2.276*** 2.247*** 2.259*** 2.221*** 2.232***(0.137) (0.138) (0.136) (0.137) (0.134) (0.136)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.172 -0.171 -0.168 -0.167 -0.183 -0.182(0.117) (0.117) (0.120) (0.120) (0.122) (0.122)
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.009 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.020 0.013(0.136) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.136) (0.137)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.533*** 0.551*** 0.531*** 0.549*** 0.538*** 0.556***(0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.190) (0.190)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.232** 0.237** 0.228**  (0.110) (0.111) (0.107)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.015 -0.010  -0.015 (0.100) (0.101)  (0.101)
Constant 9.761*** 9.745*** 9.804*** 9.787*** 9.951*** 9.945***
(1.361) (1.384) (1.374) (1.398) (1.294) (1.318)
Observations 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3B.2.2 At the 25% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 3B.11: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
25FOREIGN  and LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.227* 0.230*   (0.129) (0.128)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.065* -0.065*    (0.037) (0.037)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.102 -0.106 (0.083) (0.082)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  0.483*** 0.479*** 0.481*** 0.478*** 0.482*** 0.478***(0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.106)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.729*** 0.732*** 0.730*** 0.733*** 0.733*** 0.736***(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.940*** -0.943*** -0.923*** -0.926*** -0.911*** -0.914***(0.184) (0.186) (0.182) (0.184) (0.182) (0.184)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.757*** 0.761*** 0.754*** 0.759*** 0.742*** 0.746***(0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  1.895*** 1.901*** 1.882*** 1.888*** 1.862*** 1.868***(0.183) (0.183) (0.180) (0.181) (0.177) (0.177)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.462*** -0.466*** -0.458*** -0.461*** -0.472*** -0.476***(0.154) (0.154) (0.157) (0.157) (0.155) (0.155)
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.027 0.021 0.027 0.021 0.035 0.030(0.131) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.406** 0.420** 0.405** 0.419** 0.410** 0.423**(0.176) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.179) (0.180)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.164* 0.167* 0.161*  (0.094) (0.095) (0.092)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.037 -0.034  -0.037 (0.096) (0.096)  (0.096)
Constant 10.405*** 10.393*** 10.439*** 10.426*** 10.527*** 10.521***
(1.226) (1.236) (1.230) (1.240) (1.157) (1.169)
Observations 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.12: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
25FOREIGN  and BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.196* 0.196*   (0.113) (0.112)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.057* -0.056*    (0.031) (0.031)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.069 -0.071 (0.070) (0.069)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  0.493*** 0.490*** 0.491*** 0.488*** 0.493*** 0.490***(0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.108) (0.107)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.762*** 0.766*** 0.763*** 0.767*** 0.768*** 0.771***(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059) (0.060)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.792*** -0.793*** -0.778*** -0.779*** -0.768*** -0.768***(0.171) (0.173) (0.169) (0.171) (0.169) (0.171)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.632*** 0.637*** 0.630*** 0.636*** 0.620*** 0.625***(0.096) (0.095) (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  1.618*** 1.625*** 1.608*** 1.614*** 1.589*** 1.595***(0.166) (0.167) (0.166) (0.167) (0.166) (0.167)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.558*** -0.560*** -0.554*** -0.556*** -0.566*** -0.568***(0.132) (0.133) (0.134) (0.136) (0.133) (0.134)
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.017 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.023 0.017(0.128) (0.130) (0.129) (0.130) (0.129) (0.130)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.377** 0.387** 0.375** 0.386** 0.380** 0.390**(0.174) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) (0.176) (0.177)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.179 0.182* 0.177*  (0.104) (0.104) (0.103)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.030 -0.026  -0.030 (0.120) (0.120)  (0.119)
Constant 7.766*** 7.722*** 7.793*** 7.747*** 7.813*** 7.773***
(1.358) (1.372) (1.362) (1.377) (1.294) (1.310)
Observations 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.13: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
25FOREIGN  and LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.324** 0.328**   (0.128) (0.128)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.095** -0.095**    (0.035) (0.035)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.157* -0.162* (0.086) (0.085)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  0.504*** 0.501*** 0.502*** 0.499*** 0.502*** 0.499***(0.118) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.116)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.313*** 0.311*** 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.314*** 0.312***(0.094) (0.096) (0.094) (0.097) (0.092) (0.094)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -1.026*** -1.030*** -1.002*** -1.006*** -0.985*** -0.989***(0.177) (0.180) (0.173) (0.176) (0.174) (0.176)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.882*** 0.889*** 0.879*** 0.886*** 0.862*** 0.868***(0.089) (0.088) (0.091) (0.090) (0.093) (0.092)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  2.271*** 2.282*** 2.253*** 2.264*** 2.227*** 2.238***(0.135) (0.136) (0.134) (0.135) (0.132) (0.134)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.185 -0.185 -0.181 -0.181 -0.197 -0.196(0.124) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) (0.129) (0.129)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.004 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 0.008 0.001(0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.137) (0.139)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.530*** 0.548*** 0.528*** 0.546*** 0.536*** 0.553***(0.181) (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.185) (0.185)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.228** 0.233** 0.224**  (0.107) (0.108) (0.105)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.008 -0.003  -0.008 (0.101) (0.101)  (0.101)
Constant 9.795*** 9.782*** 9.839*** 9.824*** 9.987*** 9.983***
(1.394) (1.412) (1.404) (1.423) (1.326) (1.345)
Observations 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3B.2.3 At the 50% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 3B.14: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
50FOREIGN  and LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.219 0.222*  (0.127) (0.127)  
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.064* -0.065*   (0.037) (0.037)  
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.094 -0.098 (0.081) (0.081)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  0.679*** 0.674*** 0.680*** 0.675*** 0.679*** 0.674***(0.143) (0.143) (0.142) (0.141) (0.141) (0.140)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.733*** 0.737*** 0.734*** 0.738*** 0.738*** 0.741***(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.917*** -0.921*** -0.901*** -0.904*** -0.890*** -0.893***(0.182) (0.185) (0.180) (0.183) (0.181) (0.183)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.734*** 0.738*** 0.731*** 0.736*** 0.720*** 0.724***(0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  1.862*** 1.869*** 1.850*** 1.857*** 1.830*** 1.837***(0.186) (0.186) (0.184) (0.184) (0.180) (0.181)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.467*** -0.470*** -0.463*** -0.466*** -0.476*** -0.480***(0.161) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.161) (0.162)
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.028 0.022 0.027 0.022 0.036 0.030(0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.126) (0.125) (0.126)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.418** 0.432** 0.417** 0.431** 0.421** 0.435**(0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.177) (0.179) (0.180)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.173* 0.177* 0.171* (0.092) (0.093) (0.090) 
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.027 -0.024  -0.027 (0.095) (0.096)  (0.095)
Constant 10.332*** 10.319*** 10.370*** 10.357*** 10.442*** 10.436***
(1.261) (1.271) (1.263) (1.274) (1.193) (1.206)
Observations 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.15: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
50FOREIGN  and BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.185 0.185   (0.111) (0.111)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.055* -0.055    (0.032) (0.032)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.060 -0.061 (0.069) (0.067)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  0.696*** 0.692*** 0.696*** 0.692*** 0.697*** 0.693***(0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.135)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.769*** 0.772*** 0.769*** 0.773*** 0.775*** 0.778***(0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.060)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -0.764*** -0.765*** -0.751*** -0.752*** -0.741*** -0.741***(0.176) (0.178) (0.175) (0.177) (0.175) (0.177)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.608*** 0.613*** 0.606*** 0.612*** 0.597*** 0.602***(0.100) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.102) (0.101)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  1.580*** 1.587*** 1.571*** 1.577*** 1.552*** 1.559***(0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) (0.173) (0.174)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.566*** -0.568*** -0.562*** -0.565*** -0.573*** -0.575***(0.140) (0.141) (0.142) (0.144) (0.141) (0.142)
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.017 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.023 0.018(0.120) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121) (0.123)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.391** 0.401** 0.389** 0.400** 0.393** 0.404**(0.175) (0.176) (0.175) (0.176) (0.177) (0.178)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.185* 0.188* 0.183*  (0.102) (0.102) (0.101)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   -0.018 -0.013  -0.017 (0.125) (0.125)  (0.124)
Constant 7.686*** 7.645*** 7.719*** 7.676*** 7.719*** 7.681***
(1.394) (1.408) (1.396) (1.410) (1.331) (1.347)
Observations 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3B.16: The Determinants of a Firm’s Export Sales (Dep. Var. is itEXSALES ) with 
50FOREIGN  and LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tLIQUIDITY −  0.315** 0.320**   (0.126) (0.126)   
( 1)1i tLEVERAGE −   -0.094** -0.094**    (0.036) (0.036)   
( 1)2i tLEVERAGE −   -0.148* -0.154* (0.084) (0.083)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  0.698*** 0.693*** 0.699*** 0.693*** 0.697*** 0.691***(0.151) (0.150) (0.148) (0.147) (0.147) (0.146)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.325*** 0.323*** 0.328*** 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.324***(0.091) (0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.090) (0.092)
( 1)
A
i tSMALL −  -1.003*** -1.007*** -0.980*** -0.984*** -0.964*** -0.967***(0.178) (0.181) (0.174) (0.177) (0.175) (0.178)
( 1)
A
i tLARGE −  0.858*** 0.866*** 0.855*** 0.862*** 0.839*** 0.846***(0.094) (0.093) (0.095) (0.094) (0.098) (0.097)
( 1)
A
i tVLARGE −  2.236*** 2.248*** 2.219*** 2.231*** 2.194*** 2.205***(0.138) (0.138) (0.136) (0.137) (0.135) (0.136)
( 1)i tw ag e −  -0.197 -0.196 -0.193 -0.193 -0.207 -0.207(0.129) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130) (0.133) (0.133)
( 1)i tSKILL −  -0.004 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 0.008 0.001(0.130) (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) (0.131) (0.132)
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.542*** 0.560*** 0.540*** 0.558*** 0.548*** 0.565***(0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.185) (0.185)
( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT −  0.238** 0.243** 0.234**  (0.105) (0.106) (0.102)  
( 1)i tRDPRO CESS −   0.002 0.007  0.002 (0.101) (0.102)  (0.101)
Constant 9.684*** 9.670*** 9.734*** 9.720*** 9.863*** 9.859***
(1.420) (1.438) (1.428) (1.447) (1.356) (1.375)
Observations 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217 4217
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4 
Multi-Product Firms and 
Exporting  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The study of international trade has been transformed by the modelling of firm heterogeneity, 
productivity and exporting (see e.g. Hopenhayen 1992, Melitz 2003, Yeaple 2005, Melitz and 
Ottaviano 2005 and Bernard et al. 2007b).1  What the early literature failed to take into account 
was that world production and trade is dominated by multi-product firms which has led to 
recent developments in both the theoretical and empirical literature (Baldwin and Gu 2005, 
Bernard et al. 2006a, Bernard et al. 2007a, Eckel and Neary 2006, Nocke and Yeaple 2006 and 
Iacovone and Javorcik 2008) although the empirics still has some way to go to catch up and is 
the literature to which this chapter contributes.   
The importance of multi-product firms was first revealed for the US by Bernard et al. (2005) and 
(2006a) who show that 41 percent of firms produce more than one product but that multi-
                                                 
1 For a recent survey of the exporting and productivity literature see Tybout (2003) and Greenaway and Kneller 
(2007). 
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product firms account for 91 percent of total output while multi-product exporters account for 
more than 95 percent of total exports.2  An important element of firm heterogeneity therefore is 
how firms cope with expanding or contracting their product range in response to changes in 
trading conditions. 
However, detailed investigations of the multi-product firm phenomenon are limited and almost 
exclusively concentrated on developed countries.  Yet, the role of foreign firms in developing 
countries is considered a crucial part of the development story with developing countries 
becoming increasingly aggressive in their approach to attracting FDI.3  Thus, gaining an 
understanding of the dynamics of introducing new products at the firm level and how 
government policy can influence the export structure of firms is of direct policy relevance.   
In this chapter, we examine the role of multi-product firms in a developing country, in this case 
Thailand.  A first pass of the data suggests that there are both similarities and dissimilarities with 
the US.  For Thailand, 43 percent of firms produce more than one product (compared to the 41 
percent figure for the US).  However, 57 percent of output is produced by multi-product firms 
and 52 percent of total exports are from firms that export multiple products (compared to the 
US figures of 91 and 95 percent respectively).  The headline figures for the production and 
exporting share are clearly of a different magnitude to the figures that Bernard et al. (2006) find 
for the US.  The smaller output percentage for Thailand hints at the differences in the behaviour 
                                                 
2 These stylised facts have led to a renewed interest in the differentiated products and trade literature (see e.g. 
Linder 1961, Falvey 1981, Falvey and Kierzowski 1987, Flam and Helpman 1987 and Shaked and Sutton 1987) as 
evidenced by recent empirical work by Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak (2006) and Hallak and Schott (2008). 
3 Indeed, a growing literature examines the impact of FDI on developing countries and increasingly whether such 
policies are worthwhile (see e.g., Bergsman and Shen 1996, Blömstrom and Kokko, 1998, Aitkin and Harrison 1999 
and Lall and Narula 2004). 
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of firms in developed and developing countries certainly in terms of the size distribution of 
firms.4 
In the trade literature, the traditional approach to modelling the impact of trade liberalisation on 
an economy is to assume single-product firms with any intra-firm adjustment taking place in the 
scale of production with no role for multi-product production.  Thus, the prediction of a 
positive relationship between firm size and the ratio between a firm’s market value and its book 
value (Tobin’s Q) contrary to a lot of the empirical evidence.5  The industrial organisation (IO) 
literature on the other hand has been quicker to embrace the study of multi-product firms (see 
e.g. Brander and Eaton 1984, Baldwin and Ottaviano 2001, Johnson and Myatt 2003, and 
Allanson and Montagna 2005).  However, the IO literature does not examine the export 
behaviour of firms and more specifically the export profile of firms. 
So if we want to understand the dynamics of a newly industrialised country such as Thailand 
why is it important to make the distinction between single and multi-product firms?  First, one 
of the arguments put forward to justify FDI subsidies and tax breaks for foreign firms is to 
enable governments of developing countries to attract firms and to subsequently benefit from 
technology and knowledge spillovers to local firms and workers.  From a spillover perspective, 
multi-product firms are likely to be more attractive as logically the greater the number of 
                                                 
4 We must be careful when making comparisons between our results and Bernard et al. (2005, 2006a) as the 
definition of whether a firm is multiple product or not depends crucially on what constitutes an individual product.  
The greater the level of disaggregation, the larger the number of multi-product firms.  This is synonymous with the 
categorical aggregation problem that has plagued the intra-industry trade (IIT) literature (Caves 1981).  In this 
chapter, we define a product according to the equivalent of the 5-digit ISIC compared to Bernard et al. (2006a) who 
use a 5-digit US SIC classification and Bernard et al. (2005) who use a 10-digit Harmonised System (HS) 
classification to measure their output and export statistics respectively and is probably one explanation for at least 
some of the difference in our headline figures.  Indeed, given these numbers come from different aggregation levels 
one should not draw conclusions from their relative magnitudes.  The SIC 5-digit data consists of around 1800 
products whilst the HS 10-digit data contains 8500 products of which two thirds are from the manufacturing sector.  
The data reveal that firms produce across four and even two-digit industries and that the product distribution tends 
to be highly skewed where for example, exports of one product in a multi-product firm may account for 
considerably more than 50 percent of total exports.  See Bernard et al. (2006a) for further discussion. 
5 See Nocke and Yeaple (2006) for further discussion on the relationship between Tobin’s Q and firm size where 
firms with lower marginal costs have larger sales and have a higher Tobin’s Q even though the empirical evidence 
suggests a negative relationship (see e.g. Lang and Stulz 1994). 
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products produced, the wider the range of technologies employed and thus the greater the 
likelihood that domestic firms will benefit from technology and knowledge spillovers.  The 
process of a firm becoming multi-product is also associated with process and product R&D as 
firms seek to develop new products and methods of production.  R&D is also strongly 
associated with positive spillovers from FDI.   
Second, the growth through exporting route has proved to be particularly successful in the past 
as experienced by many East Asian countries over the last two decades.  Thus, governments, if 
given a choice, are likely to prefer investment from foreign firms that produce more than one 
product, ideally for export.  Finally, multi-product firms may be more attractive to host 
governments as such firms should exhibit less susceptibility to demand shocks as the risk from, 
for example, changes in fashion or advances in product specific technology, is spread over a 
variety of exports and possibly export markets.  Hence, domestic employment change may 
benefit from being smoothed. Thus, an analysis of the structure of foreign firms and the 
characteristics of firms that produce multiple products provides a useful insight into the role 
played by MNEs in developing countries. 
One result from the existing firms and exporting literature is that size matters, with large firms 
more likely to export.  It is therefore important for a developing country to attract firms of a 
certain size.6  Thus, in this chapter, we examine two specific aspects of the multi-product and 
development question.  In the first stage, we examine the relationship between multi-product 
firms’ extensive margins (number of products produced or exported) and intensive margins 
(output or export sales per product).  Given that globalization or changes in trade barriers or 
                                                 
6 Tybout (2003) in his survey of the firm-level literature concludes that whilst exporters are a minority, exporters 
tend to be larger and more productive although these firms still only export a small percentage of their total output.  
Eaton et al. (2004) in a firm-level study of export destinations for France concurred that there is significant 
heterogeneity across firms in the extent of their export participation with the number of firms selling to multiple 
markets declining with the number of destinations.  Approximately 17 percent of French firms export with over 34 
percent exporting to just one country. 
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trade costs will lead to intra-firm adjustment along firms’ extensive and intensive margins we 
examine how this relationship affects the distribution in firm size.  In addition, we examine the 
correlation between firms’ extensive and intensive margins.  Our first stage results show, in 
contrast to Bernard et al. (2006b), that in Thailand there is little variance between firms’ 
extensive margins and total output or total export sales.  In addition, the relationship between 
the intensive and extensive margins are mixed when different definitions of the two variables are 
used.  We find a negative correlation in production but a positive correlation in exports. 
In the second stage of the chapter, we examine the characteristics associated with multiple 
product producers making a distinction between domestic and foreign-owned firms.  Our 
second stage results show that being a multi-product firm and the number of products produced 
are associated with various firm characteristics including export status, TFP and R&D status.  
Comparing domestic and foreign firms, we observe some systematic differences in both the 
factors that are related to being a multi-product firm and the number of products produced.  
Overall, a complex picture of the behaviour of MNEs in developing countries emerges where 
foreign-owned firms that export are strongly associated with being multi-product but foreign 
firms that only serve the domestic market show a strong negative partial correlation with being 
multi-product.  These factors might explain, in part, why evidence for knowledge diffusion and 
productivity spillovers is less widespread that one might have imagined.  Thus, our finding for a 
significant proportion of foreign-owned firms supplied only the domestic market and produced 
just a single product is an interesting new stylised fact not previously highlighted in the literature. 
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 4.2 presents an 
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature.  Section 4.3 describes the data.  In section 
4.4, we discuss our empirical model and present the results of our intensive and extensive 
margins analysis while section 4.5 presents our results examining the characteristics of those 
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firms that produce multiple products and the factors related to the number of goods produced.  
Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Various models have been developed to explain trade at the firm level.  A widely cited paper is 
Melitz (2003) who uses productivity differences across firms to develop a firm-level model of 
intra-industry trade and exporting where firms produce horizontally differentiated goods.  The 
model assumes that the production function has a single factor of production and shows that 
trade liberalisation through a reduction in trade barriers would reduce the export productivity 
cut-off, increase benefits to exporting and persuade more productive firms to enter the market.  
Using a comparative advantage framework, Bernard et al. (2007b) point out that resource 
reallocation within and across industries leads to increases in industry productivity and sector 
outputs of the comparative advantage industries compared to industries with a comparative 
disadvantage because the former are more likely to become exporters.  These two models 
however, says nothing about the role of multi-product firms. 
One of the first papers to consider such a role was Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) who develop a 
model to explain the behaviour of multi-product firms in intra-industry FDI and intra-industry 
trade.  Because of trade costs, multi-product firms engage in FDI by producing some products 
abroad in order to reduce inter-variety competition.  Although FDI and exports are substitutes 
they may also generate some reverse imports of those varieties manufactured abroad.  In the 
heterogeneous firm model by Bernard et al. (2003) which is essentially an extension of the 
Ricardian model, a reduction in trade barriers or trade costs induces an increase in productivity 
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because of an expansion of high productivity firms with low-productivity firms exiting the 
market. 
In contrast, Bernard et al. (2006b) present a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics with 
heterogeneous firms and endogenous entry and exit of firms.  They assume the productivity of 
the firm for each single product to be fixed.  When trade is liberalised, a reduction in trade costs 
leads to a reallocation of resources and therefore increases firm-level and industry-level 
productivity.  Firms produce and export the most successful products (high-expertise products) 
rather than low-productivity products.  The model predicts and the authors find a positive 
correlation between firms’ intensive (the output per product) and extensive (the number of 
products) margins which indicates that the production for the export market is enlarged not 
only through an increase in the number of varieties sold abroad but also through an increase in 
exports per product.7  This result is driven by the interaction between general competencies 
(ability) and product specific abilities (expertise).  Thus, following trade liberalisation, exporting 
firms expand the range of the products to be exported whilst simultaneously contracting the 
range of products that they choose to produce. 
In a recent paper, Eckel and Neary (2006) present a general equilibrium model of multi-product 
firms with oligopolist behaviour and address the role of the adjustment processes within multi-
product firms and the relationship with factor and goods markets.  Specifically, they analyse how 
firms react to shocks and the affect of these shocks not only on wages and labour demand but 
also on the number of products a firm produces highlighting the role of flexible manufacturing.  
Their results suggest that in a multi-product framework firms may adjust their scale of output 
and number of varieties produced instead of in the traditional trade literature that only allow 
entry and exit in response to shocks.  One distinguishing feature of Eckel and Neary (2006) is 
                                                 
7 In the model, the relationship between extensive and intensive margins can be negatively correlated if there are 
diseconomies of scope or inefficiency in monitoring various production process (Bernard et al., 2006b). 
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the emphasis on “core competences” with one variety being able to be produced more 
efficiently than varieties that lie outside this core competency.  This means firms are free to 
expand their production lines but the process is subject to diseconomies of scope and cost 
heterogeneities.  Such costs differences allow cannibalisation to occur in response to shocks. 
Similarly, Nocke and Yeaple (2006) develop a theoretical model with multi-product firms in 
order to analyse the effect of globalisation through trade liberalisation on firm scope assuming 
that the relationship between marginal costs of each product variety and the number of varieties 
of each firm are positively correlated.  They find that globalisation and trade liberalisation affect 
firms’ productivity because the marginal costs are endogenously determined.  If new product 
lines are added, less of each good will be produced therefore firms face higher marginal costs of 
production that causes a reduction in the TFP of existing product lines.  Hence, multilateral 
trade liberalisation should result in a less skewed firm size distribution with large firms shrinking 
and small firms increasing their product lines respectively.  Crucially, in contrast to Bernard et al. 
(2006b) their model predicts a negative correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive 
margins. 
Feenstra and Ma (2007) develop a monopolistic competition model that emphasises the optimal 
choice of product scope for multi-product firms.  Each firm chooses their product scope and, at 
the same time, has to be concerned about cannibalisation effects of their own sales.  The model 
shows that when a country opens to trade, the less efficient firms exit the market while large and 
high productive firms remain and produce a greater variety of products. 
In the majority of cases, models attempt to explain the stylised facts of the US international 
trade and to address the difference between exporters and non-exporters where exporters are 
assumed to have higher employment, output, value added per worker and productivity 
compared to non-exporters (Bernard et al., 2007a).  One of the first empirical papers was 
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Bernard et al. (2006b) who investigate the relationship between multi-product firms and 
exporting by testing firms’ intensive and extensive margins using the US 1997 Manufacturing 
Census data.  The empirical results show that exporters produce a greater variety of products 
than non-exporters.  In addition, a positive and significant relationship between the intensive 
margin and an export dummy indicates that exporters produce more output per product more 
than non-exporters. 
In Bernard et al. (2007a), a gravity equation framework is employed to examine the relationship 
between bilateral distance and firms’ extensive or intensive margins.  Using US data, the results 
show that distance to trading partner decreases both the number of exporting firms and number 
of exported products but increases the average export value. 
In Bernard et al. (2006a), adjustment to firms’ extensive margins suggests that the number of 
products can be changed through resource reallocation.  The concept of adding and dropping 
particular products is based on productivity differences across products.  Bernard et al. (2006a) 
find a positive relationship between a firm’s productivity and the number of products.  
Productive firms self-select to produce additional products whereas firms are likely to drop 
later-birth products and the less-productive products, compared to other firms that produce 
similar products.  In addition, they also find that multiple product firms are larger and more 
productive than single-product firms. 
For developing countries there are four studies of interest.  First, Brambilla (2006) presents a 
model of multi-product firms using a production function of the number of product varieties, a 
cost function of production technology and the maximisation of expected profits in order to 
explain how many varieties each firm decides to produce.  The relationship between the 
structure of ownership and the number of product varieties among multi-product firms in 
China’s manufacturing sector is then examined.  Because foreign- and domestically-owned firms 
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face different costs of product development and have different technology and product 
efficiencies they show that the majority-owned foreign firms introduce more new varieties 
compared to private domestic firms. 
Second, Eaton et al. (2007) investigate the variation in a country’s exports using Colombian data.  
Total exports are a composition of the varieties sold (extensive margin) and average sales 
(intensive margin).  They find that an increase in the total export value of Colombia affects over 
50 percent more firms.  They also examine the export dynamics of continuing firms, entrants 
and those that exit.  Total export sales of new exporters are relatively small with most of the 
export revenue coming from a small number of very large stable exporters. 
Third, Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) analyse the behaviour of multi-product exporters using 
Mexican data.  The majority of firms in Mexico do not export while the exporting firms seem to 
concentrate on the export of only a few products.  They find that a reduction in trade costs 
affects the adjustment of exporting at the product level.  For new firms that enter export 
markets, they are likely to export on a small scale in terms of value and the number of products 
exported.  They also found a positive correlation between extensive and intensive margins in 
exporting consistent with the Bernard et al. (2006b). 
Finally, Goldberg et al. (2008) employ a detailed firm-level data from India to explain the 
characteristics of multi-product firms and importance of allocation of resources within firm-
level adjustment by changing their product mix.  Although India and the US are at different 
stages of development, the patterns and characteristics of multi-product firms in both countries 
appeared to be relatively similar.  In regards to the extensive and intensive margins, the positive 
relationship is in line with the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence by Bernard et al. 
(2006b).  
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4.3 Data 
In this chapter, we use the same data set as Chapters two and three which is the Annual Survey 
of Thailand’s manufacturing industry by the OIE for the period between 2001 and 2004.  One 
significant advantage of this data is that we are able to identify the number of products a firm 
produces.  Our product classification is based loosely on ISIC classifications of what constitutes 
a product and are based on the question in the survey that asks the firms to “list the products 
that you produce”.  We believe this approximates to a 5-digit product classification.8 
Tables 4A.1 and 4A.2 of the Appendix 4A provide details of definitions and descriptive 
statistics, respectively.  The raw correlations presented in Table 4A.3 show that being a multi-
product firm and the number of products produced have positive correlations with export 
status, foreign ownership, productivity, R&D wage and firm size. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of our two-digit ISIC data for the four years of our sample 2001 
to 2004.  The sectors that have a high percentage of exporting firms of more than 70 percent are 
ISIC 18 (Wearing Apparel; dressing and dying of fur), ISIC 32 (Radio, television and 
communication equipment) and ISIC 36 (Furniture).  In 17 out of 22 two-digit ISIC sectors we 
observe an increase in the proportion of firms that export with ISIC 34 (Motor vehicles, trailers 
& semi-trailers) showing the largest increase in exports during this period. 
In Table 4.2, we present the share of output and the share of firms that produce single and 
multiple products across various groupings.  When we consider all firms, we see that the 
majority of firms produce only one product (57.12 percent) with 17.81 percent producing two 
                                                 
8 Our method of product identification was to match the product lists with the ISIC 5-digit classification list by 
visual inspection.   
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products and only 9.15 percent producing five or more products.9    However, those 57.12 
percent of firms only produce around 43 percent of total output with the 9.15 percent of firms 
producing five or more products producing 15 percent of total output.  If we compare foreign 
and domestic firms we observe that a larger proportion of domestic firms produce just one 
product.  Thus, consistent with Bernard et al. (2006b) we find that foreign firms have a higher 
likelihood of being multi-product and a higher share of output with 17.25 percent of firms 
producing five or more products.  Comparing exporters and non-exporters is also illuminating 
where we find an even greater difference with 61.16 percent of non-exporters and only 53.15 
percent of exporters producing a single product. 
Finally, we introduce a final complication by making a distinction between foreign-owned 
exporters and non-exporters.  We find that 68 percent of foreign non-exporters produce a single 
product.  The fact that approximately one fifth of foreign firms do not export is a stylised fact 
that we believe has not been previously highlighted in the literature where foreign firms are 
almost considered to be exporters almost by definition.  This insight adds a layer of complexity 
to our analysis and hints at a more subtle relationship between foreign firms and the benefits 
accrued to the host country. 
                                                 
9  Our figures are broadly consistent with a study by Goldberg et al. (2008) who find that in India the single product 
and multi-product firms account for 53 and 47 percent respectively of manufacturing firms. 
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Table 4.1: Share of Exporting Firms by two-digit ISIC 
ISIC 
Rev. 3 
Industry 2001 2002 2003 2004
15 Food products & beverages 49.96
(301)
48.82 
(289) 
51.39 
(278) 
54.44
(245)
16 Tobacco products 16.67
(1)
16.67 
(1) 
20.00 
(1) 
0.00
(0)
17 Textiles 34.55
(133)
35.81 
(130) 
38.06 
(118) 
38.13
(114)
18 Wearing apparel; dressing & dyeing of fur 76.33
(216)
76.63 
(200) 
77.73 
(178) 
72.82
(142)
19 Tanning & dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddler, harness & footwear 
64.91
(74)
63.89 
(69) 
67.65 
(69) 
65.17
(58)
20 Wood & products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw & plaiting materials 
44.05
(37)
45.45 
(35) 
47.83 
(33) 
44.26
(27)
21 Paper and paper products 40.59
(41)
42.27 
(41) 
41.24 
(40) 
36.78
(32)
22 Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media 10.69
(14)
9.60 
(12) 
11.97 
(14) 
12.26
(13)
23 Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 66.67
(8)
62.50 
(5) 
50.00 
(3) 
80.00
(4)
24 Chemicals & chemical products 52.87
(129)
53.78 
(128) 
57.14 
(124) 
57.92
(106)
25 Rubber & plastics products 45.92
(169)
46.94 
(169) 
49.26 
(166) 
51.68
(154)
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 32.31
(116)
33.64 
(109) 
32.54 
(96) 
37.60
(91)
27 Basic metals 34.34
(34)
33.33 
(32) 
33.33 
(30) 
40.26
(31)
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery & 
equipment 
42.36
(86)
43.62 
(82) 
44.69 
(80) 
43.40
(69)
29 Machinery & equipment n.e.c. 49.25
(99)
51.67 
(93) 
52.84 
(93) 
54.60
(89)
30 Office, accounting & computing machinery 63.41
(26)
62.50 
(20) 
60.87 
(14) 
52.17
(12)
31 Electrical machinery & apparatus n.e.c. 43.62
(65)
43.15 
(63) 
42.52 
(54) 
44.19
(57)
32 Radio, television & communication equipment & 
apparatus 
75.95
(120)
79.08 
(121) 
78.08 
(114) 
74.26
(101)
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches & 
clocks 
47.76
(32)
50.85 
(30) 
47.27 
(26) 
50.00
(22)
34 Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers 46.53
(47)
49.48 
(48) 
59.09 
(78) 
65.60
(82)
35 Other transport equipment 48.84
(21)
51.22 
(21) 
54.05 
(20) 
41.38
(12)
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 74.43
(163)
73.43 
(152) 
77.83 
(158) 
77.27
(136)
37 Recycling 25.00
(4)
30.77 
(4) 
33.33 
(4) 
28.57
(4)
 Total industry 48.10
(1,936)
49.16 
(1,854) 
51.10 
(1,791) 
51.78
(1,601)
Note: Numbers of exporting observation are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2: Share of Firms and Output for Different Groups by Product Distributions 
Number 
products 
produced 
 
All Firms 
 
Domestic Firms 
 
Foreign Firms 
Non-Exporting 
Firms 
 
Exporting Firms 
Foreign Non-
Exporting Firms 
Foreign Exporting 
Firms 
Share 
Firms
Share 
Output 
Share 
Firms
Share 
Output
Share 
Firms
Share 
of 
Output
Share 
Firms
Share 
Output 
Share 
Firms
Share 
of 
Output
Share 
Firms
Share 
of 
Output
Share 
Firms
Share 
of 
Output 
1 57.12 
(5,438)
43.02 
 
58.17 
(4,001)
42.49 54.37 
(1,437)
43.31 61.16 
(2,883)
52.63 
 
53.15 
(2,555)
40.54 68.29 
(364)
48.34 50.85 
(1,073)
42.75 
 
2 17.81 
(1,696)
19.79 
 
16.89 
(1,162)
20.19 20.20 
(534)
19.58 16.31 
(769)
20.79 
 
19.28 
(927)
19.57 16.70 
(89)
22.76 21.09 
(445)
19.21 
 
3 9.16 
(872)
13.74 
 
9.57 
(658)
16.91 8.10 
(241)
11.42 8.59 
(405)
17.14 
 
9.71 
(467)
12.95 6.38 
(34)
21.99 8.53 
(180)
10.25 
 
4 6.76 
(644)
8.66 
 
6.54 
(450)
8.87 7.34 
(194)
8.44 5.11 
(241)
4.59 
 
8.38 
(403)
9.60 3.75 
(20)
3.51 8.25 
(174)
9.01 
 
5+ 9.15 
(871)
14.79 
 
8.83 
(607)
11.54 9.99 
(264)
17.25 8.82 
(416)
4.85 
 
9.47 
(455)
17.33 4.88 
(26)
3.41 11.28 
(238)
18.78 
 
Total 100 
(9,521)
100 
 
100 
(6,878)
100 100 
(2,643)
100 100 
(4,714)
100 
 
100 
(4,807)
100 100 
(533)
100 100 
(2,110)
100 
 
Note: Numbers of observation are reported in parentheses. 
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4.4 Multi-Product Firms’ Intensive and Extensive Margins 
As previously noted, multi-product firms in Thailand produce 57 percent of total output while 
firms that export multiple products account for over 52 percent of total export sales.  Bernard et 
al. (2006b) investigate this phenomenon for multi-product firms in the US by examining the 
contribution of firms’ extensive margins to firm-size distribution.  Similarly, Yeaple (2005) 
argues that large firms are responsible for much in the variation in sales across firms managing 
product lines much more actively than small firms.  This line of thinking is matched by Berger 
and Ofek (1995) who find that single-product firms have large sales per product than multi-
product firms.  In this section we follow the methodology of Bernard et al. (2006b) to examine 
the relationship between intensive and extensive margins and size distribution for a newly 
industrialising country where the importance of attracting large MNEs is often part of 
government industrial policy. 
Bernard et al. (2006b) begin with a cross-section estimation.  The basic framework for firm-size 
distribution is to identify a firm’s extensive (number of products) and intensive (output per 
product) margins.  In this chapter, we have a panel estimation so the relationship is presented in 
Equation (4.1): 
 it it itY n y=  (4.1) 
where iY  is firm size measured by total output of each individual firm. 
 in  is the number of products produced by firm. 
iy  is the average output per product that is defined as 
1
it pit
pit
y y
n
≡ ∑ . 
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The subscripts i , t  and p  denote firm, time and product respectively.  The relationship 
between firm size and multiple product firms requires a knowledge of how firm size varies.  By 
taking the log of Equation (4.1), the model can be separated into two regressions for firms’ 
intensive and extensive margins as a function of the log of total output, 
 1 1ln lnit it itn Yδ β μ= + +  (4.2) 
 2 2ln lnit it ity Yδ β ε= + +  (4.3) 
where itμ  and i tε  denote stochastic errors and by using OLS estimation techniques, 
β β+ =1 2 1 .  Thus the coefficient of β1  captures the partial correlation between total output 
and the extensive margin and β2  captures the partial correlation between total output and the 
intensive margin (Bernard et al., 2006b). 
In addition, we examine the relationship between exporting and firms’ intensive and extensive 
margins.  In the case of an exporting firm, total exports is the number of products exported 
( )ein  multiplied by average exports per product ( )
e
iy .  Thus, the estimated regression 
decompositions for exporting are presented as:  
 3 3ln ln
e e
it it itn Yδ β μ= + +  (4.4) 
 4 4ln ln
e e
it it ity Yδ β ε= + +  (4.5) 
Since a firm’s extensive and intensive margins are correlated, where β β= −2 11  and 4 31β β= −  
we simply report the estimated results of a firm’s extensive margin ( 1β  and 3β ).  A robust 
variance estimation corrects for the problem of heteroscedastic errors.  The results from OLS 
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estimations with and without region, industry and time fixed effects are presented in Table 4.3 
and are based on a sample of multi-product firms only. 
In Columns (1) and (2), we find that the number of products produced accounts for 
approximately one percent of the variation in total firm output.  This means that an increase in 
the number of products (extensive margin) accounts for only one percent of the increase in total 
output.  On the other hand, this result indicates that the variation of total firm output in 
Thailand is mainly due to changes in average output per product (intensive margin).10 
A slightly higher variation is observed if we consider the number of products exported and total 
export sales (Columns (3) and (4)).  The coefficient shows that the number of products exported 
causes a variation in total export sales of 7.4 percent.  This means that the number of products 
exported raises total export sales by 7.4 percent by keeping average export sales per product 
constant. 
Table 4.3: OLS Regression Decomposition of Firm Size and Firms’ Extensive Margins  
 Production  Exporting  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln itY  0.009*** 0.012***   
(4.17) (5.20)   
ln eitY    0.074*** 0.074*** 
  (21.87) (20.48) 
Observations 6042 6042 3331 3331 
R-squared 0.003 0.057 0.118 0.189 
Additional 
Covariates 
None Region, Industry 
and Time Fixed 
Effects 
None Region, Industry 
and Time Fixed 
Effects 
Notes: Sample includes multi-product firms only.  Dependent variable in Column (1) and (2) is the log of number 
of products produced (ln )itn , and Column (3) and (4) is the log of number of product exported (ln )
e
itn .  Robust t 
statistics in parentheses. *** significant at 1%. 
                                                 
10 As Bernard et al. (2006a) point out, our use of the equivalent of 5-digit ISIC data will have the effect of masking 
unobserved changes within 5-digit categories thus our results are likely to underestimate the importance of firm 
adjustments to the extensive margins. 
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Next we examine the relationship between intensive and extensive margins by regressing firms’ 
output or exports per product on the number of products produced or exported by firm.  The 
estimated regressions are presented as follows: 
 1 1ln lnit it ity nσ γ ξ= + +  (4.6) 
 2 2ln lnit i t
e e
ity nσ γ ω= + +  (4.7) 
In Table 4.4 we observe a positive correlation between the extensive and intensive margins in 
Columns (3) and (4) only.  This positive relationship indicates that the number of products 
exported increases export sales per product by between 50.1 percent and 58.4 percent.  We can 
conclude therefore that multi-product firms only marginally increase the number of products 
exported but for each product, multi-product firms export a larger volume of each.  However, in 
contrast to Bernard et al. (2006b), Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) and Goldberg et al. (2008), we 
find a negative and significant correlation for firms’ extensive and intensive margins when we 
consider production data.  Thus, in Columns (1) and (2), we find that an increase in the number 
of products produced decreases the amount of output per product by between 64.1 percent and 
69.2 percent.  This negative correlation is consistent with the relationship predicted by the 
models of Nocke and Yeaple (2006), and Eckel and Neary (2006).  The empirical result suggests 
that in Thailand, the more products a firm develops, the less of each one produced.  This  can 
be explained by diseconomies of scope in the production unit of multi-product firms in 
Thailand.  Assuming that the marginal costs and the number of products are positively 
correlated, when the new product lines are added, a firm faces higher marginal costs of 
production and therefore causes a reduction in the productivity of the existing product line.  In 
addition, the negative result implies that there is inefficiency in monitoring various production 
processes.   
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 Another explanation is that there may be advantages associated with the production of a 
number of products and that by using the same production unit, distributing products through 
the same channels and managing production within the same organisation there is no discernible 
difference in cost.  Multi-product firms in Thailand may be trying to expand their market 
potential by increasing the number of products produced rather than merely increasing sales of 
existing products.  If firms produce a greater number of products it may help to reduce future 
risk resulting from the product life cycle at any given period. More importantly, it suggests that 
the behaviour of MNEs differs by location between developed and developing countries.  It will 
be interesting to see whether these results hold for other developing countries. 
Table 4.4: OLS Regression of Firms’ Extensive and Intensive Margins 
 Production  Exporting  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln itn  -0.692*** -0.641***   
(9.32) (9.22)   
ln eitn    0.584*** 0.501*** 
  (7.49) (6.33) 
Observations 6042 6042 3331 3331 
R-squared 0.014 0.200 0.018 0.139 
Additional 
Covariates 
None Region, Industry 
and Time Fixed 
Effects 
None Region, Industry 
and Time Fixed 
Effects 
Notes: Sample includes multi-product firms only.  Dependent variable in Column (1) and (2) is log of output per 
product (ln )ity , and Column (3) and (4) is the log of export sales product per product (ln )
e
ity . Region, industry 
and time dummies are included. Robust t statistics in parentheses. *** significant at 1%. 
From the decomposition of the firm-size distribution and firms’ extensive margins, we found 
that intra-firm adjustment on the number of products produced and exported by multi-product 
firms positively and significantly affects the variation in firm size.  The effect on the variation in 
firm size is mainly due to changes in output and export sales per product.  When we consider 
the relationship between firms’ extensive and intensive margins, our results show that extensive 
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and intensive margins are negatively correlated in production but positively correlated in 
exporting. 
We now know that multi-product firms also play a significant but complex role in Thailand’s 
economy.  Although there are a larger number of single-product firms, approximately 57 percent 
of total output is accounted for by multi-product firms.  Given the importance of multi-product 
firms we now investigate which factors, in addition to size, are associated with a firm’s decision 
to produce multiple products.  By identifying these characteristics the results may enable 
policymakers to refine the selection criteria for targeting FDI attraction policies to encourage 
those firms that are most likely to benefit the domestic economy. 
4.5 The Characteristics of Multi-Product Firms 
This section presents empirical analyses on the characteristics associated with multiple product 
producers making a distinction between domestic and foreign firms.  First, we examine the 
characteristics associated with being a multi-product firm using a binary dependent variable.  We 
follow the economic methodology as previously discussed in Chapters two and three.  Second, 
we examine the characteristics associated with the number of products produced using a count 
data so the methodology used is the negative binomial regression.  In each sub-section, we 
discuss about our model, methodology, variables and finally our estimated results. 
4.5.1 Being a Multi-Product Firm  
Recent stylised facts have shown that, in both domestic and international markets, multi-product 
firms have become increasingly important.  We now investigate the characteristics of those 
firm’s that produce multiple products. 
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We estimate a pooled probit model for the binary dependent variable, which indicates the status 
of a firm.11  All independent variables are lagged by one year in order to avoid possible 
simultaneity problems.  Unfortunately the data does not provide a set of instruments to control 
for possible exogeneity between multi-product production and our dependent variables.  For 
example, being multi-product may cause TFP to rise or make it more likely that a firm will 
export.  We believe this is less of a problem than with the traditional determinants of exporting 
regressions.  However, we acknowledge that lagging by one year is not ideal and hence in our 
results section we refer to associations and partial correlations instead of determinants and 
effects.  Thus, our probit model is as follows, 
 β− −′= = Φ( 1) ( 1)Pr( 1 ) ( )it i t i tMULTIDUM Z Z  (4.8) 
where, itMULTIDUM is a dummy variable that is 1 if the firm is multi-product and 0 otherwise. 
Z  is a vector of firm characteristics. 
Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution function. 
We include five region, twenty-two two-digit industry and two year dummies in order to control 
for unobserved effects.  In addition, we allow for robust clustering at the two-digit industry level 
(clustering at the regional level made little difference to the results).  This relaxes the 
independence assumption and requires only that the observations are independent across 
sectors. 
  
                                                 
11 Since our data has a short panel structure, we are not able to use alternative estimation methods (e.g. a fixed 
effects estimator or a GMM first difference estimator).  For example, Arellano and Bond (1991) explain that the 
GMM first difference estimator requires two or more lags of all the right-hand-side variables as instruments. 
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In Equation (4.8), the vector of firm characteristics ( )Z  includes the following, 
EX  is an export dummy which equals 1 if the firm has positive export sales and 0 otherwise. 
FOREIGN  is a dummy, which equals 1 if at least 10% of shares are foreign owned, and 0 
otherwise.  Cut-offs of 25% and 50% were used in a sensitivity analysis.  
EX*FOREIGN is an interaction term that measures the effect of being both foreign and an 
exporter over and above the individual effects. 
LPTFP  is a measure of total factor productivity.  The calculation of the parameter is obtained 
from the semi-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) which takes account of 
unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks.  In a sensitivity analysis, we use two alternative 
measures of TFP.  The R&D estimator of TFP ( )BUETTNERTFP  is obtained from a semi-
parametric and nonlinear least square regression of Buettner (2003) that allows for endogenous 
R&D.12  The standard labour productivity ( )LABPRODTFP is calculated from the log of value 
added over total labour. 
size  is measured as the log of total employment.  As a robustness check we also categorise firm 
size into small ( )SMALL , medium ( )MEDIUM , large ( )LARGE  and very large ( )VLARGE  
by following the quartile distribution of the total employment for all firms operating in the same 
two-digit ISIC (Rev.3). 
w ag e  is the log of wage per employee.  Wage is an indicator of labour quality.  It is expected 
that the higher the wages, the more superior the quality of labour and the more likely that a firm 
will be able to produce multiple products. 
                                                 
12 See Appendices 2B and 2C for the methodology underlying our Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Buettner (2003) 
TFP calculations. 
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RDPRODUCT  and RDPROCESS  are dummy variables for R&D to capture those firms that 
undertake R&D in product development and production processes respectively.  R&D activity 
is an important mechanism for firms to introduce new products (Brander and Eaton, 1984).  
R&D is also an important procedure for enhancing the quality of existing products and for 
developing new products as well as highlighting cost savings in the production process.  It is 
expected that firms that carry out R&D especially product R&D are more likely to be a multi-
product firms. 
The results reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are marginal effect estimations that are calculated at 
the mean of each independent variable except for the dummy variable.  Each coefficient 
indicates the change in the probability of the outcome. 
In Table 4.5, the results of our preferred specification in Columns (3) and (4) show a complex 
relationship between export status and the probability of a firm to be a multi-product producer.  
The results suggest that it is not export status itself that is important.  We also have to consider 
the interaction term between the export status of the firm and our ownership variable.  For 
domestic firms, the export status has a negative but insignificant association on the probability 
of being a multi-product firm.  For foreign firms, being an exporter is associated with an 
increase in the probability of being a multi-product firm by 1.9 percentage points relative to 
being a non-exporter.13   
Foreign ownership appears therefore to have an important association with multi-product 
production although it is not a straightforward relationship.  The individual partial correlation 
for foreign ownership is negative and significant for all specifications.  This suggests that for 
non-exporters being a foreign-owned firm is negatively associated with being a multi-product 
                                                 
13 The mean of ownership status is approximately 0.28 so the export effect conditional upon being a foreign-owned 
firm is calculated as [-0.023+(0.146*0.28)]=0.019.    
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firm.  If we compare the magnitude of the effect for non-exporter and exporters, the ownership 
effect for exporters (-0.086) is relatively lower than for non-exporters (-0.159).14  One plausible 
explanation for a negative result might be overseas firms setting up single product assembly 
plants that specialise in the production of one single product for sale either domestically in 
Thailand or for export (possibly to Thailand’s ASEAN neighbours).  This would also fit with the 
Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) hypothesis that MNEs locate the production of different varieties 
in different countries.  However, as noted earlier, foreign-owned firms that also export are 
positively and significantly correlated with firms that produce multiple products.  Thus it is clear 
that foreign firms cannot be considered one homogenous group. 
For TFP, as expected we observe that highly productive firms are positively associated with 
multi-product firms.  The positive and significant coefficients for product R&D and process 
R&D suggests that firms that carry out R&D in either product development or production 
processes, or both, are positively related to the probability that a firm will be a multi-product 
producer.  The product R&D activities facilitate a firm to improve product quality and develop 
new products.  The R&D in the production process helps a firm to generate cost savings in the 
production process that make possible for a firm to produce more products.  When we examine 
our proxy for the quality of labour, we see that the coefficient on wage is positive but generally 
insignificant. 
As expected, the relationship between size and being a multi-product firm is positive and 
significant at the one percent level.  Increasing firm size by one unit is associated with an 
increase in the probability of producing multiple products of approximately 6 percentage points.  
If we categorise firm size into small, large and very large firms, the coefficients are also 
significant at the one percent level with small firms being negatively correlated with being multi-
                                                 
14 The mean of export status is approximately 0.50 so the ownership effect conditional upon being an exporter is 
calculated as [-0.159+(0.146*0.50)]=-0.086.    
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product producers.  As firm sizes increases, we observe increasingly positive results so that the 
larger the size, the greater the probability of producing multiple products. 
To further investigate the results from Table 4.5 we split the sample into domestic firms and 
foreign firms.15  Approximately one quarter of our firm sample are foreign-owned firms.  We 
retain the 10 percent foreign-owned definition.16  The results are presented in Table 4.6.  
Observe that the export status of domestic firms has no relationship with the probability of a 
firm producing multiple products.  In contrast, exporting has a significant and positive partial 
correlation with the probability of a foreign firm being a multi-product producer.  This suggests 
a systemic difference between the behaviour of foreign and domestic firms with foreign 
exporters producing more than one product and domestic exporters tending to concentrate on 
the export of a single product. 
For productivity, the coefficients for both domestic and foreign firms are positive and 
significant for only four of our twelve specifications.  For process R&D, the positive significant 
coefficients for the domestic sample indicate that for domestic firms, R&D in production 
processes is associated with a higher probability of a firm becoming multi-product producer.  In 
contrast, the insignificant coefficient for our foreign firm sample suggests that neither R&D 
process development nor wages are associated with an increase in the probability of being a 
multi-product producer.  However, R&D product development is positive and significant at the 
                                                 
15 This breakdown sample into domestic and foreign sub-samples is verified via a likelihood ratio test by testing the 
two models that we do not allow for differences in the coefficients across ownership (model A) versus the one that 
we do (model B).  The test statistic reports the chi-squared value for the test (44.13) and the p-value for a chi-square 
with seven degrees of freedom suggests that the difference between the two models is statistically significant. This 
means that the less restive model (model B) fits better than the more restrictive model (model A).  The 
consequence of adding the interaction terms between the foreign and independent variables as predictor variables 
in the model result in statistically significant improvement of model.  Therefore, we can separately estimate model 
for domestic and foreign sub-samples. 
16 In a sensitivity analysis we tested 25 percent and 50 percent cut-off points with broadly similar results that are 
available in Appendix 4B. 
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one percent level for domestic firms and five percent for foreign firms except in Column (9).  
Firm size for both domestic and foreign firms is positive and significant.  
Our results suggest therefore that the relationship between export status, ownership and 
multiple products production are complex.  We observe that individually foreign-owned firms 
and exporters have a negative partial correlation with the likelihood of being a multi-product 
producer but that the interaction term between being a foreign-owned firm and an exporter has 
a positive partial correlation with the production of multiple products. 
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Table 4.5: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. is 
itMULTIDUM ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.031 0.033 -0.029 -0.030 -0.024 -0.023(0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.158*** -0.159***(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)( * )i tEX FOREIGN −  0.127*** 0.127*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.146***(0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.056*** 0.057*** 0.019* 0.019* 0.023** 0.024**(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.093*** 0.067*** 0.076*** (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.102*** 0.083***  0.088*** (0.022) (0.021)  (0.022)
( 1)i twage −  0.000 -0.001 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.019(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
( 1)i tsize −   0.058*** 0.059***   (0.009) (0.009)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.078*** -0.078*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.072*** 0.071*** (0.024) (0.024)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.132*** 0.133*** (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.6: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers by Ownership Structure (Dep. Var. is itMULTIDUM ) 
 Domestic Firms Foreign Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
( 1)i tEX −  0.027 0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.025 -0.026 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.124*** 0.126*** (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.051*** 0.051*** 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.020 0.021 0.032 0.033 (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.106***  0.077*** 0.083*** 0.060** 0.042 0.052**  (0.031)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026)  
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.145*** 0.126*** 0.129***  0.022 0.007 0.012  (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
( 1)i twage −  0.020 0.020 0.032* 0.032* 0.029 0.029 -0.039 -0.040 0.010 0.010 -0.001 -0.002 (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
( 1)i tsize −    0.054*** 0.055***  0.067*** 0.067***    (0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.013)  
( 1)i tSMALL −    -0.068*** -0.068***  -0.120*** -0.120***   (0.022) (0.022)  (0.039) (0.039) 
( 1)i tLARGE −    0.087*** 0.088***  0.023 0.022   (0.030) (0.030)  (0.036) (0.037) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −    0.135*** 0.136***  0.103*** 0.105***   (0.037) (0.038)  (0.033) (0.034) 
Observations 6878 6878 6878 6878 6878 6878 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4.5.2 The Number of Products Produced 
In the previous sub-section, we examined the characteristics of being a multi-product firm.  In 
this sub-section, we aim to identify a firm’s performance by investigate the characteristics 
associated with the number of products produced.  Thus, our dependent variable is now a count 
of the number of products produced. 
Since count data is used as our dependent variable, there are two alternative regression models 
for counts which are poisson regression model and negative binomial regression model.17  In 
this chapter, we estimate count data using a negative binomial regression model.  Additionally, 
we also estimated a simple poisson count model for a sensitivity check.18  We lag all independent 
variables by one year to avoid possible simultaneity problems.  As this is not ideal we continue 
to avoid direct causal language in discussing our results.  Our negative binomial regression 
model can be specified as follows:  
 α α μα α μ α μ
− −
− − −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Γ += ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟Γ + +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
1 1
1 1 1
( )Pr( )
! ( )
NPRODUCT
NPRODUCTNPRODUCT Z
NPRODUCT
(4.9) 
where NPRODUCT is a count for the number of products produced by each firm.  
Z  is a vector of firm-level characteristics. 
Γ( )  is the gamma function. 
α  is the degree of overdispersion which equals to zero when negative binomial and 
poisson has the same distribution. 
                                                 
17 Poisson regression estimation assumes that the observed count is drawn from a poisson distribution of which the 
mean and variance are equal.  In practice, the poisson regression model maybe inappropriate due to overdispersion.  
Therefore, the negative binomial regression model which is an extension of poisson regression alleviate an 
overdispersion problem by including a parameter that captures unobserved heterogeneity amongst observations. 
18 The estimated results from Poisson regression are identical to the negative binomial regression. From the 
negative binomial regression, the likelihood ratio test of α = 0  fails to reject H0: α = 0 .  This indicates that we do 
not experience an overdispersion problem in our data. 
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μ  is known as the observed heterogeneity and is estimated from the observed firm 
characteristic where μ β ε′= +exp( )Z .19 
In Equation (4.9), the independent variables included in a vector of firm-level characteristics 
( )Z  are the same as before.  Five region, twenty-two two-digit industry and two year dummies 
are included in order to control for unobserved effects.  A robust variance estimation corrects 
for possible heteroscedasticity in the error term and we allow for clustering at the two-digit 
industry level.  Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the coefficients obtained from the estimation of 
marginal effects for our negative binomial regressions calculated at the mean of each 
independent variable except for the dummy variable.  
In general, the sign and significant level of results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 are consistent with those 
presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.  Table 4.7 shows that for domestically-owned firms, being an 
exporter does not have any significant association with the number of products produced.  For 
foreign firms, being an exporter is positively associated with the number of products produced 
by 1.3 percentage points relative to being a non-exporter.20  For ownership effect, the 
relationship of foreign ownership and the product count is not so simple.  The negative and 
significant coefficient of FOREIGN  indicates that for non-exporters being a foreign-owned 
firm is negatively associated with the number of products produced.  If we consider the 
ownership status and the interaction term, for exporters, being a foreign-owned firm leads to a 
proportional decrease in the expected change in the number of products produced of 
approximately 0.22 relative to being a domestically-owned firm.21  
                                                 
19 According to Long (1997) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998), εexp( ) is unknown but it can be drawn from a 
gamma distribution of which mean equals 1 and variance equals α . 
20 The mean of ownership status is approximately 0.28 so the export effect conditional upon being a foreign-owned 
firm is calculated as [-0.117+(0.464*0.28)]=0.013.  
21 The mean of export status is approximately 0.50 so the ownership effect conditional upon being an exporter is 
calculated as [-0.451+(0.464*0.50)]=-0.22.    
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TFP has a significant positive impact on the number of products produced in two of the six 
columns.  For example, the TFP coefficient in Column (1) indicates that increasing TFP by one 
unit is associated with 10.8 percentage points increase in the expected change in the product 
count.  Other variables such as R&D of both product and production process, wage, size have 
positive and significant effect on the number of products produced as expected.  
In Table 4.8, we split the sample into domestic and foreign firms.22  The insignificant results for 
export status in Table 4.7 are now explained.  This is also picked up by the positive and 
significant results for the interaction term reported in Table 4.7.  The export status of domestic 
firms has no significant association with the product count.  In contrast, the export status of 
foreign firms has a positive and significant impact on the number of products produced.  For 
example, the EX coefficient in Column (12) indicates that being a foreign exporters is associated 
with 30.8 percentage points increase in the expected change in the number of product count 
relative to being a foreign non-exporters. 
When we consider the productivity of domestic firms, the coefficient is positive and significant 
when size is excluded from the model.  In the foreign firms’ sample, the coefficients of TFP are 
generally positive and significantly associated with the number of products produced.  In both 
samples, product R&D and process R&D have positive coefficients but are only significant in 
the sample of domestic firms.  Wage of only domestically-owned firms is associated with an 
increase in the expected change in the number of products produced.  As expected, firm size of 
both domestic and foreign firms is positive and significant.  A one unit change in firm size is 
                                                 
22 This breakdown sample into domestic and foreign sub-samples is verified via a likelihood ratio test.  The test 
statistic reports the chi-squared value for the test (26.94) and the p-value for a chi-square with seven degrees of 
freedom suggests that the difference between the two models is statistically significant. This means that if we do 
allow for differences in the coefficients across ownership results in the improvement of the model so we can 
separately estimate model for domestic and foreign sub-samples. 
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associated with a proportional increase in the expected change in the number of products by 16 
percentage points for domestic firms and 18 percentage points for foreign firms. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that we performed a series of sensitivity checks.  For ownership 
structure, we tested 25 percent and 50 percent foreign owned as the cut-off point.  For 
productivity, the Buettner (2003) approach and standard labour productivity were employed 
instead of our Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach.23  The results presented in Appendix 4B 
are broadly consistent with results shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.7. 
                                                 
23 With the Buettner (2003) measure of TFP we lose approximately four percent of our observations. 
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Table 4.7: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced (Dep. 
Var. is itNPRODUCT ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.035 0.039 -0.144 -0.144 -0.120 -0.117(0.090) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094)
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  -0.404*** -0.405*** -0.454*** -0.455*** -0.449*** -0.451***(0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
( 1)( * )i tEX FOREIGN −  0.411*** 0.410*** 0.462*** 0.463*** 0.464*** 0.464***(0.119) (0.118) (0.104) (0.103) (0.112) (0.111)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.108*** 0.109*** -0.001 -0.001 0.018 0.019(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.288*** 0.202*** 0.233*** (0.046) (0.037) (0.039) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.302*** 0.238***  0.255*** (0.063) (0.056)  (0.061)
( 1)i twage −  0.037 0.035 0.106** 0.105** 0.088* 0.087*(0.054) (0.055) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049)
( 1)i tsize −   0.167*** 0.169***   (0.021) (0.021)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.213*** -0.213*** (0.046) (0.047)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.210*** 0.210*** (0.074) (0.075)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.373*** 0.379*** (0.064) (0.065)
Observations 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. All the 
dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.8: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced by Ownership Structure (Dep. Var. is 
itNPRODUCT ) 
 Domestic Firms Foreign Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
( 1)i tEX −  0.034 0.035 -0.127 -0.131 -0.117 -0.119 0.385*** 0.390*** 0.261*** 0.264*** 0.304*** 0.308*** (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087) 
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.098*** 0.098*** -0.006 -0.007 0.005 0.004 0.168*** 0.173*** 0.036 0.039 0.085* 0.089* (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) 
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.325***  0.230*** 0.252*** 0.170 0.119 0.151  (0.094)  (0.088) (0.087) (0.109) (0.117) (0.112)  
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.433*** 0.364*** 0.376***  0.037 0.001 0.017  (0.095) (0.086) (0.089)  (0.106) (0.109) (0.107) 
( 1)i twage −  0.066 0.065 0.102** 0.102** 0.091** 0.091** -0.024 -0.029 0.111 0.110 0.059 0.059 (0.055) (0.056) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.096) (0.098) (0.105) (0.107) (0.100) (0.102) 
( 1)i tsize −    0.160*** 0.161***  0.176*** 0.179***    (0.018) (0.018)  (0.033) (0.032)  
( 1)i tSMALL −    -0.201*** -0.202***  -0.268* -0.268*   (0.059) (0.059)  (0.139) (0.140) 
( 1)i tLARGE −    0.259*** 0.260***  0.040 0.036   (0.96) (0.096)  (0.110) (0.111) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −    0.401*** 0.403***  0.230*** 0.2334**   (0.072) (0.073)  (0.088) (0.089) 
Observations 6878 6878 6878 6878 6878 6878 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we investigate different aspects of multi-product firms in international trade 
using the firm-level data from Thailand for the period 2001 to 2004.  The empirical analysis 
comprises two sections.  First, we examine the relationship between multi-product firm’s 
extensive margin (number of products) on output or exporting.  Second, we investigate the 
characteristics associated with being a multi-product firm using binary data and the number of 
products produced using count data.  The use of the former allowed us to analyse the 
characteristics of those multi-product firms while the latter is used to explain factors that affect 
the number of products produced.  We also examine the systematic differences in the between 
domestic and foreign firms by estimating each sample separately. 
Our results show that little variation is observed for firms’ extensive margins in both total 
output and export sales.  However, firms’ extensive margins seem to have a higher variation in 
export sales than in total output.  We suspect a partial explanation for these low variations, at 
least relative to the findings in Bernard et al. (2006b), is because of the level of aggregation we 
use when we classify the number of products.  Another explanation arises from the fact that 
multi-product firms in Thailand do not dominate domestic production and exporting.  In 
Thailand, there is an evidence of diseconomy of scope and inefficiency in monitoring 
production process.  If firms want to produce more products, they should be cautious when 
introducing new products and try to minimise the negative relationship between the extensive 
and intensive margins.   
Various factors such as export status, foreign ownership, TFP, R&D both in product and in the 
production processes and firm size are important correlates with both multi-product firms and 
the number of products produced.  Productive and large firms and those that carry out R&D 
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also have a strong association with being a multiple product firm.  Similarly, the effects of 
different factors on the expected number of products produced by firms are generally consistent 
with the factors associated with the probability of becoming a multi-product firm. 
We did however find that there are systematic differences in the factors correlated with multi-
product production between different groups in our sample.  The differences in the significance 
and sign of factors indicate that domestic firms perform differently to foreign firms.  Perhaps 
more importantly from a development policy perspective is that R&D has a weak association 
with the propensity of a foreign firm to be multi-product or the number of products produced.  
Assuming that potential benefits from spillovers increase with the number of varieties this may 
partially explain the lack of evidence for spillovers found in many studies of developing 
countries.  In contrast, it could be argued that a technologically advanced single-product firm 
could offer greater potential spillovers than a less technologically advanced multi-product firm.  
The government should therefore carefully consider targeting investment promotion activities 
that attract technologically advanced single-product firms or multi-product firms that provide 
various technologies in their production.  
In summary, for Thailand we show therefore that the relationship between MNEs and 
development is complex.  We show that multi-products firms have played a significant role in 
international trade especially though exporting and FDI.  The results from the empirical analysis 
also confirm that being foreign owned and an exporter is an important characteristics associated 
with the emergence of multi-product firms and number of products produced.  There appears 
however to be differences in the behaviour of foreign firms in developing and developed 
countries.  In future research it would be useful to break down foreign ownership into country 
of origin to see whether there is a difference between the behaviour of firms from developing 
and developed countries.  A further extension that would require a longer time period would be 
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to examine the behaviour of firms in response to a shock to see whether product adjustment 
occurs at the intensive or extensive margin. 
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Appendix 4A: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4A.1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
itY  Total output of the firm 
e
itY  Total firm export sales 
i tn  Number of products produced by firm 
e
itn  Number of products exported by firm 
i ty  
Average output per product that is calculated from the aggregation of 
output of individual products divides by the number of product. 
e
i ty  
Average export sales per product calculated as the aggregation of output 
of individual products divided by the number of products exported. 
itMULTIDUM  
A dummy variable for a multi-product firm which equals 1 if a firm 
produces multiple products and 0 if a firm produces a single product.  
itNPRODUCT  Count data for the number of products produced by each firm. 
−( 1)i tEX  
A dummy variable for export status where a dummy equals 1 if firm i  
has positive export sales and 0 otherwise. 
−( 1)i tFO REIGN  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 10% are foreign owned. 
−( 1)25i tFO REIGN  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 25% are foreign owned. 
( 1)50i tFOREIGN −  
A dummy variable that indicates the structure of foreign ownership 
where a dummy equals 1 if shares of at least 50% are foreign owned. 
−( 1)
LP
i tTFP  
Total factor productivity that is obtained from the estimation of the 
semi-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  
Total factor productivity obtained from the system estimation (a semi-
parametric and nonlinear least square regression) by Buettner (2003). 
−( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP  
Labour productivity calculated as the log of value added divided by total 
labour. 
−( 1)i tsize  Size is measured as the log of total employees.  
−( 1)i tSMALL  
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total labour of firm i at time −1t  is 
in the first quartile of the distribution of the total labour of all firms 
operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as firm i  at time 
−1t . 
−( 1)i tLARGE  
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total labour of firm i at time −1t  is 
in the third quartile of the distribution of the total labour of all firms 
operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as firm i  at time 
−1t . 
−( 1)i tVLARGE  
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total labour of the firm i at time 
−1t  is in the forth quartile of the distribution of the total labour of all 
firms operating in the same two-digit ISIC level (Rev. 3) as firm i  at 
time −1t . 
−( 1)i tw ag e  The log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour 
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payments over total labour less owner’s wage. 
−( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm carries out R&D in product 
development and 0 otherwise.  
−( 1)i tRDPRO CESS  
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm performs R&D in the development 
of production processes and 0 otherwise.  
BKKM  
A dummy variable identifies whether firm locates in Bangkok and 
Metropolitan Area or not.  
CENTRAL A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Central region excluding Bangkok and Metropolitan Area and 0 otherwise. 
EAST  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Eastern region and 0 otherwise. 
NORTH  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the North of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
SOUTH  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the South of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
 
176 
 
Table 4A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max
ln itY  6042 14.81 2.21 6.31 20.61
ln ity  6042 13.73 2.22 5.21 19.80
ln itn  6042 1.08 0.38 0.69 2.30
ln eitY  3331 14.70 2.36 3.86 20.37
ln eity  3331 13.87 2.23 3.86 19.21
ln eitn  3331 0.83 0.51 0  2.08
itMULTIDUM  9521 0.43  0.49  0  1
itNPRODUCT  9521 1.95 1.38 1 10.00
−( 1 )i tEX  9521  0.50  0.50  0 1
−( 1)i tFO REIGN  9521 0.28  0.45  0  1
−( 1)25i tFO REIGN  9521  0.25  0.43  0 1
( 1)50i tFOREIGN −  9521 0.14 0.35 0 1
−( 1)
LP
i tTFP  9521 9.22  1.84  0.47  16.69
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  9195 10.19 1.28 1.21 15.31
−( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP  9554  8.98 1.05 1.45 14.00
−( 1)i tRDPRO DUCT  9521  0.08  0.27  0  1
−( 1)i tRDPRO CESS  9521 0.06  0.24  0  1
−( 1)i tw ag e  9521 7.71  0.53  4.19  10.29
−( 1)i tsize  9521 4.79  1.50  1.10  9.00
−( 1)i tSMALL  9521 0.26  0.44 0  1
−( 1)i tLARGE  9521  0.25  0.43  0 1
−( 1)i tVLARGE  9521 0.25  0.43  0 1
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Table 4A.3: Correlation Matrix  
    
M
U
L
T
I
D
U
M
 
N
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
 
E
X
 
F
O
R
E
I
G
N
 
F
O
R
E
I
G
N
2
5
 
F
O
R
E
I
G
N
5
0
 
E
X
*
F
O
R
E
I
G
N
 
T
F
P
L
P
 
T
F
P
B
U
E
T
T
N
E
R
 
T
F
P
L
A
B
P
R
O
D
 
R
D
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
 
R
D
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
 
w
a
g
e
 
s
i
z
e
 
S
M
A
L
L
 
L
A
R
G
E
 
V
L
A
R
G
E
 
MULTIDUM 1.00                 
NPRODUCT 0.80 1.00                
EX 0.08    0.06 1.00               
FOREIGN 0.04    0.03 0.37   1.00              
FOREIGN25 0.04    0.03 0.37   0.92 1.00             
FOREIGN50 0.04 0.04 0.32 0.66 0.72 1.00            
EX*FOREIGN 0.07 0.06 0.53 0.86 0.82 0.67 1.00           
TFPLP     0.08    0.07 0.20   0.14 0.14 0.08 0.13 1.00          
TFPBUETTNER     0.15 00.12 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.38 0.63 1.00         
TFPLABPROD 0.11    0.09 0.26   0.35 0.33 0.27 0.32 0.61 0.93 1.00        
RDPRODUCT 0.08    0.08 0.13  0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.11 1.00       
RDPROCESS   0.07    0.07 0.10   0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.57 1.00      
wage  0.09    0.09 0.27   0.41 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.43 0.66 0.70 0.08 0.08 1.00     
size  0.16    0.15 0.53   0.29 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.60 0.31 0.18 0.12 0.28 1.00    
SMALL    -0.13 -0.12 -0.36 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.21 -0.26 -0.45 -0.25 -0.10 -0.08 -0.23 -0.70 1.00   
LARGE  0.05    0.05 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.19 -0.34 1.00  
VLARGE  0.13    0.11 0.35 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.72 -0.34 -0.33 1.00 
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Appendix 4B: Sensitivity Analysis 
We perform a range of sensitivity checks for the entire sample on our independent variables in 
the models presented in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 by using different definitions of foreign 
ownership and different techniques to measure TFP.  For foreign ownership, 25% and 50% cut-
off points of foreign-owned share are used instead of 10%.  In terms of TFP, we use 
BUETTNERTFP  and LABPRODTFP .   
Tables 4B.1 to 4B.8 report the marginal effect estimations obtained from the pooled probit 
model on the characteristics associated with multiple product producers by including different 
cut-off points for foreign ownership and different measurements of TFP.  In Tables 4B.1 and 
4B.2, we retain the 10% cut-off point. The results are broadly consistent with those in Table 4.5.  
Both TFP have positive coefficients but the level of significance is decreased when size and 
different category of size are included in the model.  Using 25% of foreign-owned share as a 
cut-off point, results in Tables 4B.3 to 4B.5 are generally unchanged.  However, when we use 
50% cut-off point the interaction term of * 50EX FOREIGN  becomes insignificant.  
Tables 4B.9 to 4B.16 report the estimated coefficients of the negative binomial regression on the 
characteristics associated with the number of products produced.24  Using different definition of 
TFP, results in Tables 4B.9 and 4B.10 are broadly consistent with those presented in Table 4.7.  
In addition, the results remain generally unchanged when we use 25% and 50% cut-off points of 
foreign-owned share. 
                                                 
24  In the main text, we report the marginal effect results. 
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4B.1 The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers  
4B.1.1 At the 10% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 4B.1: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with FOREIGN  and 
BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.019 0.020 -0.034 -0.034 -0.030 -0.030(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.161***(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
( 1)( * )i tEX FOREIGN −  0.132*** 0.132*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.152***(0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.058*** 0.059*** 0.018 0.018 0.024* 0.023*(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.085*** 0.063*** 0.072*** (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.108*** 0.095***  0.097*** (0.025) (0.024)  (0.024)
( 1)i twage −  -0.010 -0.010 0.024 0.024 0.018 0.018(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
( 1)i tsize −   0.056*** 0.056***   (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.074*** -0.074*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.070*** 0.070*** (0.023) (0.023)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.128*** 0.129*** (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.2: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with FOREIGN  and 
LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.054 0.056 -0.028 -0.028 -0.021 -0.021(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.157***(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)( * )i tEX FOREIGN −  0.119** 0.119** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.144***(0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.029** 0.029** 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.018(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.103*** 0.067*** 0.078*** (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.110*** 0.084***  0.089*** (0.021) (0.020)  (0.022)
( 1)i twage −  0.030 0.030 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
( 1)i tsize −   0.062*** 0.063***   (0.009) (0.009)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.085*** -0.085*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.077*** 0.077*** (0.024) (0.024)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.144*** 0.146*** (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4B.1.2 At the 25% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 4B.3: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with 25FOREIGN  and 
LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.034 0.034 -0.026 -0.027 -0.021 -0.021(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.162*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.163***(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
( 1)( * 25)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.135** 0.137** 0.151** 0.153** 0.153** 0.154**(0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.056*** 0.056*** 0.019* 0.019* 0.023** 0.023**(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.093*** 0.068*** 0.076*** (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.103*** 0.084***  0.088*** (0.022) (0.020)  (0.022)
( 1)i twage −  -0.001 -0.001 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.018(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
( 1)i tsize −   0.057*** 0.058***   (0.009) (0.009)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.076*** -0.076*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.071*** 0.071*** (0.024) (0.024)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.132*** 0.133*** (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.4: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with 25FOREIGN  and 
BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.022 0.023 -0.029 -0.030 -0.026 -0.025(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.163*** -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.164***(0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
( 1)( * 25)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.135** 0.136** 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.155** 0.156**(0.064) (0.064) (0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.058*** 0.058*** 0.018 0.017 0.023* 0.023*(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.086*** 0.064*** 0.073*** (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.109*** 0.096***  0.098*** (0.025) (0.024)  (0.024)
( 1)i twage −  -0.010 -0.011 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.017(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
( 1)i tsize −   0.055*** 0.056***   (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.072*** -0.072*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.070*** 0.070*** (0.022) (0.022)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.128*** 0.129*** (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.5: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with 25FOREIGN  and 
LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.057 0.058* -0.025 -0.025 -0.018 -0.018(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.160*** -0.161***(0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
( 1)( * 25)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.125* 0.127* 0.149** 0.151** 0.150** 0.151**(0.068) (0.068) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.029* 0.029* 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.017(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.103*** 0.068*** 0.078*** (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.111*** 0.084***  0.089*** (0.021) (0.020)  (0.022)
( 1)i twage −  0.030 0.030 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.023(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
( 1)i tsize −   0.062*** 0.062***   (0.008) (0.009)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.083*** -0.083*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.077*** 0.077*** (0.023) (0.023)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.144*** 0.145*** (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4B.1.3 At the 50% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 4B.6: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with 50FOREIGN  and 
LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.050* 0.051* -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  -0.071 -0.072 -0.102** -0.103** -0.101** -0.102**(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
( 1)( * 50)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.042 0.044 0.063 0.064 0.065 0.066(0.072) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.054*** 0.055*** 0.018* 0.018* 0.022** 0.023**(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.092*** 0.065*** 0.074*** (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.100*** 0.081***  0.085*** (0.022) (0.021)  (0.022)
( 1)i twage −  -0.008 -0.008 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.011(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
( 1)i tsize −   0.057*** 0.058***   (0.009) (0.009)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.076*** -0.076*** (0.017) (0.017)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.070*** 0.070*** (0.024) (0.024)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.129*** 0.131*** (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.7: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with 50FOREIGN  and 
BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.039 0.039 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  -0.072 -0.071 -0.105** -0.104** -0.104** -0.104**(0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
( 1)( * 50)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.039 0.039 0.065 0.065 0.067 0.067(0.074) (0.075) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.057*** 0.057*** 0.018 0.017 0.023* 0.023*(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.084*** 0.063*** 0.071*** (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.107*** 0.093***  0.095*** (0.025) (0.024)  (0.025)
( 1)i twage −  -0.018 -0.019 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.010(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)i tsize −   0.054*** 0.055***   (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.072*** -0.072*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.068*** 0.068*** (0.022) (0.023)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.126*** 0.126*** (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.8: The Characteristics Associated with Multiple Product Producers (Dep. Var. 
is itMULTIDUM ) with 50FOREIGN  and 
LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.072** 0.074** -0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.001(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  -0.059 -0.061 -0.101** -0.101** -0.099** -0.100**(0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
( 1)( * 50)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.030 0.032 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.062(0.074) (0.074) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.028* 0.028* 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.017(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.101*** 0.066*** 0.076*** (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.108*** 0.081***  0.086*** (0.022) (0.021)  (0.022)
( 1)i twage −  0.022 0.022 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
( 1)i tsize −   0.061*** 0.062***   (0.009) (0.009)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.083*** -0.083*** (0.016) (0.016)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.075*** 0.075*** (0.023) (0.023)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.141*** 0.143*** (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4B.2 The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products 
Produced  
4B.2.1 At the 10% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 4B.9: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with FOREIGN  and 
BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.004 0.007 -0.083* -0.083* -0.071 -0.070(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.252*** -0.252***(0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)( * )i tEX FOREIGN −  0.208*** 0.206*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.236***(0.050) (0.051) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.058*** 0.058*** -0.008 -0.008 0.006 0.006(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.118*** 0.083*** 0.098*** (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.131*** 0.110***  0.115*** (0.038) (0.038)  (0.039)
( 1)i twage −  0.009 0.008 0.066** 0.066** 0.051* 0.050*(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)i tsize −   0.090*** 0.091***   (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.115*** -0.115*** (0.027) (0.028)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.109*** 0.109*** (0.035) (0.036)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.188*** 0.190*** (0.032) (0.032)
Constant -0.473*** -0.473*** -0.457*** -0.454*** -0.244 -0.242
 (0.136) (0.139) (0.138) (0.138) (0.151) (0.153)
Observations 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.10: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with FOREIGN  and 
LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.044 0.047 -0.074 -0.074 -0.060 -0.059(0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
( 1)i tFOREIGN −  -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.250*** -0.251*** -0.247*** -0.248***(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
( 1)( * )i tEX FOREIGN −  0.197*** 0.196*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228***(0.059) (0.059) (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.013 0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.152*** 0.102*** 0.118*** (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.157*** 0.119***  0.128*** (0.027) (0.026)  (0.028)
( 1)i twage −  0.071** 0.071** 0.065** 0.065** 0.062** 0.062**(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)i tsize −   0.088*** 0.089***   (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.119*** -0.120*** (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.111*** 0.111*** (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.193*** 0.196*** (0.028) (0.028)
Constant -0.479*** -0.487*** -0.446*** -0.449*** -0.233 -0.237
 (0.126) (0.129) (0.144) (0.146) (0.157) (0.160)
Observations 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4B.2.2 At the 25% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 4B.11: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with 25FOREIGN  and 
LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.016 0.018 -0.076 -0.077 -0.064 -0.063(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  -0.247*** -0.248*** -0.273*** -0.275*** -0.272*** -0.274***(0.048) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
( 1)( * 25)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.243*** 0.245*** 0.266*** 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.269***(0.078) (0.079) (0.067) (0.068) (0.072) (0.073)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.056*** 0.057*** -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.010(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.142*** 0.102*** 0.117*** (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.149*** 0.120***  0.128*** (0.029) (0.027)  (0.028)
( 1)i twage −  0.018 0.017 0.053** 0.053** 0.044* 0.043*(0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)i tsize −   0.087*** 0.088***   (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.112*** -0.113*** (0.025) (0.026)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.108*** 0.108*** (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.187*** 0.189*** (0.031) (0.031)
Constant -0.329** -0.333** -0.427*** -0.430*** -0.201 -0.203
 (0.160) (0.167) (0.147) (0.149) (0.163) (0.167)
Observations 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.12: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with 25FOREIGN  and 
BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.003 0.005 -0.084* -0.084* -0.071 -0.070(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.283*** -0.283*** -0.280*** -0.281***(0.044) (0.046) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
( 1)( * 25)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.248*** 0.248*** 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.278***(0.074) (0.075) (0.063) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.057*** 0.057*** -0.009 -0.009 0.005 0.005(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.119*** 0.084*** 0.099*** (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.133*** 0.113***  0.118*** (0.038) (0.038)  (0.039)
( 1)i twage −  0.008 0.007 0.065** 0.065** 0.049 0.049(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)i tsize −   0.090*** 0.091***   (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.113*** -0.113*** (0.027) (0.027)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.110*** 0.110*** (0.035) (0.035)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.189*** 0.191*** (0.033) (0.033)
Constant -0.460*** -0.459*** -0.440*** -0.437*** -0.230 -0.228
 (0.135) (0.138) (0.136) (0.136) (0.149) (0.152)
Observations 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.13: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with 25FOREIGN  and 
LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.042 0.045 -0.075 -0.075 -0.061 -0.061(0.051) (0.051) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
( 1)25i tFO REIGN −  -0.237*** -0.238*** -0.273*** -0.274*** -0.270*** -0.272***(0.050) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051)
( 1)( * 25)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.235*** 0.237*** 0.266*** 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.269***(0.082) (0.083) (0.068) (0.068) (0.073) (0.073)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.012 0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.153*** 0.103*** 0.118*** (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.158*** 0.121***  0.130*** (0.027) (0.026)  (0.028)
( 1)i twage −  0.070** 0.070** 0.063** 0.063** 0.061** 0.061**(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)i tsize −   0.087*** 0.088***   (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.117*** -0.117*** (0.026) (0.026)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.111*** 0.111*** (0.036) (0.037)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.193*** 0.196*** (0.028) (0.029)
Constant -0.468*** -0.475*** -0.426*** -0.429*** -0.219 -0.221
 (0.125) (0.129) (0.140) (0.142) (0.154) (0.157)
Observations 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4B.2.3 At the 50% Cut-Off Point for Foreign Ownership 
Table 4B.14: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with 50FOREIGN  and 
LPTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.041 0.043 -0.047 -0.047 -0.034 -0.034(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  -0.106 -0.107 -0.156** -0.158** -0.151** -0.153**(0.071) (0.073) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068)
( 1)( * 50)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.100 0.101 0.131* 0.133* 0.133* 0.134*(0.088) (0.090) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.054*** 0.055*** -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.008(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.139*** 0.099*** 0.114*** (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.145*** 0.115***  0.123*** (0.028) (0.026)  (0.028)
( 1)i twage −  0.005 0.003 0.041* 0.041* 0.032 0.031(0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
( 1)i tsize −   0.086*** 0.087***   (0.011) (0.011)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.112*** -0.112*** (0.025) (0.026)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.106*** 0.106*** (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.182*** 0.185*** (0.031) (0.031)
Constant -0.220 -0.223 -0.325** -0.328** -0.099 -0.101
 (0.160) (0.166) (0.141) (0.143) (0.159) (0.162)
Observations 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.15: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with 50FOREIGN  and 
BUETTNERTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.028 0.030 -0.054 -0.053 -0.042 -0.040(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  -0.118* -0.116 -0.177*** -0.176*** -0.171*** -0.170***(0.071) (0.073) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
( 1)( * 50)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.107 0.106 0.152** 0.151** 0.152** 0.151*(0.090) (0.092) (0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.078)
( 1)
BUETTNER
i tTFP −  0.055*** 0.056*** -0.009 -0.009 0.005 0.005(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.116*** 0.081*** 0.096*** (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.129*** 0.108***  0.113*** (0.038) (0.038)  (0.038)
( 1)i twage −  -0.005 -0.006 0.052* 0.052* 0.036 0.036(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
( 1)i tsize −   0.089*** 0.090***   (0.012) (0.012)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.113*** -0.113*** (0.026) (0.027)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.107*** 0.107*** (0.036) (0.036)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.184*** 0.186*** (0.032) (0.032)
Constant -0.346** -0.344** -0.338** -0.334** -0.128 -0.125
 (0.142) (0.145) (0.138) (0.138) (0.152) (0.155)
Observations 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195 9195
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4B.16: The Characteristics Associated with the Number of Products Produced 
(Dep. Var. is itNPRODUCT ) with 50FOREIGN  and 
LABPRODTFP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
( 1)i tEX −  0.066 0.069 -0.045 -0.046 -0.032 -0.031(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
( 1)50i tFO REIGN −  -0.094 -0.096 -0.156** -0.157** -0.151** -0.152**(0.073) (0.075) (0.066) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068)
( 1)( * 50)i tEX FO REIGN −  0.089 0.091 0.132* 0.133* 0.133* 0.134*(0.091) (0.093) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.011 0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.005 -0.006(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
( 1)i tRDPRODUCT −  0.150*** 0.100*** 0.115*** (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
( 1)i tRDPROCESS −   0.154*** 0.116***  0.125*** (0.027) (0.026)  (0.028)
( 1)i twage −  0.056* 0.056* 0.051* 0.051* 0.048* 0.048*(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
( 1)i tsize −   0.086*** 0.087***   (0.010) (0.010)  
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.116*** -0.116*** (0.025) (0.026)
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.109*** 0.109*** (0.037) (0.037)
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.188*** 0.191*** (0.028) (0.028)
Constant -0.359*** -0.366*** -0.323** -0.324** -0.116 -0.118
 (0.131) (0.135) (0.139) (0.141) (0.154) (0.157)
Observations 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554 9554
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included. 
All the dependent variables are lagged one year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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5 
Productivity and Export 
Spillovers from FDI in the 
Host Country  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Policymakers and governments across the world implement policies aimed at attracting FDI.  
One important motivation is that FDI inflows can stimulate economic growth and foreign 
investors act as an efficient channel for knowledge and technology transfer that could benefit 
domestically-owned firms in the host economy (see e.g. Aitken et al. 1997, Görg and Greenaway 
2004, Bwalya 2006, Girma et al. 2007, Bitzer et al. 2008).  Because foreign firms have more 
advanced technology, employ higher numbers of highly skilled workers and invest more in R&D 
compared to domestic firms, there is the possibility that such proprietary assets can leak to 
domestic firms which in turn has a beneficial effect on productivity (Caves, 1996). 
Empirically, the evidence for productivity spillovers is mixed.  Due to data availability, early 
studies used cross-sectional data and tends to find evidence for positive spillovers (see e.g. Caves 
1974, Blomström and Persson 1983, Kokko 1994 and 1996, Blomström and Sjöholm 1999, 
Sjöholm 1999a and 1999b) while for more recent studies using either industry-level or firm-level 
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panel data the evidence is mixed (see e.g. Haddad and Harrison 1993, Aitken and Harrison 1999, 
Barrios and Strobl 2002, Javorcik 2004, Bwalya 2006, Kugler 2006, Bitzer et al. 2008).1  The 
mixed evidence on productivity spillovers and the different levels of aggregation motivated 
Görg and Strobl (2001) to conduct meta-analysis of productivity spillovers.  They point out that 
most of the studies that use cross-sectional data show positive spillovers effects due to the 
higher t-statistic.  Although the results obtained from panel data estimation are quite mixed, 
panel data is more appropriate as it allows us to investigate time-invariant and sector specific 
effects on the firm’s productivity performance over the time.  Lipsey and Sjöholm (2005) 
explain that the mixed results arise from the differences in the datasets used and the 
characteristics of firms in each country. 
Other channels of possible leakage from foreign to domestic firms are via export spillovers.  
However, the empirical studies on export spillovers are not as extensively explored as 
productivity spillovers (Görg and Greenaway, 2004).  Evidence on export spillovers is also 
mixed. Aitken et al. (1997), Greenaway et al. (2004) and Kneller and Pisu (2007) find positive 
export spillovers while Barrios et al. (2003), and Ruane and Sutherland (2005) find negative or 
even insignificant results.  
The mechanism for export spillovers is that the presence of foreign firms may have an influence 
on a firm’s export market participation, especially on the entry decision into export markets by 
local firms based on information, and imitation or competition effects (Kneller and Pisu, 2007).  
Before beginning to export, domestic firms must incur fixed costs to set up for example 
international networks, channels of distribution, research and development in products in 
foreign countries.  Foreign firms can act as a natural source of such information that would 
assist domestic firms to enter export markets (Aitken et al., 1997).  An increase in the presence 
                                                            
1 For a survey of studies on productivity spillovers see Blomström and Kokko (1998), Görg and Strobl (2001) and 
Görg and Greenaway (2004). 
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of foreign-owned firms also boosts the level of competition which forces domestic firms to 
increase productivity in order to remain in the market which in turn can positively influence the 
probability of entering export markets.  In contrast, Aitken et al. (1999) argue that there are 
possibilities of productivity reductions which tend to decrease the export intensity of domestic 
firms.  Some domestic firms that are unable to compete with foreign firms are also forced to exit 
the market.  
For Thailand, Diao et al. (2005) point out that the openness of a country has a positive effect on 
economic growth which is driven by capital investment from foreign countries.  The Thai 
government encourages FDI, providing various incentives and privileges to potential foreign 
investors.  The manufacturing sector has received the majority of FDI inflows in recent years.  
As a consequence, this chapter searches for evidence of productivity and export spillovers from 
FDI to domestic firms by examining both horizontal and vertical linkages using the same data 
set as Chapters two to four.   
Our results suggest significant evidence of productivity and export spillovers.  In terms of 
productivity spillovers, we find positive and significant horizontal productivity spillovers.  Both 
domestic market-oriented and export-oriented foreign firms operating in the same industry have 
a positive and significant impact on the productivity of all domestic firms.  The entry of foreign 
firms into the same industry pushes up the level of competition which forces domestic firms to 
become more productive in order to compete successfully.  If we distinguish between different 
types of domestic firms, the results on horizontal spillovers remain unchanged.  The 
productivity of domestic exporters is increased as a result of the rise in the presence of export-
oriented foreign firms in the same industry whereas domestic non-exporters gain from both 
domestic market-oriented and export-oriented foreign firms.  There is some evidence of vertical 
productivity spillovers to domestic non-exporters in the downstream and upstream industries 
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which indicates buyer-supplier linkages between foreign firms and domestic non-exporters.  
Contact between foreign firms and their domestic suppliers that do not export leads to 
productivity gains as foreign firms may assist domestic suppliers through the improvement of 
products which are sold as intermediates inputs, production technology and market information.  
Moreover, foreign firms generate positive spillovers to their domestic customers that do not 
export.  Since foreign firms supply inputs to their domestic customers, spillovers can be leaked 
through the knowledge and technology used to produce the intermediate inputs.  
As regards to export spillovers, mixed evidence is found before and after the entry into export 
markets.  For the export participation decision, there is positive evidence of information 
externalities generated by contact between foreign firms and their domestic customers.  
Competition effects are also observed since there is a negative and weakly significant coefficient 
on horizontal export spillovers.  Such negative effects are explained by the dominant effects 
from the presence of domestic market orientation of foreign firms operating in the same 
industry.  The increased competition generated by the domestic market orientation of foreign 
firms enforces domestic firms need to compete in the production sold in domestic markets 
rather than place emphasis on export markets which is likely to reduce the probability of 
exporting.  In terms of export intensity, no evidence is found for vertical spillovers but we find 
significant evidence for horizontal spillovers.  Foreign firms in the same industry increase the 
export intensity of domestic firms driven by the presence of foreign exporters.  This result 
indicates that domestic exporters can benefit from both information and competition effects 
which therefore enhances export intensity.  Other firm-level characteristics also affect the 
productivity of domestic firms as well as the decision to export and how much to export.  
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 5.2 discusses 
horizontal and vertical spillovers and the empirical literature on productivity and export 
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spillovers.  Section 5.3 describes and discusses the empirical models, variables and data.  Our 
empirical results for productivity and export spillovers from FDI are presented in Section 5.4.  
Section 5.5 concludes.  
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Spillovers from FDI 
Why is it important for policymakers to implement policy that attracts FDI inflow?  The 
presence of foreign investors is often seen as one means to stimulate economic growth (Girma 
et al., 2008).  Foreign firms are believed to have both a direct and indirect impact that would 
possibly benefit the host economy.  The direct impact on the host economy would be for 
example an increase in capital inflows, employment creation, and R&D and training 
investments.  At the same time, foreign firms can indirectly benefit domestic firms in the host 
economy due to the externalities arising from proprietary assets.  Caves (1996) points out 
foreign firms are likely to have more advanced technology in the production, superior 
knowledge and strategic management compared to local producers.  The possibility of spillovers 
can then be generated through knowledge and technology transfers as multinationals experience 
leakages of their intangible proprietary assets.  These positive spillovers induce domestic firms 
to learn from multinationals and enhance their performance through the development of new 
products as well as production techniques and production processes. 
Bloomström and Kokko (1997) describe the channels to which spillovers from FDI can be 
transferred.  The first channel is through the mobility of workers.  If there is a movement of 
well trained and high skilled workers from foreign to domestic firms, domestic firms can benefit 
from the knowledge and technology used in the production of foreign firms by workers who 
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were trained and used to work in foreign firms.  The second channel is through contacts and the 
arm’s length relationship between foreign and domestic firms.  Domestic firms can learn from 
advanced production technologies, know-how, and management strategy and, therefore, adapt 
that knowledge to improve their own production and management techniques.  The last channel 
is through competition effects.  The increased competition generated by foreign firms forces 
domestic firms to improve production techniques to become more productive.  
Channels for spillovers from FDI also depend upon how foreign and domestic firms are 
contacted horizontally or vertically.  Horizontal spillovers take place if contacts between foreign 
and domestic firms are in the same industry.  However, if contacts are between industries, 
vertical spillovers are likely to occur.  In terms of horizontal spillovers, the competitive firms in 
the same industry either benefit or suffer from the presence of foreign-owned firms.  
Competitive firms in the same industry can benefit from positive leakages of knowledge and 
new technology transfer if they employ some high-skilled workers who previously worked in the 
foreign firms.  The entry of foreign firms in the same industry can also results in increased 
competition which forces domestic firm to improve the quality of their products and/or 
become more productive.  In contrast, Aitken and Harrison (1999) argue that foreign 
investment can generate negative spillovers to domestic firms through a reduction in the 
productivity of domestic firms in the same industry.  If foreign firms can produce with lower 
marginal costs, they are likely to compete with domestic firms by increasing their production.  
Domestic firms would therefore lose their market shares to the foreign-owned firms and have to 
cut the volume of their production which results in a decline in their productivity.  
The definition of vertical spillovers follows Hirschman (1958).  Vertical spillovers can be 
generated by foreign firms towards downstream (forward linkages) and/or upstream firms 
(backward linkages).  Forward linkages are the spillovers from foreign producers that supply 
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intermediate inputs to their potential domestic customers while backward linkages are linkages 
from foreign firms to their potential local suppliers of intermediate inputs.  These are also 
recognised as buyer-supplier linkages between foreign and domestic firms.  Inter-industry 
contact between foreign and domestic firms can lead to arm’s length relationships which can 
induce demonstration effects where domestic firms can easily learn and gain from technology 
and knowledge transfers.  For example, foreign firms may demand high quality of intermediate 
goods from suppliers.  If this is the case, suppliers may have to upgrade or improve the quality 
of goods, with foreign firms potentially sharing technology with their suppliers.  
Theoretically, Rodríguez-Clare (1996) develops a model to explain how foreign multinationals 
generate spillovers through the vertical linkages.  The model shows that local firms in the host 
country benefit from the positive vertical spillovers when intermediate inputs are used 
intensively in the production at foreign multinationals plants.  Local firms also benefit from 
spillovers when there are large communication costs between the headquarters and production 
plants and when the varieties of intermediate input between the home and host country are 
relatively similar that can be substituted in the production.  
5.2.2 Empirical Evidence of Spillovers from FDI 
Blomström and Kokko (1998), Lipsey (2002), Görg and Greenaway (2004) provide literature 
surveys of the empirical evidence of spillovers to domestic firms that arise from FDI through 
the presence of foreign firms or MNEs in the host country.  Although domestic firms may be 
affected via different channels such as export spillovers, productivity spillovers, wage spillovers, 
knowledge and technology spillovers, this chapter only considers those productivity and export 
spillovers from FDI.  
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5.2.2.1 Productivity spillovers from FDI  
The empirical analysis on productivity spillovers is based on a basic framework that regresses 
productivity, either labour productivity or TFP, on various independent variables including 
different measures of the presence of FDI or foreign multinationals.  Most of the early studies 
use cross-sectional industry-level data.  The first empirical test on productivity spillovers from 
FDI is conducted by Caves (1974) using data for Australia in 1966.  The result shows that the 
presence of foreign firms has positive effect on labour productivity.  Positive effects on 
productivity spillovers from FDI are also found in Globerman (1979) for Canada, Blomström 
and Persson (1983) and Blomström (1986) for Mexico.  
In Venezuela, the government implements policy to attract FDI in order to acquire technology 
spillovers.  The empirical investigation by Aitken and Harrison (1999) reveals two contrasting 
results.  First, domestic firms benefit from FDI because an increase in the percentage of foreign-
owned shares has a positive impact on the firms’ performance.  Second, there is negative 
evidence for horizontal spillovers because an increase in foreign investment decreases the 
productivity of domestic firms in the same industry.  The entry of foreign firms into the 
domestic market increases the level of competition so domestic firms lose market share to 
foreign entrances.  This means domestic firms have to cut production but at the same time they 
still face the same fixed costs.  On balance, the negative effect of FDI on domestic firms’ 
productivity appears to be fairly small.  In addition, they find no evidence of technology 
spillovers from FDI to domestic firms as assumed earlier by the government.  
Barrios and Strobl (2002) focus on an empirical investigation of Spain and that local firms may 
have superior absorptive capability due to the fact that the country is industrialised and receives 
a large share of FDI inflows.  When time invariant and sector-specific effects are not taken into 
account in the OLS regression, their negative result for a foreign presence on productivity are 
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consistent with Aitken and Harrison (1999).  To investigate further, they include additional 
variables to examine different aspects of possible spillovers effects that arise from a foreign 
presence.  They do not find any significant evidence for absorptive capacity and inter-sectoral 
spillovers.  However, they do find evidence of positive productivity spillovers but only for the 
domestically-owned exporters. 
Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Görg and Strobl (2005) search for evidence of intra-industry 
spillovers from FDI in Africa.  Haddad and Harrison (1993) could not find robust evidence of 
positive productivity spillovers using Moroccan data for the second half of the 1980s.  There is 
no evidence to support positive spillovers for domestically-owned firms.  However, joint 
ventures between local and foreign firms did gain from spillovers effects of FDI.  Görg and 
Strobl (2005) investigate how productivity spillovers from FDI can be generated through the 
movement of workers from MNEs to domestic firms using detailed firm-level data for Ghana 
and also information on the employment experience of domestic firms’ owners and on whether 
they used to work in an MNEs or not.  There is an evidence to support a positive spillovers 
effect through worker mobility of which the productivity of domestic firms, where the owners 
had working experiences from MNEs in the same industry, are higher compared to other 
domestic firms.  
In the UK, many studies search for the evidence of intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
FDI.  For instant, Liu et al. (2000), Driffield (2001) and Haskel et al. (2002) find evidence to 
support positive productivity spillovers between foreign and domestic firms in the same industry 
while Girma et al. (2001), Girma and Wakelin (2002), Girma (2005) find mixed or even 
insignificant evidence.  
Most early empirical studies were more concerned about spillover effects in the same industry 
rather than between industries (Blomström et al., 2000).  Only a few studies find positive and 
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significant evidence of productivity spillovers within industries.  Some studies even discover a 
negative relationship between productivity spillovers and FDI, due mainly to the fact that 
foreign-owned firms may have capacity to prevent the information and knowledge leakages to 
local domestic competitors in the same industry (Javorcik, 2004).  This explanation motivated 
researchers to turn their interests towards inter-industry spillovers through the vertical linkages 
where foreign-owned firms may transfer technology to their suppliers and/or customers.   
Recent studies highlight the consequences of both intra- and inter-industry spillovers.  Javorcik 
(2004) uses firm-level panel data for Lithuania from 1996 to 2000 and finds evidence of positive 
productivity spillovers through backward linkages.  No robust results are found on horizontal 
spillovers and vertical spillovers through forward linkages.  An additional investigation into the 
structure of FDI projects associated with productivity indicates that wholly-owned foreign firms 
do not have any significant effect on the productivity of local firms although partially-owned 
firms do.  
Bwalya (2006) employs firm-level data for Zambia and found evidence of both productivity 
losses and gains.  First, the productivity of domestically-owned firms tends to decrease as MNEs 
in the same industry increase.  This is because of the increased competition generated by MNEs.  
Second, the results support the existence of vertical spillovers through backward linkages that 
means local suppliers of intermediate inputs benefit from know-how and technology transfer 
generated by foreign firms in order to enhance production efficiency and productivity of local 
firms. 
Bitzer et al. (2008) use industry-level data from 17 OECD countries and find positive and 
significant evidences on horizontal productivity spillovers and vertical productivity spillovers 
through backward linkages.  They used cross-country data to allow comparisons of the 
magnitude of spillover effects among different groups.  In comparison to other OECD 
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countries, FDI in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) was found to have a larger 
effect on the productivity of local firms in the same industry, when vertical linkages variables 
were not included in the model, and local suppliers that supply intermediate inputs.  
In an analysis of Indonesia, Blalock and Gertler (2008) find a positive and significant result on 
vertical productivity spillovers for downstream industries which is consistent with the evidence 
of Javorcik (2004), Bwalya (2006) and Bitzer et al. (2008).  Multinationals transfer technology to 
their local supplier in order to increase productivity and to be supplied intermediate inputs at 
lower prices.  However, they do not find any evidence for horizontal spillovers. 
A few studies examine both intra- and inter-industry productivity spillovers in the UK.  Driffield 
et al. (2002) use industry-level panel data from 1984 to 1992 to investigate for the spillovers 
effects on productivity growth of domestic firms in the manufacturing industries and allow for 
spillovers through horizontal, backward and forward linkages.  Their findings show positive and 
significant evidence for positive spillovers through forward linkages but insignificant for 
backward linkages.  Inconsistent results are found on horizontal spillovers.  Harris and 
Robinson (2004) estimate for the effects of horizontal and vertical productivity spillovers in 20 
manufacturing industries from 1974 to 1995.  However, their framework does not distinguish 
between vertical spillovers that occur through backward or forward linkages.  Their results show 
that vertical spillovers are more widespread than horizontal spillovers.  The overall inter-industry 
effects in UK are inconclusive as each individual industry has different spillover results.  
Negative spillovers are found in some industries while others find positive spillovers.  
In a recent study of the UK, Girma et al. (2008) use firm-level data between 1992 and 1999 to 
investigate for evidences of both horizontal and vertical spillovers through backward and 
forward linkages, and separately investigate possible spillovers to domestic exporters and 
domestic non-exporters.  Under the assumption that different incentives for FDI may generate 
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different spillovers effects towards domestic firms, they consider the spillover effects from 
domestic- and export-market oriented FDI.  Results for spillovers to domestic firms are quite 
complex and depend on the type of FDI. Different samples (domestic exporters and domestic 
non-exporters) show different significant results on productivity spillovers.  In general, the 
results confirm the existence of positive horizontal productivity spillovers from export-oriented 
FDI.  For vertical spillovers, only domestic-market oriented FDI generate positive backward 
linkages to domestic firms for both exporters and non-exporters.  
Furthermore, a study by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) provides a detailed investigation of 
spillovers from different types of investment projects by ownership structure (jointly and wholly 
owned) to local producers in the same industry and upstream sectors.  Using 6 years of 
Romanian firm-level data from 1998 to 2003, the results show a positive and significant 
association between investment projects with joint domestic and foreign ownership on vertical 
spillovers to upstream sectors.  However, for wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, they found no 
significant evidence of vertical spillovers.  Jointly-owned firms may choose to engage in local 
outsourcing of the intermediate inputs because local suppliers can provide intermediate inputs at 
lower costs compare to wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries.  In contrast to inter-industry 
productivity spillovers, FDI has a negative horizontal spillover effects on local firms.  When 
comparing the magnitude of the horizontal spillover effects between different types of 
ownership structure, jointly-owned firms have a less negative impact on local firms than wholly-
owned firms. 
Another dimension of the productivity spillover literature is examined by Alvarez and López 
(2008) who highlight the importance of productivity spillovers from export activities both intra- 
and inter-industry, using a plant-level data for Chile between 1990 and 1999.  They find positive 
and significant effect of backward spillovers from exporting.  When they distinguish export 
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activities by different types of ownership, the evidence shows that export activities of foreign 
firms as well as domestic firms, increases the productivity of domestic firms.  Foreign-owned 
exporters generate positive horizontal and backward spillovers to domestic non-exporters while 
domestically-owned exporters only have positive influence on the productivity of domestic 
suppliers who do not export.  
In Thailand, studies on spillovers are limited. Diao et al. (2005) links foreign spillovers to 
economic growth by focusing on the analysis related to openness, productivity, and foreign 
investment using a growth model.  High economic growth in Thailand is a result of openness, 
tariff reduction and productivity which is driven by spillovers from foreign investment.  
Kohpaiboon (2006) uses cross-sectional data from the 1997 Industrial Census to examine 
spillovers from FDI through technology transfer.  He finds that FDI generates negative 
productivity spillovers to locally owned industries.  The effect of spillovers also depends upon 
the trade policy regime.  Tomohara and Yokota (2007) investigate for productivity spillovers 
from FDI using a firm-level panel data between 1999 and 2003 from the National Statistic 
Office of Thailand (TNSO).  The overall results indicate significant evidence of positive 
horizontal productivity spillovers but not for vertical spillovers.  However, when they split 
establishments into different samples: export orientation, material import, operation year and 
size, they observe different spillovers effects.  For instance, export-oriented firms benefit from 
spillovers through forward linkages while horizontal and backward linkages have a negative 
effect on productivity.  
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5.2.2.2 Export Spillovers from FDI 
Most studies search for productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms while only a small 
number of studies empirically investigate the possibility of export spillovers.  The key 
mechanism of export spillovers is the assumption that domestic firms may learn and gain 
knowledge from the export activities and firm specific advantages of MNEs which help to 
enhance their productivity and, therefore, has an impact on the entry decision into export 
markets and the export intensity of existing exporters.  
One of the first empirical studies by Aitken et al. (1997) links spillovers with export behaviour 
and FDI by emphasising the role of foreign investment has as a catalyst for domestically-owned 
firms to enter export markets.  These export spillovers from foreign investment arise from the 
fact that MNEs appear to have greater access to information, foreign markets, distribution 
services and advance production technology.  These same factors could benefit domestically-
owned firms if they learn from MNEs.  Using plant-level data from the Mexican manufacturing 
industry between 1986 and 1990, they find evidence for export spillovers from MNEs that act as 
export catalysts for domestically-owned firms.  The probability of domestically-owned firms 
exporting is positively associated with the proximity of MNEs who export. 
Kokko et al. (2001) use cross sectional data for 1998 manufacturing firms in Uruguay to search 
for export spillovers.  At different periods of time, the government implements policy aimed at 
attracting different types of MNEs.2  Kokko et al. (2001) define two types MNEs according to 
their year of establishment.  There is no evidence for export spillovers from MNEs established 
in the inward-oriented period (before 1972).  However, MNEs established in the outward-
                                                            
2 The policies implemented by government are inward- and outward-oriented policy.  The explanation of the 
former is based on the framework of protectionism.  The government subsidises import substitution aimed at 
replacing the imported goods and services with domestic production.  The latter is implemented in order to 
stimulate more exports by providing various incentives to the new and existing exporters for example reduces tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, and maintains competitive exchange rate. 
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oriented period (after 1973) generate positive export spillovers to domestic firms in Uruguay and 
also its neighbouring markets in Brazil and Argentina. 
In terms of developed countries, evidence for export spillovers from FDI to domestic firms in 
different European countries is mixed.  Barrios et al. (2003) emphasise the importance of export 
spillovers from R&D expenditure and export activity of both domestic firms and MNEs using 
Spanish firm-level panel data from 1990 to 1998.  The presence of MNEs in this study is 
measured by their R&D expenditure and export activity.  Results from a probit model on the 
entry decision shows that there is no significant evidence for export spillovers from either R&D 
or export activities of MNEs in the same sector.  However, positive and significant results are 
found on the export activity of domestic firms.  In the tobit model, only R&D expenditures of 
MNEs have positive spillovers effects on export ratio of domestic firms.   
For the UK, Greenaway et al. (2004) try to explain an indirect channel for productivity spillovers 
from FDI generated through exports using firm-level panel data from 1992 to 1996.  They 
measure the presence of MNEs based on their employment and export share.  They find 
positive evidence for export spillovers from both measures.  The presence of MNEs has a 
positive effect on the export participation decision of domestic firms and the propensity to 
export.  Further investigation by Kneller and Pisu (2007) look at the effect of industrial linkages 
and export spillovers from FDI between 1992 and 1999.  The empirical results from Heckman 
selection model show that MNEs generate export spillovers to domestic firms.  Firstly, there is a 
positive and significant relationship between vertical spillovers through backward linkages and 
export share.  Secondly, a positive and significant coefficient on horizontal export spillovers 
from export-oriented MNEs indicates that exported-oriented MNEs have a significant effect on 
the probability of exporting for those domestic firms operating in the same industry. 
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Ruane and Sutherland (2005) compute the presence of foreign firms using an identical 
methodology to Greenaway et al. (2004).  Using data from Irish manufacturing industry during 
the period 1991 and 1998 they investigate export spillovers from foreign firms on the export 
decision and export intensity of domestic firms.  The empirical evidence reveals two contrasting 
findings which are a positive and significant effect of export spillovers from employment share 
of foreign firms but a negative and significant effect on export spillovers from the export share 
of foreign firms.  The negative effect is explained by the fact that US-owned firms invest in 
Ireland in order to use the country as an export platform to produce and distribute products to 
other countries in Europe.  
As regards to recent studies from a developing country perspective, Alyson (2006) investigates 
export spillovers to Chinese-owned firms using data from 29 provinces between 1993 and 2000.  
The presence of foreign firms is measured by their export activity.  Foreign firms owned by 
different countries generate different effects on the entry decision of domestic firms.  The 
evidence indicates a positive relationship between the presence of foreign firms from OECD 
countries and the decision of domestic firms to enter export markets.  Alvarez (2007) 
investigates factors that determine the export participation decision in Chile during 1990 and 
1996.  Results show that multinationals generate positivity spillovers on the probability of 
becoming a permanent exporter which can be explained either by the competition effects or 
information effects through technology and knowledge transfer that encourage other firms to 
improve efficiency and export performance. 
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5.3. Model Specification, Variables and Data 
5.3.1 Empirical Models 
In this section, we present empirical models for the estimation of the relationship between FDI, 
MNEs in Thailand, productivity and the export behaviour of domestic firms.  Factors included 
in each model are in line with previous theoretical and empirical literature.  Our main focus is on 
the variables that capture productivity and export spillovers from foreign to domestic firms for 
both horizontal and vertical linkages.  In addition to spillovers variables, we also include the 
standard firm-level specific characteristics that are assumed to affect productivity and the export 
behaviour of domestic firms.  
5.3.1.1 Empirical Model of Productivity Spillovers 
We carry out a two step estimation procedure in the search for productivity spillovers.  The first 
step is to estimate a production function in order to obtain TFP following Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003).  This estimation technique takes account of a simultaneity problem as well as an 
unobserved firm-specific productivity shock.  We include the data of all firms and estimate the 
production function separately for each two-digit industry. 3 
Since we would like to investigate the effect on domestic firms, in the second step, we regress 
TFP of domestic firms only on spillovers variables and other control variables such as industry-
level characteristics and various firm-level specific characteristics.  All independent variables 
except spillovers are lagged by one year to avoid possible simultaneity problems. Thus, our 
model is given by: 
                                                            
3 See Appendix 2B in Chapter two for the estimation procedure. 
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 (5.1) 
where  the subscripts i, j, r, t refer to firm, industry, region and time respectively. 
TFP  is total factor productivity of a firm.  
FORW  is a measure of vertical spillovers via forward linkages. 
HOR  is a measure of horizontal spillovers. 
BACK  is a measure of vertical spillovers via backward linkages. 
INRDSHARE  is a share of industry R&D expense. 
INEXSHARE  is the industry export share. 
CONCEN  is a measure for geographic concentration of firm in industries and regions.  
SMALL is a dummy variable to represent a small firm.  
LARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a large firm.  
VLARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a very large firm.  
w age  is the log of wages per employee.  
2w age  is a quadratic term of the log of wages per employee.  
TRAIN  is a dummy variable for both in-house and outside training. 
( 1)i tEX −  represents the export experience of a firm. 
ε  is the error term.  
As previously discussed in Chapter two about the panel structure setting, a problem unobserved 
firm heterogeneity exists and should be modelled as fixed or random effects.  According to 
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Equation (5.1), the error term ( i tε ) comprises of two components where it i itε μ η= + .  iμ  is 
the unobserved firm specific effect and itη is the stochastic disturbance term.  
The fixed effects estimator assumes that iμ  are fixed parameters to be estimated that vary over 
the individual firm and itη  follows itη ~ 2(0, )IID ησ .  In addition, the regressors are assumed to 
be independent of itη  for all i and t.  In contrast, the random effects estimator assumes that iμ  
are random factors so iμ ~ 2(0, )IID μσ , itη ~ 2(0, )IID ησ  and iμ  are independent of itη .  In 
addition, the regressors are assumed to be independent of iμ  and itη  for all i and t (Baltagi, 
2005). 
We estimate our model for both two-way fixed effects and random effects.  Both estimations 
include a set of time indicator variables to control for unobserved time varying effects.  For the 
fixed effects model, we use within regression estimator which is an OLS regression required 
regressors’ variation over time within unit.  For the random effects model, we use the 
generalised least square estimator (GLS) which is a matrix-weighted average of the between and 
within estimator (Verbeek, 2004). 
In order to test the appropriateness of the fixed versus random effects, we use the Hausman 
(1978) specification test.4  The null hypothesis is that i tε  and the regressors are uncorrelated.  
However, if they are correlated, the GLS estimator is biased and inconsistent while the within 
estimator is unbiased and consistent (Baltagi, 2005).  The Hausman specification test reported in 
the Appendix 5C reject the null hypothesis.  The significance suggests that the within estimator 
is appropriate.  Therefore, we choose within estimator which is often called fixed effects 
estimator as our estimation technique.  In addition, we allow for robust clustering at the industry 
                                                            
4 See Appendix 5C for a detailed discussion. 
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level.  This technique relaxes the independence assumption and requires only that the 
observations are independent across sectors. 
5.3.1.2 Empirical Model of Export Spillovers 
We investigate two aspects of export spillovers which are the export participation decision and 
how much to export.  This is known as a two-stage decision process as firms firstly have to 
decide whether to export or not and secondly the amount firms should export (Kneller and 
Pisu, 2007).  In order to enter export markets, firms have to invest in sunk entry costs, so not 
every firm decides to export.  The export intensity is, therefore, restricted to the subset of firms 
that do export.  As a result, a Heckman selection model is used in order to avoid sample 
selection bias in the coefficients of our estimated results (Heckman, 1979).5  We estimate our 
equations using a Heckman model with maximum likelihood estimation method because it is 
more appropriate and more efficient than the two-step estimation method.6  The model consists 
of two equations: 
Export share equation: 
 *it it its X β ω= +  (5.2) 
Export decision equation: 
 *it it itd Z α ν= +  (5.3) 
                                                            
5 This estimation technique is also used in UK studies by Greenaway et al. (2004) and Kneller and Pisu (2007).  
6 The maximum likelihood estimation method uses a full maximum likelihood procedure to jointly estimate the 
inverse Mills ratio and the coefficients in the two equations (export decision and export share).  For the two-step 
estimation, the first step is to regress the probit model of the export decision and compute the invest Mill ratio as 
the prediction of a binomial probit. Then, the invest Mill ratio is inserted as a regressor in the export share 
regression in the second step. The two-step method is easy but it is less efficient than the maximum likelihood 
method.  
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where * *, 1  0it it it its s d if d= = >  and *0,  0  0it it its d i f d= = ≤  
From both equations, identifying export intensity is dependent upon whether a firm exports or 
not.  The export value ( )its  is not observed if a firm does not export ( 0)itd =  but if a firm 
exports ( 1)itd = , we observe positive export sales.  The unobserved errors ( i tν  and itω ) are 
conditional upon whether i tν ~ (0,1)N , itω ~ (0, )N δ , ( , )it itc o rr ν ω ρ=  and ( , )it itν ω ~bivariate 
normal [0, 0,1, , ]δ ρ .  
In terms of our Heckman selection model, some factors included in both equations should be 
different (Baum, 2006).  If variables included in vector X  and Z  are the same, the coefficients 
and the error terms in both equations would be equal (β α=  and it itω ν= ) so the model would 
reduce to standard tobit model.7  For this reason, we include an additional variable which is the 
lag of export dummy ( 1)( )i tEX −  in the selection equation (export decision equation) because this 
variable is theoretically consistent with recently developed models of exports by Melitz 2003, 
Helpman et al. 2004 and Bernard et al. 2003 that take into account sunk costs of export. 8  In 
general, this variable is included in the standard regression model to empirically identify the 
factors that influence the entry decision into export market (see e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997, 
Bernard and Jensen 2004, Kimura and Kiyota 2006).  If the lag of export dummy is positive and 
significant, it is usually interpreted as an evidence of sunk costs of export.  Apart from the lag of 
export dummy, other variables are likely to appear in both equations.  All independent variables 
apart from spillovers are lagged by one year to avoid possible simultaneity problems.  Our full 
specification of the export decision (Equation (5.4)) and export share (Equation (5.5)) equations 
are as follows: 
                                                            
7 See Verbeek (2004) for a detailed discussion.  
8 A recent study of export spillovers by Kneller and Pisu (2007) also uses a Heckman model and includes the lag 
of export dummy in the selection equation.  
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where  the subscripts i, j, r, t refer to firm, industry, region and time respectively.   
EX  is a dummy for export status of firm i . 
EXSHARE  is the ratio of export sale to total sale of firm i . 
( 1)i tEX −  represents the export experience of a firm. 
FORW  is a measure of vertical spillovers via forward linkages. 
HOR  is a measure of horizontal spillovers. 
BACK  is a measure of vertical spillovers via backward linkages. 
INRDSHARE  is a share of industry R&D expense. 
INEXSHARE  is the industry export share. 
TFP  is total factor productivity of a firm.  
2TFP  is a quadratic term of total factor productivity of a firm.  
SMALL is a dummy variable to represent a small firm.  
LARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a large firm.  
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VLARGE  is a dummy variable to represent a very large firm.  
w age  is the log of wages per employee.  
2w age  is a quadratic term of the log of wages per employee. 
SKILL  is a ratio of skilled labour to total labour. 
TRAIN  is a dummy variable for both in-house and outside training. 
REGION  is a vector of five regional dummies which indicates the regional location of a 
firm. 
In addition to region dummies, we include industry and year dummies to control for the 
unobserved, industry and time varying effects.  We also allow for robust clustering at the 
industry level which relaxes the independence assumption and requires only that the 
observations are independent across industries.  
5.3.2 Variables 
We use two indicators to identify a firm’s export behaviour.  The first indictor is used to 
determine whether a firm exports or not which is a dummy variable for export status ( )EX  
which equals 1 if the firm has positive export sales and 0 otherwise.  The second indicator is the 
value of a firm’s export share ( )EXSHARE  which is used to determine the export intensity of a 
firm.  
Total factor productivity ( )TFP  is a measurement for efficiency in the production process.  The 
higher the value of TFP determines the greater effectiveness use of inputs and hence a greater 
shifts of production function.  Since we only use TFP as one of the independent variables in the 
export spillovers model, we thus expect a positive relationship between TFP and both a firm’s 
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decision to export and export intensity.9  We use a semi-parametric approach following 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) that takes account of unobserved firm-specific productivity shock 
( )LPTFP .  In a sensitivity analysis, we use another measurement of productivity which is the 
standard labour productivity ( )
LABPRODTFP  defined as the log of value added divided by total 
labour. 
Firm size is expected to be one of the important firm characteristics that affect both 
productivity and export behaviours.  We believe the productivity is positively correlated to firm 
size.  Small firms are less likely to increase their productivity whilst large firms seem to have 
more advanced technology and higher production efficiency that affects the increase in 
productivity.  This therefore can possibly induce firms to enter export markets as well as 
enhance export sales among the existing exporters.  We categorise firm size into small 
( )SMALL , medium ( )MEDIUM , large ( )LARGE  and very large ( )VLARGE  by following the 
quartile distribution of the total employment for all firms operating in the same two-digit 
industry.  We omit MEDIUM firms in our analysis. 
In terms of labour force, we used different measures to capture the quality of the labour.  First, 
wage ( )w age  is defined as the log of wages per employee where wages per employee are the 
ratio of total salaries to total worker less owners who do not receive salaries.  If employees 
receive high wages, they tend to be the skilled and professional workers.  In contrast, employees 
who receive low wages tend to be the unskilled workers.  Our second measure is the ratio of 
skilled labour to total labour ( )SKILL .10  Finally, we include a measure of training ( )TRAIN  
where a dummy variable equals 1 if employees within a firm receive formal training either in-
                                                            
9 Our expectation of the positive relationship is based on the empirical evidence that supports the fact that highly 
productive firms are more likely to enter export markets (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999 and 2004, Kneller and 
Pisu 2004) and increase export intensity (see e.g. Kneller and Pisu 2007). 
10 Since a variable that measures a number of workforces is already included when estimating TFP, we do not 
include SKILL in the productivity spillovers model but we do include that in the export spillovers model.  
219 
 
house or outside training or both at least once and 0 otherwise.  Specialisation and working 
expertise tend to be increased in those workers who are trained.  Therefore, we expect that the 
higher the wage, the more superior the quality of labour.  The higher the ratio of skilled labour 
or workers who received training should also have a positive impact on the firms’ export 
behaviour.  The wage and training are also expected to have a positive effect on the firm 
productivity. 
For horizontal and vertical spillovers variables from foreign to domestic firms, we compute 
indices at the industry level to capture the presence of foreign firms for both intra- and inter-
industry.11  Foreign ownership is defined as if at least 10% of shares are owned by foreign 
investors.  The index that captures horizontal spillovers effects ( )HOR  is defined as: 
 =
f
jt
jt
jt
Y
HOR
Y
 (5.6) 
The horizontal spillover variable is the ratio of total sales of foreign firms operating in Thailand 
( )fjtY  in industry j at time t to total sales of all firms ( )jtY  that includes both foreign and 
domestic firms.  The empirical evidence for horizontal productivity and export spillovers is 
mixed so the coefficients could be either negative or positive. 
Moreover, we take into account the difference between export-oriented and domestic market- 
oriented FDI by computing additional indices for horizontal spillovers as we assume that the 
different market orientation of foreign firms may have different spillover effects on domestic 
firms.  For example, foreign exporters may have firm specific advantages, such as information 
about foreign markets that are able to generate positive export spillovers to domestic firms, and 
                                                            
11 Different definitions are used to measure foreign presence such as share of foreign equity participation (Aitken 
and Harrison 1999, Javorcik 2004), growth rate of sales of foreign firms (Driffield, 2001), employment share and 
export share of foreign firms (Greenaway et al. 2004, and Ruane and Sutherland 2005), total production of foreign 
firms (Kneller and Pisu 2007, Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008 and Girma et al. 2008).  
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advanced production processes that would have positive productivity spillovers to domestic 
firms.  Two indices that capture horizontal spillovers from foreign firms according to domestic 
market orientation ( )HOR Dom estic−  and export market orientation ( )HOR Export−  are 
computed as: 
 − =
df
jt
jt
jt
Y
HOR Dom estic
Y
 (5.7) 
 − =
e f
jt
jt
jt
Y
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Y
 (5.8) 
jtHO R Dom estic−  is the ratio of total domestic sales in a host country of foreign firms ( )dfjtY  
in industry j at time t to total sales of all firms ( )jtY  whilst jtHO R Expo r t−  is the ratio of total 
export sales of the same foreign firms ( )efjtY  in industry j at time t to total sales of all firms in the 
same industry and same time.  
For the vertical spillovers variables, an Input-Output (I-O) table is used to calculate backward 
and forward linkages.  The I-O table contains information on the value of output of one 
industry supplies as inputs to another industry.  We compute the backward and forward linkages 
in the same way as Javorcik (2004), Kneller and Pisu (2007) and Girma et al. (2008).  
Backward linkages index ( )BACK  captures the contact between foreign firms and their 
potential local suppliers of intermediate inputs.  The measurement of backward linkages is 
computed as: 
 α= ≠∑     jt kjt kt
k
BACK HOR fo r k j  (5.9) 
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where the variable kjtα  represents the proportion of industry k’s output supplied to industry j 
that can be specified as kjtkjt
kt
Y
Y
α = .  kjtY  is the output of industry k that is provided to industry j 
and ktY is the total output of industry k. 
The forward linkage variable ( )FORW  is an index that captures the contact between foreign 
firms and their domestic customers.  As a consequence, we measure the forward variable in the 
similar way to the backward variable.  However, instead of using kjtα , we use jhtβ  which 
corresponds to the proportion of the output that industry j supplies to industry h that can be 
specified as jhtjht
ht
Y
Y
β = .  The measurement of forward index is thus defined as: 
     jt jht ht
h
FORW HOR fo r h jβ= ≠∑  (5.10) 
In addition, we measure the industry-level variables which are the industry export share 
( )INEXSHARE  defined as the ratio between total export sales and total sales of industry j in 
the same year, industry R&D expense ( )INRDSHARE  defined as the ratio of R&D expenses 
in industry j to total R&D expense of all industry in the same year, and concentration 
( )CONCEN .  The concentration variable is included because we assume that the geographical 
concentration of industries and regions may have some impact on the firms’ productivity.  If 
firms agglomerate in some industries and regions, these agglomeration effects may enhance the 
productivity of firms that operate in the particular industry or region.  The measurement of 
concentration in this chapter is based on the methodology outlined in by Álvarez and López 
(2008) which is defined as:  
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where the subscripts r, j, t refer to region, industry and time respectively. 
5.3.3 Data 
We use the same data set as Chapters two to four which is a firm-level panel data from the 
Annual Survey of Thailand’s manufacturing industry by the OIE between 2001 and 2004.  In 
addition, we use the 2000 I-O table from Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), Thailand to calculate our spillovers indices.12  
Details of definitions are presented in Table 5A.1 of the Appendix 5A.  As all regressors in the 
model except the spillovers variables are lagged by one year to minimise possible simultaneity 
problems, the data in the estimated sample of productivity spillovers includes 6,529 observations 
and export spillovers includes 6,768 observations.  Descriptive statistics for both samples are 
provided in Tables 5A.2 and 5A.3 of the Appendix 5A.  Table 5A.4 shows the raw correlations 
of variables. 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of a firm’s characteristics where we report the means and 
standard deviations for different types of firms.  Amongst different characteristics and 
performances such as output, sales, capital stock and employment, we observe that foreign firms 
have superior performance compared to domestic firms.  Employees who work in foreign firms 
receive higher wages compared to those working in domestic firms.  The means reported also 
                                                            
12 From the I-O table of Thailand, we use 58x58 sectors but only restrict ourselves to sectors that relate to 
manufacturing activities so 30 sectors are selected.  Since the classification of sectors in the I-O table and two-digit 
ISIC in the manufacturing survey are different, we have to group 30 sectors and 22 two-digit ISIC in order to create 
a 18x18 matrix used to calculate measurements of vertical spillovers through backward and forward linkages (see 
Appendix 5B for details of the construction). 
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shows that foreign firms are slightly more productive than domestic firms.  If we make a 
distinction between domestic exporters and domestic non-exporters, the former perform better.  
For example, domestic exporters have more assets, are more productive, and pay higher wages. 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics 
 Foreign 
Firms
Domestic 
Firms
Domestic  
Exporters 
Domestic 
Non-Exporters
Output 327.499 
(765.61)
77.233 
(267.06)
128.94 
(327.99) 
45.148 
(214.84)
Sales 403.826 
(906.57)
95.706 
(342.03)
161.60 
(445.18) 
54.789 
(249.48)
Assets 375.241 
(857.42)
127.339 
(598.03)
181.32 
(782.44) 
78.098 
(347.12)
Capital stock 156.790 
(454.61)
38.065 
(325.61)
72.518 
(516.46) 
16.631 
(69.92)
Labour 642.338 
(1204.26)
271.601 
(561.93)
519.64 
(792.21) 
117.592 
(245.62)
Wage 42.082 
(87.80)
23.546 
(17.91)
25.531 
(14.01) 
22.313 
(19.86)
Productivity 9.848 
(1.91)
9.118 
(1.56)
9.552 
(1.47) 
8.849 
(1.56)
Observation 2,558 6,529 2,501 4,028
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.  Capital stock is a firm’s total fixed assets. Labour is total 
employment including owners.  Productivity is obtained from the estimation technique of Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003).  Wage is the ratio of total labour costs to total employment less owners who do not receive wage.  Output, 
sales and capital stock are measured in hundreds of thousands of US Dollars while wage is measured in hundred of 
US Dollars.  
Our figures of Thailand are in line with the explanation provided by Caves (1996), that foreign 
firms are larger, perform better, and have greater knowledge, technology and production 
capacity than domestic firms.  These attributes can be observed by domestic firms, based on the 
explanation from information and/or competition effects, hence we search the presence of 
spillovers from foreign firms to domestic firms and present the results in the next section.  
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5.4 Results 
This section contains 2-sub sections for our productivity spillover and export spillover results.  
5.4.1 Productivity Spillovers from FDI  
Since we are interested in the spillover effects from foreign firms to domestic firms, we estimate 
the productivity spillover effects from foreign to all domestic firms and also separately estimate 
the effect from foreign firms to domestic exporters and domestic non-exporters.  Tables 5.2 to 
5.4 present the estimated results that are obtained from the fixed effects estimation.  Different 
columns demonstrate how the model is built by starting from the horizontal and vertical 
spillovers variables.  Additional industry- and firm-level characteristics are included.  We also 
present a comparison of our productivity spillover results for the aggregate sample with other 
previous studies in Table 5.5. 
For all domestic firms in Table 5.2, the results show that there is evidence of productivity 
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in the same industry.  The horizontal variable 
( )jtHO R  has a positive and significant influence on productivity of domestic firms in all 
specifications (Columns (2) to (8)) which indicates that adding one percentage point to the 
horizontal index will increase the productivity of domestic firms by 0.7 percent.13  The positive 
horizontal spillovers are explained by the competition effects generated by foreign firms.  
Domestic firms have to develop their productive efficiency in order to compete with foreign 
firms.  This positive evidence of intra-industry productivity spillovers from FDI is consistent 
with the findings from Thailand provided by Tomohara and Yokota (2007) and from other 
                                                            
13 Since TFP is a log transformed, the economic magnitude of the effect is calculated as [exp(0.007*1)-
1]*100=0.7%. 
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countries such as the UK by Lui et al. (2000) and Haskel et al. (2002), and Ghana by Görg and 
Strobl (2005).  
With regards to vertical spillover effects, the coefficients on both forward and backward linkage 
variables are positive but insignificant. The contact between foreign firms and their domestic 
customers and suppliers do not have any significant effect on the productivity of domestic firm.  
This is in line with the previous study of Thailand by Tomohara and Yokota (2007) who do not 
find significant effects of vertical spillovers to domestic firms in the upstream or downstream 
industries.  The insignificant evidence is explained by the technology gaps between foreign and 
domestic firms.  When the technology gaps are relatively large, domestic firms in the upstream 
and downstream industries do not gain from spillovers.  In Thailand, technology gaps are larger 
in industries such as electrical machinery and automotive than in industries such as food and 
beverage (Tomohara and Yokota, 2007).  Another plausible interpretation is that foreign firms 
in Thailand are perhaps able to protect leakages of their intangible proprietary assets that can be 
generated through knowledge and technology.  Industry R&D investment share, industry export 
share and geographic concentration have the expected positive relationship with the productivity 
of domestic firms.  However, only the share of R&D investment in Columns (2) and (3) has a 
significant effect on productivity.  Domestic firms operating in an industry with high levels of 
R&D investment tend to experience high productivity levels. 
In addition, various firm-level characteristics affect their TFP.  In Column (5), we take account 
of firm size because we expect that differences in firm size may have different effects on the 
productivity.  We categorise firm size into small, large and very large.  A negative and significant 
coefficient of small firms indicates that the productivity of small firms will be lower compared 
to other firm sizes.  Being a large or very large domestic firm has no significant effect on the 
productivity. 
226 
 
Two variables are used to proxy for the quality of labour; wage and training.  Firstly, the higher 
the wage implies the higher the quality of labour a firm employed.  However, our result shows 
that the linear term of wage has no significant effect on the productivity of domestic firms and 
only a quadratic term of wage rate has a negative and significant coefficient at the 10% level.  
Secondly, training is a means for workers to enhance their working skills and expertise.  The 
coefficient on training variable is positive as expected but insignificant. The evidence for 
Thailand shows that wage and training have no significant impact on the productivity upgrading 
in domestically-owned firms.  One plausible explanation is that the production process of some 
products does not require training nor demand high quality of labour.  The deviation of overall 
significant result of wage rate is also explained by the characteristic of each industry, as wage is 
positive and significant in some industries such as machinery and equipment chemicals and 
motor vehicles but insignificant in others such as basic metals and publishing and printing.  In 
addition, the limitation of our data allows us to use only a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a firm carries out training or not.  However, the dummy variable may not be a proper 
measure of quality of labour since we do not have information about the percentage of 
workforce who actually receives training.   
In the final column, export status of a domestic firm is included because of the learning-by-
exporting hypothesis of which the productivity tends to increase further after a firm exports (see 
e.g. Van Biesebroeck 2003, Blalock and Gertler 2004, Alvarez and López 2005).  For Thailand, 
we find no evidence of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis since we observe an insignificant 
coefficient of export status.  Thus, previous export experience has no significant effect on the 
level of productivity of a domestic firm in the current period.  Our result is in line with for 
example Aw et al. (2000) for South Korea, and Arnold and Hussinger (2005) for Germany.  
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In Table 5.3, we investigate spillover effects for the different market orientation of FDI towards 
domestic firms.  We replace horizontal spillovers variable ( )jtHO R  by the horizontal domestic 
index ( )jtHO R Dom estic−  and horizontal export index ( )jtHO R Expo r t− .  The horizontal 
domestic index captures the production share of foreign firms sold in domestic market while 
horizontal export index is an index that captures the presence of the export activity of foreign 
firms.  Results are presented in Table 5.3.  The positive and significant of horizontal spillovers 
variable in Table 5.2 is explained by the significance of both horizontal domestic and export 
indices.  The horizontal domestic index has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 10% 
level except for Column (1).  The horizontal export index also has a positive coefficient and is 
significant at the 5% level in Columns (2) to (8) which is consistent with evidence from Chile by 
Alvarez and López (2008).  Our results indicate that the production of foreign firms in the same 
industry for both domestic and export markets do generate positive spillover effects to domestic 
firms.  Adding one percentage point to the horizontal domestic and export indices will increase 
the productivity of domestic firms by 0.7 percent.14 
Results for other variables are consistent with Table 5.2.  There is no significant evidence of 
vertical spillovers through forward and backward linkages.  Industry R&D investment is positive 
and significant only in Columns (2) and (3).  Wage is positive but insignificant in Columns (6) to 
(8).  Negative and significant coefficients are found on a quadratic term of wage rate and a 
dummy variable for small firm. 
 
                                                            
14 The figure is calculated as [exp(0.007*1)-1]*100=0.7%. 
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Table 5.2: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers to all Domestic Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
jtFO RW  0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
jtHO R  0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
jtBACK  0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   0.065** 0.062* 0.056 0.058 0.055 0.055 0.054  (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.145 0.190 0.179 0.158 0.158 0.158  (0.417) (0.423) (0.416) (0.428) (0.429) (0.435) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −   0.042 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.050  (0.082) (0.075) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.152*** -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.147***  (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005  (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.123 0.102 0.102 0.106  (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.119) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.692 0.692 0.686  (0.407) (0.407) (0.407) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.052* -0.052* -0.051*  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.009 0.010  (0.031) (0.031) 
( 1)i tEX −   -0.081  (0.059) 
Constant 8.162*** 8.122*** 8.087*** 8.031*** 8.038*** 5.806*** 5.796*** 5.858*** 
(0.510) (0.513) (0.496) (0.488) (0.481) (1.580) (1.585) (1.601) 
Observation 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5.3: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers (Domestic Market- and Export-Oriented FDI) to all Domestic Firms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
jtFO RW  0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
jtHO R Dom estic−  0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
jtBACK  0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   0.066** 0.062* 0.056 0.058 0.054 0.054 0.054  (0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.147 0.192 0.185 0.167 0.166 0.168  (0.436) (0.442) (0.433) (0.445) (0.445) (0.452) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −   0.041 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.050  (0.082) (0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.152*** -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.147***  (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005  (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.124 0.102 0.102 0.106  (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.119) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.694 0.694 0.689  (0.405) (0.405) (0.405) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.052* -0.052* -0.051*  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.009 0.010  (0.031) (0.031) 
( 1)i tEX −   -0.081  (0.059) 
Constant 8.153*** 8.120*** 8.083*** 8.025*** 8.024*** 5.778*** 5.769*** 5.828*** 
(0.520) (0.519) (0.513) (0.505) (0.494) (1.563) (1.567) (1.583) 
Observation 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 6529 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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For further analysis, we distinguish the spillover effects from foreign firms to different types of 
domestic firms which are domestic exporters and domestic non-exporters.  The results 
presented in Table 5.4 are from the sample of domestic exporters and domestic non-exporters, 
respectively.15  The coefficients reported show the significant evidence of horizontal spillovers 
from foreign firms to both domestic exporters and domestic non-exporters.  Adding one 
percentage point to the horizontal index will increase the productivity of domestic exporters by 
0.6 percent and of domestic non-exporters by 0.8 percent.16  If we make a distinction between 
horizontal spillovers from domestic market-oriented and export-oriented foreign firms, we 
observe that in Column (2) the horizontal spillovers from export-oriented foreign firms has a 
positive and significant effect on the productivity of domestic exporters. In Column (4), there is 
a positive and significant evidence of horizontal spillovers from both domestic market-oriented 
and export-oriented foreign firms to domestic non-exporters. 
Amongst vertical spillovers, we only find significant evidence to support the existence of vertical 
productivity spillovers from foreign firms to domestic non-exporters.  Positive and significant 
coefficients on forward linkages from foreign firms to domestic non-exporters are observed 
suggesting that foreign firms can generate a positive externality effect on the productivity of 
their domestic customers that do not export.  These productivity gains are generated by contacts 
between foreign firms and domestic customers through the knowledge and technology used in 
the production of intermediate inputs that are supplied by foreign firms to their domestic 
customers.  Additionally, the coefficients on backward linkages are positive and significant in 
Columns (3) and (4).  These results on backward linkages indicate that foreign firms can 
positively affect the productivity of their domestic suppliers that only sell in local market.  The 
                                                            
15 See Tables 5D.1 to 5D.4 in the Appendix 5D for the model construction and results of each sample in details.  
16 The figures are calculated as [exp(0.006*1)-1]*100=0.6% and [exp(0.008*1)-1]*100=0.8%. 
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economic magnitude of the effect indicates that adding one percentage point to the backward 
index will only increase the productivity of domestic non-exporters by 1.41 percent. 17 
Foreign firms may generate positive spillovers to their domestic suppliers through the 
improvement of technological knowledge such as improvement in the design of products, 
quality and market information.  Although we do only find significant evidence of vertical 
spillover effects from foreign firms to domestic non-exporters, our results on backward linkages 
are in line with the empirical findings of Lithuania by Jarvorcik (2004), Zambia by Bwalya (2006) 
and the UK by Girma et al. (2008).  
For our other variables, industry R&D investment has a positive coefficient but is only 
significant at the 1% level for domestic non-exporters.  In both samples, a dummy that 
represent a small firm has a positive and significant coefficient which indicates that being a small 
firm is likely to decrease the productivity of domestic exporters by about 19 percent and the 
productivity of domestic non-exporters by about 16 percent.18  The insignificant coefficient of 
the wage variable in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 is now explained by a dominant effect from the domestic 
exporters’ sample.  In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.4, a linear term and a quadratic term of 
wage are insignificant whilst we observe significant relationships for both variables and the 
productivity of domestic non-exporters in Columns (3) and (4).  These significant coefficients 
suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between the wage rate and the productivity of 
domestic non-exporters with the effect increasing at a decreasing rate.  For example in Column 
(3) the turning point is 7.66 which equals to approximately US$ 2122.19 
  
                                                            
17 The figure is calculated as [exp(0.014*1)-1]*100=1.41%. 
18 The figures are calculated as [exp(0.178)-1]*100=19.48% and  [exp(0.148)-1]*100=15.95%. 
19 The figure is obtained from computation of exp[0.766/(0.05*2)]=2121.757. 
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Table 5.4: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers to Domestic Exporters and 
Domestic Non-Exporters 
 Domestic Exporters Domestic Non-Exporters
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
jtFO RW  0.012 0.010 0.028* 0.029** (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) 
jtHO R  0.006*** 0.008*  (0.002) (0.004)  
jtHO R Dom estic−   0.005 0.009*  (0.004) (0.004) 
jtHO R Expo r t−   0.007*** 0.007*  (0.002) (0.004) 
jtBACK  -0.010 -0.010 0.014* 0.013* (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  0.031 0.035 0.078** 0.077* (0.060) (0.058) (0.037) (0.037) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  -0.182 -0.224 0.426 0.430 (0.577) (0.623) (0.585) (0.590) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  0.140 0.141 0.035 0.036 (0.088) (0.088) (0.107) (0.107) 
( 1)i tSMALL −  -0.185** -0.185** -0.152*** -0.152***(0.077) (0.078) (0.051) (0.052) 
( 1)i tLARGE −  0.053 0.055 -0.015 -0.015 (0.081) (0.082) (0.074) (0.074) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −  0.094 0.095 0.200 0.201 (0.121) (0.121) (0.191) (0.191) 
( 1)i tw ag e −  -1.404 -1.412 0.766** 0.771** (1.010) (1.004) (0.272) (0.271) 
2
( 1)i tw age −  0.079 0.080 -0.050** -0.050**(0.065) (0.064) (0.019) (0.019) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.182 0.182 -0.051 -0.052 (0.116) (0.116) (0.037) (0.037) 
Constant 15.175*** 15.256*** 4.297*** 4.256***
(3.467) (3.440) (1.135) (1.134) 
Observation 2501 2501 4028 4028 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1% 
233 
 
Table 5.5: Summary of Results on Productivity Spillovers  
Author Dependent 
Variable 
Country Period Results
a
Hor Forw Back 
Virakul (2009)  TFP Thailand 2001-2004 + ? ? 
Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) 
Log of output Venezuela 1976-1989 - N/A N/A 
Barrios and Strobl 
(2002) 
 TFP Spain 1990-1994 ? N/A N/A 
Javorcik (2004) Log of output Lithuania 1996-2000 ? N/A + 
Lui et al. (2000) Log of labour 
productivity 
UK  + N/A N/A 
Görg and Strobl 
(2005) 
TFP Ghana 1991-1997 + N/A N/A 
Bwalya (2006) ∆Log of output Zambia 1993-1995 ? N/A + 
Tomohara and 
Yokota (2007) 
Log of output Thailand 1999-2003 + ? ? 
Alverez and López 
(2008) 
TFP Chile 1990-1999 + + + 
Blalock and Gertler 
(2008) 
Log of output Indonesia 1988-1996 ? N/A + 
Girma et al. (2008)b TFP UK 1992-1999 ? ? ? 
Notes:  
a The symbol+ indicates positive and significant, + indicates negative and significant, and ? indicates mixed or 
insignificant results on the variable that measure the presence of foreign firms for the aggregate sample.  N/A 
means not applicable.  
b Distinguish between different incentives of FDI.  Results show that different incentives of FDI generate different 
spillovers effects.  For example, there are evidence for positive spillovers on horizontal export-oriented FDI and 
backward domestic-oriented FDI, and negative spillovers on backward-export oriented FDI. 
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5.4.2 Export Spillovers from FDI 
Results from a Heckman selection model are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.  We begin with an 
investigation of the relationship between export market entry and the performances of domestic 
firms (both the export participation decision and export intensity) and the measurement of 
spillover variables without controlling for other covariates.  We then extend the model by 
adding industry-level variables to a number of firm-level characteristics that are assumed to 
affect the export behaviour of domestic firms.  In both tables, our preferred specifications are 
Column (6.1) for export participation decision and Column (6.2) for export intensity or export 
share.  We also present the marginal effects of the Heckman selection model in Table 5.8.  Our 
spillover results for the aggregate sample are presented in Table 5.9 in order to clarify similarity 
and/or dissimilarity with other studies. 
In terms of the export participation decision equation, the results in Table 5.6 show that 
measures on the presence of foreign firms are insignificant for both horizontal and backward 
variables.  However, a significant result is found on the forward linkages variable which indicates 
that contacts between foreign multinationals and their domestic customers have positive impact 
on the probability of exporting.  Because domestic firms purchase intermediate inputs from 
foreign firms, spillover effects may be generated through the greater access to less costly or even 
the quality improvement of intermediate inputs produced by foreign firms.  These would reduce 
the production costs of domestic firms as well as improve the quality of their products that 
would enable domestic firms to enter export markets.  Other industry-level variables, both 
industry R&D share and industry export share, have insignificant effects on the entry decision 
into the export market.  Such insignificant results can be explained by the inclusion of the fixed 
industry effects (Kneller and Pisu, 2007). 
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In terms of our firm-level characteristics, in the probit regression for the export participation 
decision, the coefficients have the expected signs that are in line with the empirical evidence 
from other countries studies provided for example by Roberts and Tybout (1997) for Columbia, 
Bernard and Jensen (1999 and 2004) for the US, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) for the UK, 
Kimura and Kiyota (2006) for Japan.  The export participation decision of domestic firms is 
positively affected by the export status in the previous period at the 1% significant level.  If a 
domestic firm had export experience in the previous year, the probability of current period 
exporting is likely to increase.  This importance is typically interpreted as the evidence of sunk 
costs of exports, an initial large and one-off investment faced by a firm in order to enter the 
export market, which positively influences the entry decision of a firm (see e.g. Roberts and 
Tybout 1997, Bernard and Jensen 2004, Greenaway and Kneller 2004). 
Productivity is positive while a quadratic term of TFP is negative.  Both variables are significant 
at the 1% level.  The probability of exporting increases with productivity but at a decreasing rate.  
Firm size is another important factor that affects the export decision of firms.  Three categories 
of firm size provide different results.  The negative and significant coefficient on small firms 
indicates that small firms are less likely to become exporters.  However, we observe increasingly 
positive and significant results when firm sizes increase.  The coefficients of large and very large 
firms indicate that the larger the size, the more likely the firm is to enter the export market.   
The results on different measures of the quality of labour show that wage, a quadratic term of 
wage rate and a dummy for training have the expected signs but insignificant coefficients.  One 
plausible explanation arises from the differences in the characteristic of products exported.  
Some products do not require high quality of labour or training in their production while some 
do.  Moreover, some firms tend to export mass-produced products or intermediate inputs that 
are produced using cheap labour costs.  We find that only the ratio of skilled labour significantly 
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affects the increase in the probability of exporting.  This positive and significant result is in line 
with the findings from other countries such as the UK by Roper and Love (2002), the US by 
Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Chile by Alvarez and López (2005). 
Regarding the export share equation, we observe different results on the measurement of 
foreign presence compared to the export participation decision.  We do not find any significant 
evidence to support the effect of vertical spillovers through forward and backward linkages.  
However, the coefficient on horizontal variable is positive and significant at the 1% level which 
means that once a firm enters an export market, their export intensity tends to increase as a 
consequence of an increase in the presence of foreign firms in the same industry.  Domestic 
exporters may gain from information externalities generated by foreign firms operating in the 
same industry and such information externality encourages domestic exporters to enhance their 
export intensity.  Another possible explanation is that competition with foreign firms within the 
industry obliges exporters to improve their production efficiency and facilitates them to an 
increase in export share. 
Once more, the industry-level variables for both industry R&D share and industry export share 
are insignificant.  For firm-level variables, the relationship between export intensity and firm 
characteristics are generally consistent with the results from the export participation equation of 
which productivity and large firm have positive and significant effects on the export intensity 
whereas a quadratic term of productivity and being a small firm  have a negative and significant 
effect. 
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Table 5.6: Heckman Selection Model for Export Spillovers to all Domestic Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2)
 EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1 )i tEX −  3.684*** 3.687*** 3.617*** (0.069) (0.067) (0.066) 
jtFO RW  0.077** 0.004 0.079** 0.004 0.073** 0.005(0.031) (0.005) (0.031) (0.005) (0.034) (0.005)
jtHO R  -0.003 0.003*** -0.003 0.003** -0.004 0.003***(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
jtBACK  -0.002 0.001 -0.010 0.002 -0.010 0.002(0.033) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   -0.245 0.005 -0.207 0.007 (0.204) (0.018) (0.215) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.546 -0.237 0.835 -0.206 (1.986) (0.231) (2.006) (0.233)
( 1 )i t
LPTFP −  
 0.755*** 0.111*
 (0.205) (0.063)
2
( 1)( )
LP
i tTFP −   -0.028*** -0.007** (0.010) (0.003)
( 1)i tSMALL −      
( 1)i tLARGE −      
( 1)i tVLARGE −      
( 1)i tw ag e −      
2
( 1)i tw age −      
( 1)i tSKILL −      
( 1)i tTRAIN −      
Constant -2.552* 0.479*** -2.731 0.607*** -6.991** 0.117
 (1.523) (0.132) (1.984) (0.100) (2.787) (0.331)
ρ -0.450*** 
(0.062) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.449*** 
(0.061) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.458*** 
(0.064) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
  
238 
 
Table 5.6: Continued 
 (4) (5) (6) 
 (4.1) (4.2) (5.1) (5.2) (6.1) (6.2)
 EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1 )i tEX −  3.537*** 3.533*** 3.531*** (0.058) (0.061) (0.062) 
jtFO RW  0.079** 0.004 0.080** 0.004 0.081** 0.004(0.033) (0.005) (0.033) (0.005) (0.032) (0.005)
jtHO R  -0.004 0.003*** -0.004 0.003*** -0.004 0.003***(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
jtBACK  -0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.002 -0.013 0.002(0.032) (0.002) (0.032) (0.002) (0.033) (0.002)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  -0.244 0.008 -0.246 0.007 -0.246 0.005(0.201) (0.021) (0.201) (0.020) (0.201) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.707 -0.196 0.799 -0.168 0.816 -0.170(2.034) (0.243) (2.037) (0.250) (2.036) (0.249)
( 1 )i t
LPTFP −  
0.621*** 0.101* 0.554*** 0.098* 0.561*** 0.104*
(0.196) (0.056) (0.202) (0.058) (0.200) (0.057)
2
( 1)( )
LP
i tTFP −  -0.026*** -0.006** -0.025** -0.005* -0.025*** -0.006*(0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
( 1)i tSMALL −  -0.236*** 0.085* -0.233*** 0.085* -0.240*** 0.077(0.076) (0.050) (0.077) (0.050) (0.079) (0.047)
( 1)i tLARGE −  0.225** 0.064*** 0.231** 0.061*** 0.232** 0.062***(0.094) (0.019) (0.091) (0.019) (0.093) (0.020)
( 1)i tVLARGE −  0.307*** 0.059 0.326*** 0.050 0.327*** 0.053(0.082) (0.054) (0.086) (0.048) (0.086) (0.047)
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.700 0.508 0.526 0.492 (0.903) (0.419) (0.805) (0.442)
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.032 -0.036 -0.022 -0.035 (0.056) (0.027) (0.050) (0.029)
( 1)i tSKILL −   0.166* 0.062 (0.095) (0.042)
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.078 -0.008 (0.082) (0.023)
Constant -5.889** 0.124 -8.954** -1.677 -8.387** -1.634
 (2.744) (0.270) (3.876) (1.505) (3.654) (1.579)
ρ -0.456*** 
(0.061) 
-0.153*** 
(0.023) 
-0.457*** 
(0.062) 
-0.153*** 
(0.023) 
-0.459*** 
(0.063) 
-0.153*** 
(0.023) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
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In further analysis, we make a distinction between types of FDI (domestic market- and export-
oriented FDI) as we intend to investigate whether market oriented FDI generates possible 
export spillover effects.  Previous research such as Kneller and Pisu (2007) also use the same 
measure for export orientation of foreign firms in order to capture the idea that export 
spillovers are perhaps caused by information externalities.  Results from a Heckman selection 
model are presented in Table 5.7 where we include horizontal domestic and horizontal export 
indices to capture domestic market orientation and export orientation of foreign firms, 
respectively. 
For the reason that other industry- and firm-level variables are unchanged, we only discuss the 
coefficients of our spillover variables.  The coefficient on forward linkages remains positive but 
does not significantly affect the probability of exporting (except for Column (6.1)) and export 
intensity.  Our backward linkage variable is found to be insignificant.  The negative coefficient 
on horizontal spillovers in the export participation decision from Table 5.6 is now explained by 
the negative and weakly significant coefficient of the horizontal domestic index which can be 
interpreted as to mean that the domestic market orientation of foreign firms operating in the 
same industry significantly decreasing the probability of exporting.  The result implies that there 
is an increase in the level of competition in the domestic market between domestic and foreign 
firms in the same industry.  Domestic firms may lose some of their market share to foreign 
firms operating in the same industry whilst domestic firms face the same fixed costs.  It is less 
likely that domestic firms would be able to generate enough profit to cover the sunk entry cost 
of exporting.  In contrast to the UK study by Kneller and Pisu (2007), we do not find a 
significant relationship between a horizontal export index and the probability of exporting.  
However, our finding supports evidence of Mexican firms provided by Atiken et al. (1997) who 
do not find evidence of spillovers from the general export activity.  Export-oriented foreign 
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firms are able to protect leakages from their export activities and do not really provide 
information about foreign market opportunities that helps domestic firms to overcome or even 
reduce sunk costs of exports.   
In the export share equation, a positive and significant coefficient on horizontal spillovers in 
Table 5.6 is now explained by a dominant effect from a positive and significant effect of the of 
horizontal export index.  The export orientation of foreign firms operating in the same industry 
helps domestically-owned firms to enhance their export intensity.  After domestic firms enter 
export markets, they benefit from the export orientation of foreign firms operating in the same 
industry through imitation, knowledge spillovers or even foreign market specific information.  
An increase in the presence of export-oriented foreign firms can also cause an increase in the 
level competition with domestic exporters in the same industry that forces domestic exporters to 
become more productive and thus increase their export intensity.  This explanation is in line 
with the finding from the previous sub-section (5.4.1) where horizontal export index has a 
positive and significant effect on the productivity of domestic exporters.  
To understand the economic magnitude of the our spillover variables discussed in Table 5.7, we 
present in Table 5.8 the coefficients obtained from the marginal effects of the Heckman 
selection model.  The marginal effects are calculated at the mean of each continuous 
independent variable (except for the dummy variable) keeping all other variables constant.  We, 
therefore, compute the marginal effects separately for the export decision and export share 
regression.  For the export decision, adding one percentage point to the forward index will add 
to the probability of exporting about 0.024 percentage points.  In contrast, adding one 
percentage point to horizontal domestic index will reduce to the probability of exporting around 
0.009 percentage points.  The significance on the coefficients of TFP and a quadratic term 
suggest that the probability of exporting is increased with productivity but at a decreasing rate.  
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The turning point is when TFP equals to approximately 11.20  Different size categories also 
significantly affect the probability of exporting.  For example, the interpretation for SMALL is 
that being a small firm is likely to decrease the probability of exporting by 8.4 percentage points.  
Another factor that determines the probability of exporting is the ratio of skilled labour of 
which adding one unit increase in the ratio of skilled labour will increase the probability of 
exporting by around 5.9 percentage points. In terms of export share regression, horizontal 
export index has a positive and significant coefficient that is explained as adding one percentage 
point to horizontal export index increases the export share by 0.004 point.  
  
                                                            
20 The figure is calculated as [0.197/(0.009*2)]=10.94. 
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Table 5.7: Heckman Selection Model for Export Spillovers (Domestic Market- and 
Export-Oriented FDI) to all Domestic Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2)
 EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1 )i tEX −  3.691*** 3.693*** 3.623*** (0.070) (0.068) (0.067) 
jtFO RW  0.062 0.003 0.065* 0.003 0.059 0.004(0.038) (0.006) (0.039) (0.006) (0.043) (0.006)
jtHO R Dom estic−  -0.026* 0.002 -0.024* 0.002 -0.026* 0.002(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002)
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.007 0.003*** 0.007 0.003*** 0.005 0.003***(0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
jtBACK  0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.003* -0.003 0.003(0.032) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   -0.218 0.008 -0.180 0.009 (0.185) (0.018) (0.199) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.310 -0.291 0.592 -0.249 (2.125) (0.234) (2.174) (0.238)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −   0.746*** 0.111* (0.205) (0.063)
2
( 1)( )
LP
i tTFP −   -0.028*** -0.007** (0.010) (0.003)
( 1)i tSMALL −      
( 1)i tLARGE −      
( 1)i tVLARGE −      
( 1)i tw ag e −      
2
( 1)i tw age −      
( 1)i tSKILL −      
( 1)i tTRAIN −      
Constant -3.235** 0.474*** -3.281 0.624*** -7.459** 0.133
 (1.617) (0.129) (2.049) (0.110) (2.919) (0.331)
ρ -0.450*** 
(0.061) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.450*** 
(0.055) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.457*** 
(0.064) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
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Table 5.7: Continued  
 (4) (5) (6) 
 (4.1) (4.2) (5.1) (5.2) (6.1) (6.2)
 EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1 )i tEX −  3.542*** 3.538*** 3.536*** (0.060) (0.062) (0.063) 
jtFO RW  0.066 0.003 0.067 0.002 0.068* 0.002(0.041) (0.006) (0.041) (0.006) (0.040) (0.006)
jtHO R Dom estic−  -0.025* 0.002 -0.025* 0.002 -0.025* 0.002(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002)
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.005 0.003*** 0.005 0.003*** 0.005 0.003***(0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
jtBACK  -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.007 0.002(0.032) (0.002) (0.033) (0.002) (0.033) (0.002)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  -0.221 0.011 -0.222 0.010 -0.221 0.008(0.186) (0.021) (0.186) (0.020) (0.186) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.520 -0.248 0.616 -0.224 0.627 -0.222(2.191) (0.251) (2.193) (0.258) (2.184) (0.254)
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  0.612*** 0.101* 0.544*** 0.098* 0.551*** 0.104*(0.194) (0.056) (0.201) (0.057) (0.198) (0.057)
2
( 1)( )
LP
i tTFP −  -0.025*** -0.006** -0.024** -0.005* -0.025** -0.006*(0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
( 1)i tSMALL −  -0.236*** 0.085* -0.234*** 0.085* -0.240*** 0.077(0.076) (0.050) (0.077) (0.050) (0.079) (0.047)
( 1)i tLARGE −  0.222** 0.064*** 0.228** 0.061*** 0.230** 0.063***(0.093) (0.019) (0.090) (0.019) (0.092) (0.019)
( 1)i tVLARGE −  0.307*** 0.059 0.326*** 0.051 0.326*** 0.053(0.081) (0.054) (0.085) (0.048) (0.085) (0.047)
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.719 0.511 0.544 0.494 (0.899) (0.421) (0.802) (0.444)
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.033 -0.036 -0.023 -0.036 (0.056) (0.027) (0.050) (0.029)
( 1)i tSKILL −   0.166* 0.062 (0.094) (0.042)
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.082 -0.008 (0.081) (0.023)
Constant -6.381** 0.142 -9.524** -1.669 -8.951** -1.625
 (2.884) (0.267) (4.028) (1.512) (3.801) (1.585)
ρ -0.455*** 
(0.061) 
-0.153*** 
(0.023) 
-0.456*** 
(0.062) 
-0.153*** 
(0.023) 
-0.459*** 
(0.062) 
-0.153*** 
(0.023) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768 6768
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
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Table 5.8: Marginal Effects of the Heckman Selection Model from Column (6) of Table 
5.7 
      (1)   (2) 
     EX
Decision 
  EX 
Share 
( 1)i tEX −  0.922***  (0.006)  
jtFO RW  0.024* 0.010 (0.014) (0.010) 
jtHO R Dom estic−  -0.009* -0.001 (0.005) (0.002) 
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.002 0.004*** (0.004) (0.001) 
jtBACK  -0.003 0.001 (0.012) (0.004) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  -0.079 -0.016 (0.066) (0.033) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.224 -0.152 (0.779) (0.376) 
( 1 )i t
LPTFP −  
0.197*** 0.165*** 
(0.071) (0.057) 
2
( 1)( )
LP
i tTFP −  -0.009** -0.008*** (0.003) (0.003) 
( 1)i tSMALL −  -0.084*** 0.050 (0.027) (0.050) 
( 1)i tLARGE −  0.084** 0.088*** (0.034) (0.017) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −  0.121*** 0.089 (0.033) (0.052) 
( 1)i tw ag e −  0.194 0.555 (0.286) (0.463) 
2
( 1)i tw age −  -0.008 -0.038 (0.018) (0.030) 
( 1)i tSKILL −  0.059* 0.080 (0.033) (0.048) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.029 0.002 (0.028) (0.025) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Region, two-
digit industry and time dummies are included. 
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In Table 5.9, we compare our findings for export spillovers with results from other studies.  
Some studies find positive export spillovers while some find different results when 
distinguishing between horizontal and vertical spillovers.  Our result is consistent with Kneller 
and Pisu (2007) on the horizontal export spillovers when the export share is used as the 
dependent variable.  We do not find any significant evidence for backward spillovers but Kneller 
and Pisu (2007) find a positive and significant result.  One explanation for the differences in the 
results is because of dissimilarity between developed and developing countries.  Lipsey and 
Sjöholm (2005) also mention that different country may find dissimilar results because of the 
difference in the characteristics of firms in each country.  For instance, Kneller and Pisu (2007) 
find that horizontal export spillovers are driven by significance of export-oriented foreign firms 
operating in the same industry.  Imitation or information externalities allow domestic firms to 
compete successfully in order to participate in the export market.  However, in the case of 
Thailand, horizontal export spillovers are negatively determined by the domestic market 
orientation of foreign firms operating in the same industry that implies a negative competition 
effect.  Domestic firms may gain from knowledge and information externalities generated by 
foreign firms operating in the same industry, and also from competition effects as their 
intensities to export are increased following the entry into export market. 
In a sensitivity analysis, we use an alternative measurement of productivity which is the standard 
labour productivity ( )LABPRODTFP .  The results presented in the Appendix 5E but are generally 
consistent with the results discussed in Tables 5.2 to 5.4 for productivity spillovers, and Tables 
5.6 and 5.7 for export spillovers.  
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Table 5.9: Summary of Results on Export Spillovers 
Author Dependent 
Variable 
Country Period Results
a 
Overall Hor Forw Back 
 
Virakul 
(2009) 
Export 
Dummy 
Thailand 2001-2004 N/A ? + ? 
Export 
Share 
Thailand 2001-2004 N/A + ? ? 
Aitken et al. 
(1997) 
Export 
Dummy 
Mexico 1986/1989 N/A + N/A N/A 
Kneller and 
Pisu (2007) 
Export 
Dummy 
UK 1992-1999 N/A ? ? ? 
Export 
Share 
UK 1992-1999 N/A + ? + 
Kokko et al. 
(2001)c 
Export 
Dummy 
Uruguay 2001 ? N/A N/A N/A 
Ma (2006)c Export 
Dummy 
China 1993-2000 + N/A N/A N/A 
Alvarez 
(2007)c 
Export 
Dummy 
Chile 1990-1996 + N/A N/A N/A 
Notes:  
a The symbol+ indicates positive and significant, + indicates negative and significant, and ? indicates mixed or 
insignificant results on the measurement of foreign presence for the aggregate sample.  N/A means not applicable.  
c Do not distinguish between intra- and inter-industry spillovers.  
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5.5 Conclusions 
Policymakers in both developed and developing countries have attempted to implement policies 
to encourage FDI inflows assuming that they benefit the host country.  The direct impact of 
FDI is through increases in capital inflows, employment, as well as R&D investment all of 
which can be seen as ways to stimulate economic growth.  Foreign firms may particularly 
indirectly benefit domestic firms through externalities arising from the proprietary assets of 
foreign firms.  This chapter presents an empirical investigation into the existence or otherwise of 
productivity and export spillovers from FDI through the presence of foreign firms using an 
unbalanced panel of firm-level data from Thailand between 2001 and 2004.  We search for both 
intra- and inter-industry spillovers from foreign firms.  Furthermore, we differentiate between 
different types of FDI and whether the foreign firms are domestic market oriented or export 
oriented and how this affect the productivity and export behaviour, for both the export 
participation decision and how much to export, of domestic firms. 
Our findings show significant evidence on productivity and export spillovers.  For productivity 
spillovers, there is a positive association between the presence of foreign firms operating in the 
same industry and the productivity of domestic firms.  Both domestic market-oriented and 
export-oriented foreign firms tend to increase the productivity of all domestic firms in the same 
industry.  It is suggested that the increased competition generated by foreign firms forces 
domestic firms to become more productive in order to compete successfully.  In addition, our 
results show that spillover effects on domestic exporters are different from domestic non-
exporters.  An increase in the productivity of domestic exporters is affected by an increase in the 
presence of export-oriented foreign firms in the same industry.  At the same time, domestic 
non-exporters gain from both horizontal and vertical productivity spillovers.  The competition 
between foreign firms and domestic non-exporters in the same industry force the latter to 
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improve their productive efficiency.  Buyer-supplier linkages also appear to improve the 
productivity of domestic non-exporters. 
Looking at the export behaviours of domestic firms, we model two decisions.  The first is 
whether a firm chooses to export or not.  The second is how much to export.  The export 
participation decision of domestic firms is determined by vertical spillovers through forward 
linkages suggesting the importance of contacts between foreign firms and their domestic 
customers.  Regarding horizontal spillovers, a negative and weakly significant result is found 
which can be explained by the dominant effect from domestic market- oriented foreign firms 
operating in the same industry.  An increase in competition among domestic firms and domestic 
market-oriented foreign firms in the same industry diminishes the probability of exporting.  We 
observe different results in the export share equation.  Foreign firms, especially export-oriented 
foreign firms, operating in the same industry have a positive effect on the export intensity of 
domestic exporters.  This indicates that domestic exporters can benefit from both information 
and competition effects.  Other firm-level characteristics also have a significant impact on the 
productivity, export participation decision and export intensity of domestic firms. 
Our results prove that domestic firms in Thailand do indeed gain from FDI measured by the 
presence of foreign-owned firms operating in the same and across industries.  Different 
incentives for FDI have different spillover effects towards domestic firms.  In addition, 
productivity and export spillovers are diverse and affect exporters and non-exporters differently.  
Therefore, government have to carefully design the right policy that stimulate growth in 
economy as well as benefit domestic firms.  Export-oriented FDI show the Thai government 
should stress on as the empirical evidence show that export-oriented foreign firms horizontally 
generate positive productivity and export spillovers to domestic firms.  Another implication is 
that the government should cautiously consider protecting some industries lose market share or 
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face significant competitions pressures due to the inflows of FDI because there is evidence 
suggesting negative export spillovers from domestic market-oriented foreign firms to domestic 
firms.   
Since we find evidence that the productivity and export decision of domestic non-exporters 
seems to be affected by contacts they have with foreign firms, the policy design should also 
emphasise on the impact of FDI via vertical linkages between foreign and domestic firms that 
can be generated through technology, knowledge and skill transfers.  The government should 
carry out targeted investment promotion activities so as to fill technology gaps and technology 
needs. This implication would enhance the possibility of spillovers.  Moreover, rather than 
attracting new investment, the government should work more closely with the existing MNEs in 
the country in order to increase arm length relationship with domestic firms and enhance 
spillovers benefit.  For example, government may promote linkages by providing incentives and 
promotion packages that encourage MNEs to use more intermediate inputs from the local 
economy rather than import. 
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Appendix 5A: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5A.1: Definition of Variables 
Level Variable Definition 
Firm 
itEX  
A dummy variable for export status where a dummy equals 1 
if firm i  has positive export sales and 0 otherwise. 
−( 1)i tEX  
The lagged of export status represents for the past export 
experience or the sunk entry costs.  
itEXSHARE  The share of export sale total sale of firm i . 
−( 1)
LP
i tTFP  
Total factor productivity that is obtained from the estimation 
of the semi-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003). 
−( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP  
Labour productivity calculated as the log of value added 
divided by total labour. 
−( 1)i tSMALL  
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total labour of firm i at 
time −1t  is in the first quartile of the distribution of the 
total labour of all firms operating in the same two-digit 
industry level as firm i  at time −1t . 
−( 1)i tLARGE  
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total labour of firm i at 
time −1t  is in the third quartile of the distribution of the 
total labour of all firms operating in the same two-digit 
industry level as firm i  at time −1t . 
−( 1)i tVLARGE  
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total labour of the firm i
at time −1t  is in the forth quartile of the distribution of the 
total labour of all firms operating in the same two-digit 
industry level as firm i  at time −1t . 
−( 1)i tw ag e  
The log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total 
labour payments over total labour less owner’s wage. 
( 1)i tSKILL −  
Skilled labour is the ratio of skilled labour to total 
employment.  
( 1)i tTRAIN −  
A dummy variable for training whether workforce within a 
firm receive either in house- or outside training at least once 
or not. A dummy equals 1 if workforce of firm i  has 
received some training and 0 otherwise. 
Industry 
jtFO RW  
An index for vertical spillovers through forward linkages 
where the computation was described in Expression (5.10). 
jtHO R  
An index for horizontal spillovers captures the presences of 
foreign firms in each industry of which the computation was 
described in Expression (5.6). 
− jtHO R Dom estic  
Horizontal domestic index is an index that captures the 
production of foreign firms sold in Thailand only. The 
computation was described in Expression (5.7).  
− jtHO R Expo r t  
Horizontal export index is an index that captures the 
presence of the export activity of foreign firms only. The 
computation was described in Expression (5.8). 
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jtBACK  
An index for vertical spillovers through backward linkages 
where the computation was described in Expression (5.9). 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  
A share of industry R&D expense is defined as the ratio 
between industry R&D spending and total R&D expense of 
all industries in the same year. 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  
The industry export share is defined as the ratio between 
export sales and total sales of the same industry and same 
year. 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  
A measure for geographic concentration of firm in industries 
and regions is computed as described in Expression (5.11).  
Region 
BKKM  
A dummy variable identifies whether firm locates in Bangkok 
and Metropolitan Area or not.  
CENTRAL A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Central region excluding Bangkok and Metropolitan Area and 0 otherwise. 
EAST  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in Eastern region and 0 otherwise. 
NORTHEAST  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the Northeast of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
NORTH  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the North of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
SOUTH  A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm locates in the South of Thailand and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5A.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimated Sample on Productivity Spillovers 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max
LP
itTFP  6529 9.12 1.56 1.93 16.75
LABPROD
itTFP  6667 8.81 0.96 2.21 16.21
−( 1 )i tEX  6529  0.38  0.49  0 1
−( 1)i tw ag e  6529 7.57  0.47  3.08  10.29
−
2
( 1)i tw age  6529  57.45  7.11  9.50 105.83
−( 1)i tSMALL  6529 0.31  0.47 0  1
−( 1)i tLARGE  6529  0.24  0.43  0 1
−( 1)i tVLARGE  6529 0.19  0.39  0 1
( 1)i tSKILL −  6529 0.54 0.32 0 1
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  6529 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.77
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  6529 0.42 0.19 0.04 0.83
jtFO RW  6529 24.83 21.79 0.00 66.20
jtHO R  6529 49.62 22.47 7.50 97.67
jtHO R Dom estic−  6529 25.46 15.27 2.65 93.72
jtHO R Expo r t−  6529 24.17 18.12 0.00 83.06
jtBACK  6529 29.21 19.37 0.88 79.27
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  6529 1.34 1.28 0.01 23.74
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Table 5A.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimated Sample on Export Spillovers  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max
itEXSHARE  6768 0.20 0.34 0 1
itEX  6768 0.39 0.49 0 1
( 1)i tEX −  6768 0.38 0.49 0 1
( 1)
LP
i tTFP −  6768 9.05 1.56 1.35 16.69
2
( 1)( )
LP
i tTFP −  6768 84.38 28.70 1.83 278.47
−( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP  6801 8.73 0.93 1.45 13.65
2
( 1)( )
LABPROD
i tTFP −  6801 77.11 16.64 2.10 186.34
−( 1)i tw ag e  6768 7.57  0.47  3.08  10.29
−
2
( 1)i tw age  6768  57.52  7.07 9.50 105.83
−( 1)i tSMALL  6768 0.31  0.46 0  1
−( 1)i tLARGE  6768  0.24  0.43  0 1
−( 1)i tVLARGE  6768 0.19  0.39  0 1
( 1)i tSKILL −  6768 0.54 0.32 0 1
( 1)i tTRAIN −  6768 0.85 0.36 0 1
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  6768 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.76
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  6768 0.42 0.19 0.04 0.83
jtFO RW  6768 24.81 21.79 0.00 66.20
jtHO R  6768 49.51 22.52 7.50 97.67
jtHO R Dom estic−  6768 25.44 15.33 2.65 93.72
jtHO R Expo r t−  6768 24.07 18.14 0.00 83.06
jtBACK  6768 29.17 19.36 0.88 79.27
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Table 5A.4: Correlation Matrix  
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EXSHARE 1.00      
EX 0.73 1.00     
FORW 0.21 0.17 1.00    
HOR -0.09 -0.04 0.09 1.00    
HOR-Domestic -0.19 -0.10 0.32 0.60 1.00    
HOR-Export 0.05 0.04 -0.16 0.74 -0.10 1.00    
BACK 0.09 0.07 -0.68 0.19 0.01 0.23 1.00    
INRDSHARE -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.10 -0.06 -0.10 1.00    
INEXSHARE 0.20 0.15 -0.45 0.28 -0.49 0.76 0.28 -0.07 1.00    
CONCEN 0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.10 1.00    
TFPLP  0.13 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.23 -0.20 0.04 -0.05 -0.14 0.04 1.00   
(TFPLP)2 0.11 0.24 0.03 0.01 0.25 -0.21 0.05 -0.05 -0.18 0.03 0.99 1.00   
TFPLABPROD  0.06 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.15 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.15 0.01 0.67 0.68 1.00   
(TFPLABPROD)2 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.15 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.16 0.02 0.67 0.68 0.99 1.00   
SMALL -0.26 -0.35 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.28 -0.28 -0.25 -0.24 1.00   
LARGE 0.14 0.17 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 -0.38 1.00   
VLARGE 0.27 0.34 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.14 -0.33 -0.27 1.00   
wage 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 0.45 0.45 0.60 0.59 -0.22 0.12 0.12 1.00   
wage2 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.45 0.46 0.60 0.60 -0.22 0.12 0.12 0.99 1.00   
SKILL 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.54 -0.05 0.08 0.07 1.00  
TRAIN 0.13 0.19 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 -0.28 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.18 -0.04 1.00 
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Appendix 5B: New Construction of Industry from the 
Manufacturing Survey and I-O Table 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), Thailand provides 
three ranges of the for I-O table (16x16 sectors, 26x26 sectors and 58x58 sectors).  In this paper 
we use 58x58 sectors of the I-O 2000 and control for sectors that only relate to manufacturing 
activities so 30 sectors are selected.  The sector classification in the I-O table of Thailand is 
slightly differed from the two-digit ISIC classification in the manufacturing survey of Thailand.  
We have to match 30 sectors from I-O table with 22 two-digit ISIC from the survey.21  Finally, 
we have 18x18 sectors matrix that is used to calculate indexes of vertical spillovers through 
backward and forward linkages.  The construction of 18 industries is explained as follow; 
Indust
ry 
Manufacturing Survey Input-Output Table  
Two-digit  Division Code Description 
1 ISIC 15 Food products and 
beverages 
15-21 Slaughtering, processing and 
preserving of foods, rice and 
other grain milling, sugar 
refineries, other foods, animal 
food and beverages 
2 ISIC 16 Tobacco products 22 Tobacco processing and 
products  
3 ISIC 17-18 Textiles and wearing 
apparel 
23-24 Spinning, weaving, bleaching and 
textile product 
4 ISIC 19 Tanning and dressing of 
leather 
42 Leather products 
5 ISIC 20 Wood and product of 
wood and cork except 
furniture 
43 Saw mill and wood products 
6 ISIC 21 Paper and paper products 25 Paper and paper products 
7 ISIC 22 Publishing and printing 
and reproduction of 
recorded media 
26 Printing and Publishing 
8 ISIC 23 Coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel 
30 Petroleum refineries 
9 ISIC 24 Chemicals and chemical 27-29 Basic chemical products, 
                                                            
21 Actually, there are 23 two-digit ISIC but so we account for only 22 two-digit industries as we exclude Recycling 
(ISIC 37) from our sample. 
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products fertilizer and pesticides, other 
chemical products 
10 ISIC 25 Rubber and plastics 
products 
31-32 Rubber products and plastic 
wares 
11 ISIC 26 Other non-metallic 
mineral products 
33-34 Cement and concrete products, 
other non-metallic products 
12 ISIC 27 Basic metals 35-36 Iron, steel and non-ferrous metal
13 ISIC 28 Fabricated metal products 37 Fabricated metal products 
14 ISIC 29 Machinery and equipment 38 Industrial machinery 
15 ISIC 30-32 Office, accounting, 
computing machinery, and 
electrical machinery, radio, 
television and 
communication 
equipment  
39 Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 
16 ISIC 34 Motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers 
40 Motor vehicles and repairing 
17 ISIC 35 Other transport 
equipment 
41 Other transportation equipment 
18 ISIC 33+36 Medical, precision optical 
instruments, watch and 
clocks, and furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c. 
44 Other manufacturing products 
such as, photographic and 
optical goods, watches and 
clocks, jewellery and related 
articles, recreation and athletic 
equipment 
Note: From I-O table of 58 sectors, we limit our interest on sectors in the manufacturing industry so only 30 
sectors are related to the manufacturing activities.  In the ISIC 33, we exclude the ISIC 3610 (manufacture of 
furniture) at the four-digit level and only account for ISIC 3691-3694 and ISIC 3699.  In the manufacture of 
furniture, we separate types of furniture according to the input of materials used in the production.  For example, if 
a firm produces wood furniture, we include this firm in sector 43 or ISIC 20.  If a firm produces metal furniture, we 
include this firm in sector 37 or ISIC 28. 
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Appendix 5C: Hausman Specification Test 
The Hausman specification test is used to test the appropriateness of fixed effects versus 
random effects under the null hypothesis that the error term ሺߝ௜௧ሻ and the regressors ሺܼ௜௧ሻ are 
uncorrelated, ܧሺߝ௜௧|ܼ௜௧ሻ ൌ 0.  If ܧሺߝ௜௧|ܼ௜௧ሻ ് 0 which means ߝ௜௧ and ܼ௜௧ are correlated, GLS 
estimator ሺߚመீ௅ௌሻ becomes biased and inconsistent for ߚ but the within estimator ሺߚ෨ௐ௜௧௛௜௡ሻ is 
unbiased and consistent for ߚ.  The GLS estimator is BLUE (best linear biased estimator), 
consistent and efficient only if ߝ௜௧ and ܼ௜௧ are uncorrelated (Baltagi, 2005). 
Regarding a comparison between the two estimators, the covariance matrix is used to evaluate 
the significant of the difference in vector ߚ෨ௐ௜௧௛௜௡ െ ߚመீ௅ௌ.  Since ߚመீ௅ௌ is efficient under the null 
hypothesis, it can be shown that 
 ܸሼߚ෨௪௜௧௛௜௡ െ ߚመீ௅ௌሽ ൌ ܸሼߚ෨ௐ௜௧௛௜௡ሽ െ ܸሼߚመீ௅ௌሽ (5C.1) 
Therefore, the Hausman test statistic can be computed as: 
 ߦு ൌ ൫ߚ෨ௐ௜௧௛௜௡ െ ߚመீ௅ௌ൯
ᇱ
ሾ ෠ܸ ሼߚ෨ௐ௜௧௛௜௡ሽ െ ෠ܸሼߚመீ௅ௌሽሿିଵሺߚ෨ௐ௜௧௛௜௡ െ ߚመீ௅ௌሻ (5C.2) 
where ෠ܸ  is the estimates of the true covariance matrices and the statistic ߦு has an asymptotic 
Chi-square distribution ሺ߯௄ଶሻ with K degree of freedom.  
The Hausman specification test is used to test whether within and GLS estimators are 
significantly different.  If the test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis, there is no systematic 
difference between the two estimators so ߚመீ௅ௌ is efficient. However, if the null hypothesis is 
rejected, ߚመீ௅ௌ is inefficient.  Hence, the within estimator or the fixed effects approach is 
appropriated.  
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From the Hausman specification test, the test statistics of the model in Equation (5.1) are 
߯ଶ(15) = 530.46 and the p-value = 0.00. This result shows that the null hypothesis is rejected 
which means the within estimator produce the efficient results so we estimate the model in 
Equation (5.1) with the within estimator which is often called the fixed effects estimator. 
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Appendix 5D: Additional Results 
Table 5D.1: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers to Domestic Exporters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
jtFO RW  0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.012(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 
jtHO R  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
jtBACK  -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  0.036 0.039 0.026 0.030 0.034 0.031(0.062) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.057) (0.060) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  -0.184 -0.070 -0.104 -0.158 -0.182 (0.554) (0.549) (0.530) (0.572) (0.577) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  0.148 0.145 0.134 0.140(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.204** -0.189** -0.185**  (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.057 0.049 0.053 (0.089) (0.087) (0.081) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.115 0.088 0.094 (0.124) (0.123) (0.121) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   -1.502 -1.404  (0.963) (1.010) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   0.085 0.079 (0.062) (0.065) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.182 (0.116) 
Constant 9.471*** 9.460*** 9.502*** 9.288*** 9.226*** 15.762*** 15.175*** 
(0.538) (0.540) (0.532) (0.530) (0.557) (3.309) (3.467) 
Observation 2501 2501 2501 2501 2501 2501 2501
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
260 
 
Table 5D.2: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers (Domestic Market- and Export-Oriented FDI) to Domestic Exporters  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
jtFO RW  0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
jtHO R Dom estic−  0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
jtBACK  -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  0.038 0.043 0.030 0.034 0.038 0.035(0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  -0.226 -0.114 -0.148 -0.199 -0.224 (0.600) (0.592) (0.574) (0.615) (0.623) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  0.148 0.145 0.134 0.141(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.204** -0.188** -0.185**  (0.077) (0.075) (0.078) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   0.058 0.051 0.055 (0.091) (0.089) (0.082) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.115 0.089 0.095 (0.125) (0.124) (0.121) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   -1.510 -1.412  (0.959) (1.004) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   0.086 0.080 (0.061) (0.064) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.182 (0.116) 
Constant 9.502*** 9.497*** 9.557*** 9.346*** 9.282*** 15.840*** 15.256*** 
(0.567) (0.567) (0.570) (0.567) (0.581) (3.290) (3.440) 
Observation 2501 2501 2501 2501 2501 2501 2501
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5D.3: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers to Domestic Non-Exporters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
jtFO RW  0.028* 0.029** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028* 0.028* (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
jtHO R  0.008* 0.008* 0.008** 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
jtBACK  0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.014* 0.015** 0.014* 0.014* (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  0.091*** 0.079** 0.077* 0.080** 0.077** 0.078** (0.030) (0.031) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.440 0.453 0.419 0.429 0.426(0.537) (0.586) (0.563) (0.584) (0.585) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  0.011 0.026 0.033 0.035(0.120) (0.103) (0.106) (0.107) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.151** -0.150*** -0.152***  (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   -0.016 -0.015 -0.015  (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.196 0.199 0.200 (0.197) (0.191) (0.191) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.771** 0.766**  (0.269) (0.272) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.050** -0.050**  (0.019) (0.019) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   -0.051  (0.037) 
Constant 7.359*** 7.285*** 7.167*** 7.153*** 7.197*** 4.249*** 4.297*** 
(0.589) (0.572) (0.580) (0.585) (0.555) (1.133) (1.135) 
Observation 4028 4028 4028 4028 4028 4028 4028
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5D.4: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers (Domestic Market- and Export-Oriented FDI) to Domestic Non-
Exporters  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
jtFO RW  0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.028** 0.029** (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
jtHO R Dom estic−  0.009* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.007 0.007 0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
jtBACK  0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.014* 0.014** 0.013* 0.013* (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  0.091*** 0.079** 0.077* 0.079** 0.076* 0.077* (0.031) (0.032) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.441 0.455 0.422 0.432 0.430(0.542) (0.590) (0.568) (0.588) (0.590) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  0.011 0.026 0.033 0.036(0.120) (0.103) (0.106) (0.107) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.151** -0.150*** -0.152***  (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   -0.016 -0.015 -0.015  (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.196 0.199 0.201 (0.198) (0.191) (0.191) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.776** 0.771**  (0.268) (0.271) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.050** -0.050**  (0.019) (0.019) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   -0.052  (0.037) 
Constant 7.340*** 7.275*** 7.155*** 7.141*** 7.175*** 4.214*** 4.256*** 
(0.577) (0.558) (0.581) (0.584) (0.550) (1.131) (1.134) 
Observation 4028 4028 4028 4028 4028 4028 4028
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Appendix 5E: Sensitivity Analysis 
In the Appendix 5E, we present a sensitivity checks on the productivity variable in both models 
by using the standard labour productivity ( )LABPRODTFP  defined as the log of value added to 
total labour.  
Tables 5E.1 to 5E.3 report the estimated results from the fixed effects model for the export 
spillovers.  The results are generally consistent with the results discussed in Tables 5.2 to 5.4.  In 
Table 5E.1, we find a positive and significant evidence for the horizontal productivity spillovers. 
In Table 5E.2, we distinguish between different market orientations of FDI.  The coefficients 
for both indices ( HOR Dom estic− and HO R Expo r t− ) are positive and significant.  In 
addition, we also find some evidence of vertical spillovers through the forward and backward 
linkages in Colum (2) of Table 5E.2.  
Tables 5E.4 and 5E.5 provide the estimated results from the Heckman selection model for 
export spillovers.  In both export decision and export share equations, LABPRODTFP  has a 
positive coefficient while 2( )LABPRODTFP  has a negative coefficient.  However, these coefficients 
are significant only if w ag e  and 2w age  are excluded from the model.  This can be explained by 
the fact that LABPRODTFP  and w ag e  are correlated (see Table 5A.4).  For all other variables 
including spillovers, results are consistent with those in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.  
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5E.1 Productivity Spillovers  
Table 5E.1: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers to all Domestic Firms (Dep. Var. is LABPRODitTFP ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
jtFO RW  0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
jtHO R  0.007** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
jtBACK  0.007* 0.008* 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   0.079** 0.074** 0.067 0.068* 0.065 0.065 0.065  (0.030) (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.227 0.274 0.260 0.237 0.237 0.237  (0.440) (0.463) (0.460) (0.478) (0.478) (0.480) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −   0.044 0.054 0.056 0.055 0.054  (0.096) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.158** -0.154** -0.153** -0.153**  (0.058) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   -0.024 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030  (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.077 0.058 0.058 0.061  (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.113) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.687 0.687 0.682  (0.417) (0.417) (0.418) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.051* -0.051* -0.050*  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.011 0.012  (0.034) (0.034) 
( 1)i tEX −   -0.065  (0.075) 
Constant 7.766*** 7.727*** 7.671*** 7.612*** 7.646*** 5.405*** 5.395*** 5.448*** 
(0.481) (0.489) (0.458) (0.455) (0.446) (1.592) (1.594) (1.623) 
Observation 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5E.2: Fixed Effects Model for Productivity Spillovers (Domestic Market- and Export-Oriented FDI) to all Domestic Firms 
(Dep. Var. is LABPRODitTFP ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
jtFO RW  0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
jtHO R Dom estic−  0.009* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
jtBACK  0.006 0.008* 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   0.079** 0.073** 0.066 0.067* 0.064 0.063 0.063  (0.030) (0.033) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.238 0.286 0.275 0.255 0.254 0.255  (0.463) (0.483) (0.478) (0.494) (0.494) (0.497) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −   0.044 0.054 0.056 0.056 0.055  (0.096) (0.087) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) 
( 1)i tSMALL −   -0.158** -0.154** -0.154** -0.153**  (0.058) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
( 1)i tLARGE −   -0.024 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030  (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −   0.077 0.058 0.058 0.061  (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.113) 
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.690 0.691 0.686  (0.414) (0.414) (0.415) 
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.051* -0.051* -0.051*  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.010 0.011  (0.034) (0.034) 
( 1)i tEX −   -0.066  (0.075) 
Constant 7.738*** 7.708*** 7.646*** 7.585*** 7.612*** 5.353*** 5.344*** 5.396*** 
(0.479) (0.485) (0.472) (0.467) (0.455) (1.575) (1.576) (1.604) 
Observation 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 6667 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5E.3: Fixed Effect Model for Productivity Spillovers to Domestic Exporters and 
Domestic Non-Exporters (Dep. Var. is LABPRODitTFP ) 
 Domestic Exporters Domestic Non-Exporters
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
jtFO RW  0.007 0.006 0.030** 0.031** (0.025) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) 
jtHO R  0.006** 0.008**  (0.002) (0.004)  
jtHO R Dom estic−   0.005 0.010**  (0.006) (0.004) 
jtHO R Expo r t−   0.006** 0.008*  (0.002) (0.004) 
jtBACK  -0.010 -0.009 0.015** 0.015** (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  0.060 0.062 0.078* 0.076* (0.061) (0.061) (0.037) (0.038) 
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.004 -0.020 0.452 0.457 (0.721) (0.812) (0.589) (0.594) 
( 1)r j tCO NCEN −  0.095 0.095 0.047 0.048 (0.108) (0.108) (0.116) (0.115) 
( 1)i tSMALL −  -0.338 -0.338 -0.130* -0.130* (0.197) (0.197) (0.064) (0.064) 
( 1)i tLARGE −  0.003 0.004 -0.020 -0.020 (0.087) (0.089) (0.071) (0.072) 
( 1)i tVLARGE −  0.016 0.016 0.166 0.167 (0.117) (0.117) (0.174) (0.174) 
( 1)i tw ag e −  -1.211 -1.214 0.747** 0.753** (1.014) (1.009) (0.269) (0.268) 
2
( 1)i tw age −  0.068 0.068 -0.048** -0.049**(0.065) (0.065) (0.020) (0.020) 
( 1)i tTRAIN −  0.215* 0.215* -0.055 -0.055 (0.118) (0.118) (0.043) (0.043) 
Constant 13.906*** 13.945*** 4.067*** 4.012***
(3.402) (3.365) (1.125) (1.119) 
Observation 2543 2543 4124 4124 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1% 
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5E.2 Export Spillovers  
Table 5E.4: Heckman Selection Model for Export Spillovers with LABPRODTFP to all 
Domestic Firms  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2)
 EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1)i tEX −  3.689*** 3.691*** 3.659*** (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) 
jtFO RW  7.684** 0.344 7.888** 0.407 7.712** 0.611(3.072) (0.529) (3.071) (0.508) (3.226) (0.555)
jtHO R  -0.354 0.299*** -0.263 0.306** -0.323 0.312***(0.440) (0.105) (0.496) (0.120) (0.511) (0.118)
jtBACK  -0.242 0.146 -0.977 0.250 -0.862 0.266(3.293) (0.199) (3.065) (0.211) (3.075) (0.206)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   -0.245 0.007 -0.233 0.004 (0.204) (0.017) (0.206) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.561 -0.240 0.879 -0.194 (1.979) (0.231) (1.948) (0.241)
( 1 )i t
LABPRODTFP −  
 1.005*** 0.206
 (0.332) (0.140)
2
( 1)( )
LABPROD
i tTFP −   -0.047*** -0.014* (0.018) (0.008)
( 1)i tSMALL −      
( 1)i tLARGE −      
( 1)i tVLARGE −      
( 1)i tw ag e −      
2
( 1)i tw age −      
( 1)i tSKILL −      
( 1)i tTRAIN −      
Constant -2.546* 0.479*** -2.734 0.608*** -8.042*** -0.196
 (1.520) (0.131) (1.982) (0.097) (2.996) (0.693)
ρ -0.450*** 
(0.077) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.449*** 
(0.061) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.460*** 
(0.068) 
-0.154*** 
(0.025) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
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Table 5E.4: Continued  
 (4) (5) (6) 
 (4.1) (4.2) (5.1) (5.2) (6.1) (6.2)
 EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1 )i tEX −  3.543*** 3.538*** 3.536*** (0.058) (0.061) (0.062) 
jtFO RW  8.339*** 0.518 8.557*** 0.485 8.704*** 0.484(3.209) (0.544) (3.211) (0.551) (3.128) (0.548)
jtHO R  -0.383 0.312** -0.329 0.322*** -0.324 0.320***(0.542) (0.123) (0.551) (0.122) (0.550) (0.121)
jtBACK  -1.065 0.265 -1.061 0.242 -1.212 0.206(3.262) (0.208) (3.283) (0.209) (3.347) (0.207)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  -0.260 0.006 -0.263 0.004 -0.263 0.003(0.195) (0.020) (0.195) (0.020) (0.196) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.737 -0.185 0.849 -0.170 0.869 -0.172(2.004) (0.248) (2.014) (0.252) (2.015) (0.250)
( 1 )i t
LABPRODTFP −  
0.698** 0.189 0.579 0.148 0.574 0.152
(0.332) (0.123) (0.384) (0.126) (0.391) (0.119)
2
( 1)( )
LABPROD
i tTFP −  -0.033* -0.013* -0.030 -0.010 -0.030 -0.010(0.018) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007)
( 1)i tSMALL −  -0.266*** 0.090* -0.252*** 0.090* -0.257*** 0.082*(0.071) (0.052) (0.073) (0.052) (0.076) (0.050)
( 1)i tLARGE −  0.256*** 0.057*** 0.252*** 0.058*** 0.253*** 0.060***(0.095) (0.017) (0.091) (0.016) (0.093) (0.017)
( 1)i tVLARGE −  0.363*** 0.047 0.358*** 0.047 0.358*** 0.050(0.080) (0.043) (0.080) (0.042) (0.080) (0.041)
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.843 0.357 0.696 0.345 (0.986) (0.393) (0.936) (0.408)
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.039 -0.024 -0.031 -0.023 (0.061) (0.026) (0.058) (0.026)
( 1)i tSKILL −   0.158 0.060 (0.097) (0.041)
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.083 -0.008 (0.083) (0.024)
Constant -6.278** -0.164 -9.727** -1.332 -9.215** -1.294
 (3.070) (0.604) (4.144) (1.450) (4.077) (1.512)
ρ -0.461*** 
(0.065) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
-0.460*** 
(0.064) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
-0.462*** 
(0.064) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
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Table 5E.5: Heckman Selection Model for Export Spillovers (Domestic Market- and 
Export-Oriented FDI) with LABPRODTFP  to all Domestic Firms  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2)
 EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1)i tEX −  3.695*** 3.697*** 3.666*** (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) 
jtFO RW  0.062 0.002 0.065* 0.003 0.062 0.005(0.038) (0.006) (0.039) (0.006) (0.042) (0.006)
jtHO R Dom estic−  -0.026* 0.002 -0.025* 0.002 -0.026* 0.001(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002)
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.006 0.003*** 0.007 0.003*** 0.006 0.003***(0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
jtBACK  0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.003* -0.001 0.003*(0.031) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −   -0.218 0.010 -0.205 0.007 (0.185) (0.017) (0.187) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −   0.330 -0.294 0.623 -0.256 (2.122) (0.233) (2.123) (0.244)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −   1.017*** 0.208 (0.332) (0.141)
2
( 1)( )
LABPROD
i tTFP −   -0.048*** -0.014* (0.018) (0.008)
( 1)i tSMALL −      
( 1)i tLARGE −      
( 1)i tVLARGE −      
( 1)i tw ag e −      
2
( 1)i tw age −      
( 1)i tSKILL −      
( 1)i tTRAIN −      
Constant -3.230** 0.474*** -3.288 0.625*** -8.628*** -0.188
 (1.612) (0.127) (2.046) (0.107) (3.155) (0.704)
ρ -0.450*** 
(0.061) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.450*** 
(0.061) 
-0.152*** 
(0.023) 
-0.460*** 
(0.067) 
-0.154*** 
(0.025) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
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Table 5E.5: Continued  
 (4) (5) (6) 
 (4.1) (4.2) (5.1) (5.2) (6.1) (6.2)
 EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX
Decision 
EX
Share 
EX 
Decision 
EX
Share 
( 1 )i tEX −  3.550*** 3.545*** 3.542*** (0.060) (0.062) (0.063) 
jtFO RW  0.070* 0.003 0.072* 0.003 0.073* 0.003(0.041) (0.006) (0.041) (0.006) (0.039) (0.006)
jtHO R Dom estic−  -0.025* 0.001 -0.025* 0.001 -0.025* 0.001(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002)
jtHO R Expo r t−  0.006 0.003*** 0.007 0.004*** 0.007 0.004***(0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
jtBACK  -0.004 0.003** -0.004 0.003* -0.006 0.003(0.033) (0.002) (0.033) (0.002) (0.034) (0.002)
( 1)j tINRDSHARE −  -0.235 0.010 -0.238 0.008 -0.237 0.007(0.179) (0.020) (0.178) (0.020) (0.178) (0.020)
( 1)j tINEXSHARE −  0.549 -0.255 0.670 -0.239 0.684 -0.237(2.169) (0.253) (2.174) (0.257) (2.166) (0.254)
( 1)
LABPROD
i tTFP −  0.708** 0.191 0.590 0.150 0.585 0.154(0.331) (0.123) (0.385) (0.126) (0.391) (0.119)
2
( 1)( )
LABPROD
i tTFP −  -0.034* -0.013* -0.031 -0.010 -0.030 -0.011(0.018) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007)
( 1)i tSMALL −  -0.266*** 0.090* -0.252*** 0.090* -0.257*** 0.082*(0.071) (0.052) (0.073) (0.053) (0.075) (0.050)
( 1)i tLARGE −  0.254*** 0.058*** 0.250*** 0.058*** 0.250*** 0.060***(0.094) (0.017) (0.090) (0.016) (0.093) (0.017)
( 1)i tVLARGE −  0.363*** 0.047 0.358*** 0.047 0.358*** 0.050(0.078) (0.043) (0.079) (0.042) (0.079) (0.041)
( 1)i tw ag e −   0.830 0.358 0.683 0.346 (0.981) (0.395) (0.931) (0.409)
2
( 1)i tw age −   -0.038 -0.024 -0.030 -0.023 (0.061) (0.026) (0.058) (0.027)
( 1)i tSKILL −   0.158* 0.059 (0.096) (0.041)
( 1)i tTRAIN −   0.087 -0.008 (0.082) (0.024)
Constant -6.882** -0.154 -10.308** -1.325 -9.791** -1.287
 (3.237) (0.616) (4.304) (1.458) (4.227) (1.519)
ρ -0.460*** 
(0.064) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
-0.460*** 
(0.063) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
-0.462*** 
(0.064) 
-0.154*** 
(0.024) 
 
λ 
 
Observations 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%.  Region, two-digit industry and time dummies are included.  ρ  is the estimated correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations; if it is different from zero it suggests that the two equations are related and that the 
selection model is appropriate.  λ is the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio; if it is different from zero it 
suggests that there is sample selection. 
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6 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
This chapter includes two sub-sections.  First, we provide a summary of the empirical results 
presented in Chapters two to five and discuss limitations of the study. Recommendations for 
further research are also discussed in the second section of the chapter.  
6.1 Summary of Results 
This thesis consists of four empirical studies related to different aspects of exporting, FDI and 
firm heterogeneity in Thailand.  All chapters use a firm-level data from the Annual Survey of 
Thailand’s manufacturing industry by the OIE for the period between 2001 and 2004.  The first 
two studies investigate the determinants of export participation.  The third study explains the 
distinction between single and multi-product firms to contribute to the understanding of the 
complex relationship between MNEs and exporting and also characteristics associated with 
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multi-product firms.  The final study concerns the effects of FDI inflows on the domestic firms 
in the host economy.  
Chapter two investigates the relationship between firm heterogeneity, origin of ownership and 
export participation.  We find evidence that a firm’s decision to export is determined by export 
experience, structure of ownership, productivity, firm size and its establishment location.  As a 
whole, export experience interpreted as the evidence of sunk entry costs is the most important 
determinant of the probability of exporting.  This finding is consistent with both the theoretical 
and past empirical explanations where a firm enters export market if the expected gross profit 
exceeds the sunk entry costs.  If a firm exports in the previous period, it is likely to export in the 
current period as well.  For other independent variables, the results that productivity, foreign 
ownership have positive and significant effects on the probability of exporting.  Firms with high 
wages are likely to enter export markets.  The firm size is also important, small firms are less 
likely to export but the larger a firm then becomes the more likely it is to export.  Establishment 
location of a firm affects the probability of exporting as well of which the probability of 
exporting is higher for a firm that locates in the south, compared to other regions.  
Furthermore, we are able to break down FDI by countries and regions of origin with the 
intention to investigate the effect of country of origin on the decision of a firm to enter export 
markets.  The results show that country of origin matters in determining the export decision of a 
firm.  The probability of exporting is higher for firms from China, Japan, Singapore, US and UK 
compared to other countries or regions.  These results indicate the evidence of export platform 
FDI.  In addition, using different cut-off points for foreign-owned share, we observe that the 
behaviour of Chinese- and Singaporean-owned firms is different to firms from others countries 
with the probability of exporting correlated with the size of the foreign-owned share. 
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In Chapter three, we further investigate the determinants of export participation decision by 
linking a firm’s financial health with the entry decision into export market because we assume 
that the investment relates to a firm’s internal finance.  Exporting is considered as a form of 
investment as a firm has to invest in sunk entry costs in order to enter export markets.  Thus, we 
re-examine the model in Chapter two and retain all independent variables except for the lag of 
export status.  We replace the lag of export status which is a proxy for sunk entry costs with the 
financial variables.  The financial variables are used to indicate firms’ ability of investment 
especially in sunk entry costs in order to enter export markets.  We categorise firm size 
according to total fixed assets rather than total labour since this chapter emphasises on the 
internal finance of a firm.  
The empirical results show that financial health of a firm affect its decision to export.  Liquidity 
is positive whilst leverage is negative and both ratios are significant.  Firms that have high 
liquidity are more likely to export.  In contrast, firms with high leverage are less likely to become 
exporters.  Results for other firm specific characteristics are broadly consistent with those 
presented in Chapter two.  In addition, we investigate factors that affect the size of exports.  
The financial health is also found to have a significant effect on the export intensity of a firm. 
This finding reveals a firm’s capability to produce goods for export.  
In Chapter four, we look at another dimension of firm heterogeneity by focusing on different 
aspects of multi-product firms in international trade and also making a distinction between 
single- and multi-product firms.  First, we examine the relationship between multi-product 
firm’s extensive margin on output or exporting.  We observe little variation for firms’ extensive 
margins in both total output and export sales.  If we compare the magnitude of the effect, firms’ 
extensive margins seem to have a higher variation in export sales than in total output.   
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The second part of Chapter four is about the empirical investigations of the characteristics 
associated with being a multi-product firm using binary data and the number of products 
produced using count data.  Results show that various factors such as the interaction between 
export and foreign ownership, TFP, R&D both in product and in the production processes and 
firm size are associated with being a multi-product firm   Productive and large firms and those 
that carry out R&D also have a strong association with being a multi-product firm.  In terms of 
the characteristics associated with the number of products produced, the results are generally 
consistent with the factors that associate with the probability of becoming a multi-product firm. 
If we distinguish between domestic and foreign firms, we observe that there are systematic 
differences of the factors associated with being a multi-product firm and the number of 
products produced.  This indicates that domestic firms perform differently to foreign firms. The 
export status of foreign firms has a positive and significant association with being a multi-
product firm and the number of products produced.  Both R&D are found to be more 
important for domestic firms compared to foreign firms.  
In Chapter five, we highlight on the effect of FDI inflows that can be generated through 
spillovers to domestic firms.  We account for both productivity and export spillovers via both 
intra- and inter-industry spillovers.  We also make a distinction between different types of FDI 
to investigate how domestic market-oriented and export-oriented foreign firms affect the 
productivity and exporting of domestic firms. 
Regarding productivity spillovers, there is a significant evidence for positive horizontal 
productivity spillovers. This is explained by the competition between foreign and domestic firms 
in the same industry that forces the latter to improve their productive efficiency.  Both domestic 
market-oriented and export-oriented foreign firms tend to increase the productivity of all 
domestic firms in same industry.  If we distinguish between spillovers to domestic exporters and 
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domestic non-exporters, results show that export-oriented foreign firms generate positive 
horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic exporters.  Domestic non-exporters benefit from 
both horizontal and vertical productivity spillovers. 
In terms of export spillovers, we model two decisions, the export decision and how much to 
export.  In the export participation decision, we find positive and significant evidence for 
vertical spillovers through forward linkages which suggests the importance of contacts between 
foreign firms and their domestic customers.  Different types of FDI also generate different 
spillovers to domestic firms.  Our results show that domestic-oriented foreign firms generate 
negative spillovers to the domestic firms in the same industry.  
In the export share equation, we observe different results.  Domestic exporters benefit from the 
presences of foreign firms, especially export-oriented foreign firms, operating in the same 
industry.  This indicates that domestic exporters can benefit from both information and 
competition effects.  Other firm-level characteristics also significantly affect the productivity of 
domestic firms as well as the decision to export and how much to export. 
In this thesis, the empirical results lead us to suggest several policy implications. The 
government should continue to implement policies that encourage firms to export and attract 
FDI inflows.  Both policies are known as a means to stimulate economic growth.  However, the 
government may need to think carefully about whom they should target their inward FDI 
policies because different countries of origin are found to have different incentives of 
investment. 
In addition, the government should also be aware of making decision on the right policies that 
do not only stimulate growth but also benefit domestic firms.  Our results suggested that 
different incentives for FDI have different spillover effects towards domestic firms.  Some 
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industries benefit from the spillovers while others lose their market share or face significant 
competition pressures due to the inflows of FDI.  Therefore, the government should stress on 
those policies that attract certain types of FDI that benefit domestic firms and, at the same time, 
protect some industries that receive negative spillover effects.  
Regarding the policies that encourage exports, the government should also highlight entry-
promotion as well as export promotion policies.  The financial health of a firm is found to have 
significant effect on the entry decision of a firm into export markets and also the export 
intensity.  Entry-promotion policies could benefit from government help to reduce sunk entry 
costs faced by firms, so some financial constrained firms can afford the costs of entry into 
export markets.  The implementation of export promotion policies would support existing 
exporters to stimulate their export sales.  
6.2 Further Research 
The key limitation of this thesis relates to our data. Since we have a short panel structure, we 
cannot perform alternative estimation techniques.  In order to improve our analyses of all 
chapters, our plan is to construct a longer panel by adding the recent years of data.  
If we are able to expand the time period, we will carry out other estimation techniques such as 
the fixed effects probit, GMM or even other dynamic estimators.  All of these techniques 
account for the unobserved heterogeneity problem.  In addition, the first-difference GMM 
estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) allows for possible endogeneity by requiring two or 
more lags of the right-hand-side variables as instruments.  However, the first-difference GMM is 
found to have weak instrument problems that arise from the sample bias especially in the short 
panel (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  Furthermore, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that the 
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system GMM is more efficient than the first-difference GMM estimator.  The system GMM as 
it combines two moment conditions; for the differenced equation and for the model in levels. In 
our models, there may be causality problems between dependent and independent variables.  
For example, a firm’s decision to export may have causality impact on productivity.  In this case, 
the system GMM estimator would be our appropriate estimation technique. 
In addition to improvements in the estimation techniques, in Chapters two and three, we could 
examine the effect of establishment locations from different investment promotion zones on a 
firm’s decision to export if we are able identify whether foreign-owned firms in the sample 
actually receive privileges from BOI or not.  In terms of Chapter four, it would be useful to 
break down foreign ownership into country of origin to see whether there is a difference 
between the behaviour of firms from developing and developed countries.  The longer time 
period of the data allows us to examine the behaviour of firms in response to a shock to see 
whether product adjustment occurs at the intensive or extensive margin.  Finally in Chapter five, 
we can further separately investigate spillover effects of each individual industry to distinguish 
the difference of the effects among industries. Other channels of possible spillovers such as 
technology and R&D are also interesting to examine. Rather than focusing on spillovers from 
FDI, we can look at the spillovers from exporting as well. 
278 
 
Bibliography 
Aitken, B. J., Hanson, H. G. and Harrison, A. E. (1997), “Spillovers, Foreign Investment and 
Export Behavior”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 103-132. 
Aitken, B. J. and Harrison, A. E. (1999), “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 605-618. 
Allanson, P. and Montagna, C. (2005), “Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure: An 
Explorative Application to the Product Life Cycle”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
Vol. 23, No. 7-8, pp. 587-597. 
Alvarez, R. (2007), “Explaining Export Success: Firm Characteristics and Spillover Effects”, 
World Development, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 377-393. 
Alvarez, R. and López, R. A. (2005), “Exporting and Performance: Evidence from Chilean 
Plants”, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 1384-1400. 
Alvarez, R. and López, R. (2008), “Is Exporting a Source of Productivity Spillovers?”, Review of 
World Economics, Vol. 144, No. 4, pp. 723-749. 
Alyson, C. M. (2006), “Export Spillovers to Chinese Firms: Evidence from Provincial Data”, 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 127-149. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 
2, pp. 277-297. 
Arnold, J. M. and Hussinger, K. (2005), “Export Behavior and Firm Productivity in German 
Manufacturing: A Firm-Level Analysis”, Review of World Economics, Vol. 141, No. 2, pp. 119-243. 
Aw, B. Y., Chung, S. and Roberts, M. J. (2000), “Productivity and Turnover in the Export 
Market: Micro-level Evidence from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China)”, The World 
Economy, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 65-90. 
Aw, B. Y., Roberts, M. J. and Winston, T. (2007), “Export Market Participation, Investment in 
R&D and Worker Training, and the Evolution of Firm Productivity”, World Economy, Vol. 30, 
No. 1, pp. 83-104.  
Baldwin, R. E. (1988), “Hysteresis in Import Prices: The Beachhead Effect”, American Economics 
Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 773-785. 
Baldwin, R. E. (1989), “Sunk-Cost Hysteresis”, NBER Working Paper No. 2911.  
Baldwin, J. and Gu, W. (2005), “The Impact of Trade on Plant Scale, Production-Run Length 
and Diversification”, Statistics Canada, mimeo. 
279 
 
Baldwin, R. E. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2001), “Multiproduct Multinationals and Reciprocal FDI 
Dumping”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 429-448. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd ed, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd. 
Bank of Thailand (2006), “Thailand’s Economic and Monetary Conditions in 2005”, Annual 
Report. 
Barrios, S., Görg, H. and Strobl, E. (2003), “Explaining Firms’ Export Behaviour: R&D, 
Spillovers and the Destination Market”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65, No. 4, 
pp. 475-496. 
Barrios, S. and Strobl, E. (2002), “Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity Spillovers: 
Evidence from the Spanish Experience”, Review of World Economics, Vol. 138, No. 3, pp. 459-481. 
Baum, C. F. (2006), An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata, Texas: Stata Press 
Publication.  
Berger, P. G. and Ofek, E. (1995), “Diversification Effect on Firm Value”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 39-65. 
Bergsman, J. and Shen, X. (1996), “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries”, Journal 
of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 343-348. 
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B. and Kortum, S. (2003), “Plants and Productivity in 
International Trade”, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, pp. 1268-1290. 
Bernard, A. B. and Jensen, J. B. (1999), “Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect or 
Both?”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 1-25. 
Bernard, A. B. and Jensen, J. B. (2004), “Why Some Firms Export”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 561-569.  
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B. and Schott, P. K. (2005), “Importers, Exporters, and Multinationals: 
A Portrait of Firms in the U.S. that Trade Goods”, NBER Working Paper No. 11404. 
Bernard, A. B., Redding, S. J. and Schott, P. K. (2006a), “Multi-product Firms and Product 
Switching”, NBER Working Paper No. 12293. 
Bernard, A. B., Redding, S. J. and Schott, P. K. (2006b), “Multi-Product Firms and Trade 
Liberalization”, NBER Working Paper No. 12782.  
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., Redding, S. J. and Schott, P. K. (2007a), “Firms in International 
Trade”, NBER Working Paper No. 13054.  
Bernard, A. B., Redding, S. J. and Schott, P. K. (2007b), “Comparative Advantage and 
Heterogeneous Firms”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 31-66. 
280 
 
Bernard, A. B. and Wagner, J. (1997), “Exports and Success in German Manufacturing”, Review 
of World Economics, Vol. 133, No. 1, pp. 134-157. 
Bernard, A. B. and Wagner, J. (2001), “Export Entry and Exit by German Firms”, Review of 
World Economics, Vol. 137, No. 1, pp. 105-123. 
Bhaopichitr, K. (1997), “Thailand’s Road to Economic Crisis”, The Nation (Bangkok), December. 
Bitzer, J., Geishecker, I. and Görg, H. (2008), “Productivity Spillovers through Vertical 
Linkages: Evidence from 17 OECD Countries”, Economics Letters, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 328-331. 
Blalock, G. and Gertler, P. J. (2004), “Learning from Exporting Revisited in a Less Developed 
Setting”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 75, No. 2 , pp. 397-416. 
Blalock, G. and Gertler, P. J. (2008), “Welfare Gains from Foreign Direct Investment through 
Technology Transfer to Local Suppliers”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 
402-421. 
Blalock, G. and Roy, S. (2007), “A Firm-level Examination of the Exports Puzzle: Why East 
Asian Exports Didn’t Increase After the 1997-1998 Financial Crisis”, World Economy, Vol. 30,  
No. 1, pp. 39-59.  
Blomström, M. (1986), Foreign Investment and Productivity Efficiency: The Case of Mexico, 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 97-112.  
Blomström, M. and Kokko, A. (1997), “How Foreign Direct Investment Affects Host 
Countries”, World Bank Working Paper No. 1745. 
Blomström, M. and Kokko, A. (1998), “Multinational Corporations and Spillovers”, Journal of 
Economic Surveys, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 247-277. 
Blomström, M., Kokko, A. and Mario, A. (2000), Foreign Direct Investment: Firm and Host Country 
Strategies, London: Palgrave Macmillan Press.  
Blomström, M. and Persson, H. (1983), “Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency in an 
Underdeveloped Economy: Evidence from the Mexican Manufacturing Industry”, World 
Development, Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. 493-501. 
Blomström, M. and Sjöholm, F. (1999), “Technology Transfer and Spillovers: Does Local 
Participation with Multinationals Matter?”, European Economic Review, Vol. 43, No. 4-6, pp. 915-
923. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. R. (1998), “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic 
Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 115-143. 
Bond, S., Elston, J. A., Mairesse, J. and Mulkay, B. (2003), “Financial Factors and Investment in 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A Comparison Using Company Panel 
Data”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp. 153-165. 
Bond, S. and Meghir, C. (1994), “Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm’s Financial Policy”, 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 197-222. 
281 
 
Brambilla, I. (2006), “Multinationals, Technology, and the Introduction of Varieties of Goods, 
NBER Working Paper No. 12217. 
Brander, J. A. and Eaton, J. (1984), “Product Line Rivalry”, American Economic Review, Vol. 74, 
No. 3, pp. 323-334. 
Buettner, T. (2003), “R&D and the Dynamics of Productivity” London School of Economics, 
mimeo. 
Bugmamelli, M. and Infante, L. (2003), “Sunk Costs of Exports, Bank of Italy Discussion Paper No. 
469.   
Bwalya, S. M. (2006), “Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Spillovers: Evidence form 
Panel Data Analysis of Manufacturing Firms in Zambia”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 81, 
No. 2, pp. 514-526. 
Cabral, L. M. B. and Ross, T. W. (2008), “Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?”, Journal of 
Economics Management Strategy, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 97-112. 
Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (1998), Regression Analysis of Count Data, Econometric Society 
Monograph, New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Campa, J. M. (2004), “Exchange Rates and Trade: How Important is Hysteresis in Trade?”, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 527-548.  
Campa, J. M. and Shaver, J. M. (2002), “Exporting and Capital Investment: on the Strategic 
Behavior of Exporters”, CIFF Research Paper No. 469, Centro Internacional de Investigación 
Financiera.  
Carpenter, R. E., Fazzari, S. M., Petersen, B. C., Kashyap, A. K. and Friedman, B. M. (1994), 
“Inventory Investment, Internal-Finance Fluctuations, and the Business Cycle”, Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, Vol. 1994, No. 2, pp. 75-138. 
Caves, R. E. (1974), “Multinational Firms, Competition, and Productivity in Host-country 
Market”, Economica, Vol. 41, No. 162, pp. 176-193. 
Caves, R. E. (1981), “Intra-Industry Trade and Market Structure in the Industrial Countries”, 
Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 203-233. 
Caves, R. E. (1996), Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Chaipravat, O. (2003), “Thailand’s Positioning in a New Global Economic Paradigm”, The 
Fiscal Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Thailand.  
Chaney, T. (2005), “Liquidity Constrained Exporters”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
mimeo. 
282 
 
Clerides, S. K., Lach, S. and Tybout, J. R. (1998), “Is Learning by Exporting Important? Micro-
Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
113, No. 3, pp. 903-947. 
Delgado, M. A., Fariñas, J. and Ruano, S. (2002), “Firm Productivity and Export Markets: A 
Non-parametric Approach”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 397-422. 
Diao, X., Rattsø, J. and Stokke, H. E. (2005), “International spillovers, productivity growth and 
openness in Thailand: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis”, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 76, No.2. pp. 429-450.  
Dixit, A. (1989a), “Entry and Exit Decisions Under Uncertainty”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
97, No. 3, pp. 620-638. 
Dixit, A. (1989b), “Hysteresis, Import Penetration, and Exchange Rate Pass-Through”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 205-228. 
Driffield, N. (2001), “The Impact on Domestic Productivity of Inward Investment in the UK”, 
Manchester School, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 103-119. 
Driffield, N., Munday, M. and Roberts, A. (2002), “Foreign Direct Investment, Transactions 
Linkages and the Performance of the Domestic Sector”, International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 335-351. 
Eaton, J., Eslava, M., Kugler, M. and Tybout, J. (2007), “Export Dynamics in Colombia: Firm-
Level Evidence”, NBER Working Paper No. 13531.  
Eaton, J., Kortum, S. and Kramarz, F. (2004), “Dissecting Trade: Firms, Industries, and Export 
Destinations”, American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 150-154. 
Eckel, C. and Neary, P. J. (2006), “Multi-Product Firms and Flexible Manufacturing in the 
Global Economy”, Economic Series Working Papers No. 292, Department of Economics, 
University of Oxford. 
Edward, S. (1993), “Openness, Trade Liberalisation and Growth in Developing Countries”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 1358-1393. 
Edward, S. (1998), “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?”, Economic 
Journal, Vol. 108, No. 447, pp. 383-398. 
Fariñas, J. and Martín-Marcos, A. (2007), “Exporting and Economic Performance: Firm-level 
Evidence of Spanish Manufacturing”, World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 618-646.  
Falvey, R. (1981), “Commercial Policy and Intra-Industry Trade”, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 495-511. 
Falvey, R. and Kierzkowski, H. (1987), “Product Quality, Intra-Industry Trade and (Im)Perfect 
Competition”, in H. Kierzkowski (ed.), Protection and Competition in International Trade, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, pp. 143-161. 
283 
 
Fazzari, S. M. and Petersen, B. C. (1993), “Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New 
Evidence on Financing Constraints”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 328-342.  
Feenstra, R. and Ma, H. (2007), “Optimal Choice of Product Scope for Multiproduct Firms 
under Monopolistic Competition”, NBER Working Paper No. 13703. 
Flam, H. and Helpman, R. (1987), “Vertical Product Differentiation and North-South Trade”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 5, pp. 810-822. 
Garcia-Vaga, M. and Guariglia, A. (2007), “Volatility, Financial Constraints and Trade”, GEP 
Research Paper 2007/33, Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, 
University of Nottingham.  
Girma, S. (2005), “Absorptive Capacity and Productivity Spillovers from FDI: A Threshold 
Regression Analysis”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 281-306. 
Girma, S., Greenaway, D. and Kneller, R. (2004), “Does Exporting Increase Productivity? A 
Microeconometric Analysis of Matched Firms”, Review of International Economics, Vol. 12, No. 5, 
pp. 855-866. 
Girma, S., Greenaway, D. and Wakelin, K. (2001), “Who Benefit from Foreign Direct 
Investment in the UK?”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 119-133. 
Girma, S., Görg, H. and Pisu, M. (2008), “Exporting Linkages and Productivity Spillovers from 
Foreign Direct Investment”, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 320-340.  
Girma, S., Kneller, R. and Pisu, M. (2007), “Do Exporters Have Anything to Learn From 
Foreign Multinationals”, European Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 981-998. 
Girma, S. and Wakelin, K. (2002), “Are There Regional Spillovers from FDI in the UK?”, in D. 
Greenaway, R. Upward and K. Wakelin (eds.), Trade, Investment, Migration and Labour Market, 
Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.  
Globerman, S. (1979), “Foreign Direct Investment and ‘Spillover’ Efficiency Benefits in 
Canadian Manufacturing Industries”, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 42-56.  
Goldberg, P. K., Khandelwal, A., Pavcnik, N. and Topalova, P. (2008), “Multi-Product Firms 
and Product Turnover in the Developing World: Evidence from India”, NBER Working Paper 
No. 14127. 
Görg, H. and Greenaway, D. (2004), “Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really 
Benefit from Foreign Investment?”, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 171-197. 
Görg, H. and Strobl, E. (2001), “Multinational Companies and Productivity Spillovers: A Meta-
Analysis”, Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 475, pp. F723-F739. 
Görg, H. and Strobl, E. (2005), “Spillovers from Foreign Firms through Worker Mobility: An 
Empirical Investigation”, Scandinavia Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 4, pp. 693-709. 
284 
 
Greenaway, D., Guariglia, A., and Kneller, R. (2007), “Financial Factors and Exporting 
Decisions”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 377-395. 
Greenaway, D., Gullstrand, J. and Kneller, R. (2005), “Exporting Many Not Always Boost Firm 
Productivity”, Review of World Economics, Vol. 141, No. 4, pp. 561-582. 
Greenaway, D. and Kneller, R. (2004), “Exporting and Productivity in the United Kingdom”, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 358-371.  
Greenaway, D. and Kneller, R. (2007), “Firm Heterogeneity, Exporting and Foreign Direct 
Investment”, Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 517, pp. F134-F161. 
Greenaway, D., Sousa, N. and Wakelin, K. (2004), “Do Domestic Firms Learn to Export from 
Multinationals”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 1027-1043. 
Grubel, H. G. (1967), “Intra-Industry Specialization and the Pattern of Trade”, Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 374-388. 
Guariglia, A. (1999), “The Effects of Financial Constraints on Inventory Investment: Evidence 
form a Panel of UK Firms”, Economica, Vol. 66, No. 261, pp.43-62. 
Guariglia, A. and Mateut, S. (2005), “Inventory Investment, Global Engagement, and Financial 
Constraints in the UK: Evidence from MicroData”, GEP Research Paper 2005/23, Leverhulme 
Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, University of Nottingham.  
Gujarati, D. N. (1995), Basic Econometrics, 3rd ed, Singapore: McGraw-Hill. 
Haddad, M. and Harrison, A. (1993), “Are There Positive Spillovers from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Panel Data for Morocco”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 42, 
No. 1, pp. 51-74. 
Hallak, J. C. (2006), “Product Quality and the Direction of Trade”, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 238-265. 
Hallak, J. C. and Schott, P. K. (2008), “Estimating Cross-Country Differences in Product 
Quality”, NBER Working Paper No. 13807. 
Hallward-Driemeier, M., Iarossi, G. and Sokoloff, K. L. (2002), “Export and Manufacturing 
Productivity in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis with Firm-Level Data”, NBER Working Paper 
No. 8894. 
Harris, R. and Robinson, C. (2004), “Productivity Impacts and Spillovers from Foreign 
Ownership in the United Kingdom”, National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 187, No. 1, pp. 58-
75.  
Harrison, A. E. and McMillan, M. S. (2003), “Does Direct Foreign Investment Affect Domestic 
Credit Constraints?”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 73-100. 
Hausman, J. A. (1978), “Specification Tests in Econometrics”, Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 6, pp. 
1251-1271.  
285 
 
Heckman, J. J. (1979), “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Econometrica, Vol. 47, 
No. 1, pp. 153-161. 
Helpman, E. (1981), “International Trade in the Presence of Product Differentiation, 
Economies of Scale, and Monopolistic Competition: A Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin 
Approach”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 305-340. 
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. (1985), Market Structure and Foreign Trade: Increasing Returns, 
Imperfect Competition and the International Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. J. and Yeaple, S. R. (2004), “Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous 
Firms”, American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 300-316. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press.  
Hopenhayan, H. (1992), “Entry, Exit and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 5, pp. 1127-1150. 
Hubbard, R. G. (1998), “Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 193-225. 
Hummels, D. and Klenow, P. J. (2005), “The Variety and Quality of a Nation’s Exports”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 704-723. 
Iacovone, L. and Javorcik, B. S. (2008), “Multi-Product Exporters: Diversification and Micro-
Level Dynamics”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4723. 
Javorcik, B. S. (2004), “Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic 
Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages”, American Economic Review, Vol. 94, 
No. 3, pp. 605-627. 
Javorcik, B. S. and Spatareanu, M. (2008), “To Share or Not to Share: Does Local Participation 
Matter for Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 85, 
No. 1-2, pp. 194-217. 
Johnson, J. P. and Myatt, D. P. (2003), “Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting Brands and 
Product Line Pruning”, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 748-774.  
Kashyap, A. K, Lamont, O. A. and Stein, J. C. (1994), “Credit Conditions and the Cyclical 
Behavior of Inventories”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 3, pp. 565-592. 
Kimura, F. and Kiyota, K. (2006), “Exports, FDI, and Productivity: Dynamic Evidence from 
Japanese Firms”, Review of World Economics, Vol. 142, No. 4, pp. 695-719. 
Kneller, R. and Pisu, M. (2004), “Export-Oriented FDI in the UK”, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 424-439. 
286 
 
Kneller, R. and Pisu, M. (2007), “Industrial Linkages and Export Spillovers from FDI”, The 
World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 105-134.  
Kohpaiboon, A. (2006), “Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Spillovers: A Cross-
Industry Analysis of Thai Manufacturing”, World Development, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 541-556. 
Kokko, A. (1994), “Technology, Market Characteristics, and Spillovers”, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 279-293. 
Kokko, A. (1996), “Productivity Spillovers from Competition between Local Firms and Foreign 
Affiliates”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 517-530. 
Kokko, A., Zejan, M. and Tansini, R. (2001), “Trade Regimes and Spillover Effects of FDI: 
Evidence from Uruguay”, Review of World Economics, Vol. 137, No. 1, pp. 124-149. 
Konings, J., Rizov, M. and Vandenbussche, H. (2003), “Investment and Financial Constraints in 
Transition Economies: Micro Evidence from Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Romania”, Economics Letters, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 253-258. 
Krongkaew, M. (1999), “Capital Flows and Economic Crisis in Thailand”, The Developing 
Economies, Vol. 37, No.4, pp. 395-416. 
Krugman, P. (1989), Exchange Rate Instability, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Krugman, P. (1980), “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 5, pp. 950-959. 
Kugler, M. (2006), “Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment Within or Between Industries?”, 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 444-477. 
Lall, S. and Narula, R. (2004), “FDI and its Role in Economic Development: Do We Need a 
New Agenda”, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 447-464. 
Lang, L. and Stulz, R. (1994), “Tobin’s Q Diversification, and Firm Performance”, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 6. pp. 1248-1280. 
Levinsohn, J. and Petrin, A. (2003), “Estimation Production Functions Using Inputs to Control 
for Unobservables”, Review of Economic Studies, Vo. 70, No. 2, pp. 317-341. 
Linder, S. (1961), An Essay on Trade and Transformation, Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 
Lipsey, R. E. (2002), “Home and Host Country Effects of FDI”, NBER Working Paper No. 
9293. 
Lipsey, R. E. and Sjöholm, F. (2005), “Host Country Impacts of Inward FDI: Why Such 
Different Answers?, in M. Blomström, E. Graham and T. Moran (eds.), The Impact of Foreign 
Direct Investment on Development, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.  
287 
 
Liu, X., Siler, P., Wang, C. and Wei, Y. (2000), “Productivity Spillovers from Foreign Direct 
Investments: Evidence from UK Industry Level Panel Data”, Journal of International Business 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 407-425. 
Long, J. S. (1997), Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (Advanced 
Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences Series 7), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
López, R. A. (2004), “Self-Selection into the Export Markets: A Conscious Decision?”, 
Department of Economics, Indiana University,  mimeo. 
López, R. A. (2005), “Trade and Growth: Reconciling the Macroeconomic and Microeconomic 
Evidence”, Journal of Economic Survey, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 623-648. 
Marinov, R., Rocha, N. and DiNino, V. (2008), “Trade Liberalization and New Exporters’ Size: 
A Test of the Heterogeneous Firm Model”, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol. 8, 
No.1 (Topics), Article 10. 
Melitz, M. J. (2003), “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 6, pp. 1695-1725.  
Melitz, M. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2005), “Market Size, Trade and Productivity”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 11373. 
Nocke, V. and Yeaple, S. (2006), “Globalization and Endogenous Firm Scope”, NBER Working 
Paper No. 12322. 
Office of Industrial Economics (2001), “Annual Report on Industry Economics Outlook: The 
2001 Manufacturing Industry Survey”, Ministry of Industry, Bangkok, Thailand (in Thai). 
Office of Industrial Economics (2004), “Annual Report on Industry Economics Outlook: The 
2004 Manufacturing Industry Survey”, Ministry of Industry, Bangkok, Thailand (in Thai). 
Olley, G. S. and Pakes, A. (1996), “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications 
Equipment Industry”, Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 6, pp. 1263-1297. 
Panzar, J. C. and Willing, R. D. (1977), “Economies of Scale in Multi-Output Production”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 481-493.  
Petrin, A., Poi, B. P. and Levinsohn, J. (2004), “Production Function Estimation in Stata using 
Inputs to Control for Unobservables”, Stata Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 113-123. 
Roberts, M. J. and Tybout, J. R. (1997), “The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical 
Model of Entry with Sunk Costs”, American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 4, pp. 545-564. 
Rodríguez-Clare, A. (1996), “Multinationals, Linkages, and Economic Development”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 4, pp. 852-873. 
Roper, S. and Love, J. H. (2002), “Innovation and Export Performance: Evidence from the UK 
and German Manufacturing Plants”, Research Policy, Vol. 31, No. 7, pp. 1087-1102. 
288 
 
Ruane, F. and Sutherland, J. (2005), Foreign Direct Investment and Export Spillovers: How Do 
Export Platforms Fare?” Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS) Discussion Paper No. 58.  
Sjöholm, F. (1999a), “Technology Gap, Competition and Spillovers from Direct Foreign 
Investment: Evidence from Establishment Data”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, 
pp. 53-73. 
Sjöholm, F. (1999b), “Productivity Growth in Indonesia: The Role of Regional Characteristics 
and Direct Foreign Investment”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 
559-584. 
Sjöholm, F. (2003), “Which Indonesian Firms Export? The Importance of Foreign Networks”, 
Papers in Regional Science, Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 333-350. 
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1987), “Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure”, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 131-146.  
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1990), “Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure”, RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 45-62. 
Thomsen, S. (1999), “Southeast Asia: The Role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in 
Development”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 1/1999. 
Tomohara, A. and Yokota, K. (2007), “Industry Characteristics and FDI Induced Technology 
Spillovers”, The International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development Working Paper No. 16. 
Tybout, J. R. (2003), “Plant and Firm Level Evidence on ‘New’ Trade Theories”, in E. K. Choi 
and J. Harrigan (eds.), Handbook of International Trade, Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. 
Van Biesebroeck, J. (2005), “Exporting Raises Productivity in Sub-Saharan African 
Manufacturing Firms”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 373-391. 
Verbeek, M. (2004), A Guide to Modern Econometrics, 2nd ed., Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.  
Vermeulen, P. (2002), “Business Fixed Investment: Evidence of a Financial Accelerator in 
Europe”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 213-231. 
Wagner, J. (2007), “Exports and Productivity: A Survey of the Evidence from Firm-level Data”, 
World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 60-82. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 2nd ed, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
World Bank (1993), “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy”, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Yeaple, S. R. (2005), “A Simple Model of Firm Heterogeneity, International Trade, and Wages”, 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 1-20. 
